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ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS
GORDON BUTLER

∗

A good man leaves an inheritance for his children’s children.1

ABSTRACT
The next forty years of economic life will be dominated by one underlying
theme: dealing with the retirement income security of a growing, aging and longerlived global population. This is a “can’t run, can’t hide” problem that will affect the
lives of almost every human being on the planet . . . Whether you are light in your
pension account, whether you have more money than Croesus, whether you live in
the well-funded Netherlands, or whether you are a put-upon unambitious young male
in Japan who sees no future for himself, you cannot escape this problem.2
Before you read very far you will realize that looming Baby-Boomer retirements
are a ticking time bomb that threatens even those who have saved prudently for most
of their lives. This is because many millions of others will enter retirement with
virtually no private savings. The second group, which is far larger than the first, will
face unmet needs that governments will find politically impossible to ignore. And to
meet those needs, we will need lots of additional tax revenue, which can only come
from those in a position to provide it. As Willie Sutton replied when asked why he
robbed banks, “that’s where the money is.”3
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1

Proverbs 13:22.

2
RICHARD A. MARIN, GLOBAL PENSION CRISIS: UNFUNDED LIABILITIES AND HOW WE
CAN FILL THE GAP 43 (2013). The abstract of a recent article about the pension system in
Australia begins: “Dealing with the fiscal impacts of Australia’s ageing population is
potentially the most important issue for the next 30 years. The majority of the countries in the
developed world are facing an ageing population due to sustained low fertility and increased
life expectancy.” Rhys Cormick & John McLaren, The current retirement system in Australia
needs to be more attuned to a mobile international workforce: A case for reform, 29
AUSTRALIAN TAX F. 493 (2014).
3

Robert H. Frank, Foreword to MARIN, supra note 2, at ix.
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INTRODUCTION
On the eve of President George W. Bush’s inauguration in January 2001 the
world was at peace and the federal deficit was predicted to produce a $5.6 trillion
surplus over the next ten years. Indeed, Chairman Alan Greenspan of the Federal
Reserve Board was fretting about the problems that would be caused if the national
debt were paid off.4 At that time, total federal debt was $5.6 trillion, and debt held by
the public was $3.4 trillion. In 2009, President Obama found the federal debt nearly
doubled at $10.0 trillion and debt held by the public at $5.8 trillion. In 2017, when
the next President takes office, the federal debt is projected at $20.3 trillion with debt
held by the public at $14.9 trillion. Overall federal debt will have grown by $14.7
trillion, and the debt held by the public will have grown by $11.5 trillion in the first
sixteen years of the twenty-first century.5
The next President’s most optimistic observation may be that the United States
has survived sixteen years of fiscally irresponsible and excessive spending, wasteful
and interminable wars, failed projects, and the inability to take modest steps to solve
the nation’s long-term deficit problem handicapping the nation with $17 trillion of
debt. However, the next President may find solace from an unexpected source. The
discovery of energy resources could tip the balance toward national solvency and
reduce the cost of manufacturing in the United States provided government
regulations do not hinder its development or use the new wealth for new programs,
more wars, and/or for maintaining the wasteful and inefficient programs.6 A further
reason to be optimistic is the reassertion of the United States’ historic abhorrence of
debt.7
Retirement security is viewed as a three-legged stool in which the first leg is
Social Security, the second, employer-sponsored pensions, and the third is personal
savings.8 Medicare is sometimes viewed as a fourth leg, and a “bridge job” is
4

C. EUGENE STEUERLE, DEAD MEN RULING: HOW
RESCUE OUR FUTURE 63 (2014).

TO

RESTORE FISCAL FREEDOM

AND

5
Historical Tables: Federal Debt at the End of Year 1940-2017, OFFICE MGMT. &
BUDGET, at tbl.7.1, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals (last visited Apr. 24,
2016) (If the projections are correct, the average annual deficit over sixteen years was slightly
over $700 billion per year.).
6
See, e.g., Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Inventives to Promote Sustainable
Construction and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More Stable Land
Use Policy Initiatives, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 731, 736-37 (2008).
7

It has been a part of the American dream that our children would have a better world
than we inherited. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
8
NANCY J. ALTMAN & ERIC R. KINGSON, SOCIAL SECURITY WORKS!: WHY SOCIAL
SECURITY ISN’T GOING BROKE AND HOW EXPANDING IT WILL HELP US ALL 58-59 (2015).
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sometimes referred to as a fifth leg.9 Although a three-legged stool is inherently
unstable, when any one of the legs are weakened the entire stool is in danger of
collapsing. As a nation we find ourselves in an unstable situation due to our
unwillingness to change the system. To use a children’s fairy tale, everyone has
become immune to the warnings of fiscal demise by modern day “Chicken Littles.”
Providing for the pension and health care obligations, needs, and expectations of
the elderly is threatening the economies of cities, states, and nations, as well as
private businesses and individuals. Governments have not only been unable to
adequately address these growing obligations, but have created new ones that expand
government in such a way that all major life decisions are dominated by
governmental bureaucracy and economic growth necessary to accommodate these
obligations has been stunted.
America needs forward-thinking leaders who see into the second half of the
twenty-first century and move the United States into a position of financial strength
and solvency with personal responsibility and independence. Sylvester J. Schieber
has noted the dilemma young people face:
It looks like most of our children can just forget about a monthly
employer pension. Many of the private pensions still standing are closed
to new entrants, and the phenomenon has even spread to public pensions.
Policy mavens in Washington are now suggesting that we need to raise
the payroll tax cap and cut Social Security benefits. At the state and local
level, public pension costs are edging out funding for educating our
children and replacing crumbling infrastructure, in some cases inflicting
near paralysis on other normal governmental functions . . . .10
This Article is a continuation of two previously published articles proposing a
one-fund account to simplify retirement planning for individuals.11 First, this Article
outlines the parameters of the fiscal problem America faces and how its major
entitlement program, Social Security, fits into that problem. This Article then
focuses on the justifications given for taking twelve percent of an individual’s
lifetime earnings and eliminating their investment choices. The next section
examines the failure of cities, states, and countries, as well as companies, in
fulfilling their defined benefit pension funding obligations. Then Social Security and
its faults are discussed followed by some possible solutions and alternative ways to
provide benefits that incorporate decisions made by the taxpayer whose funds are
being taken. The final section discusses how the One Fund Solution meets many, if
not all, of the parameters for a successful retirement plan.
In reviewing the state of retirement security, Sylvester J. Schieber’s comments
that the “so-called” golden age of retirement in the 1970s may not have been so
golden after all but merely reflected a desire that should be kept in mind:
9

SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER, THE PREDICTABLE SURPRISE:
RETIREMENT SYSTEM 4 (2012).
10

THE

UNRAVELING

OF THE

U.S.

Id. at 6-7.

11

See Gordon T. Butler, American Paternalism and the One Fund Solution, 9 WYO. L.
REV. 485 (2009) [hereinafter Butler, American Paternalism]; Gordon T. Butler, The One Fund
Solution: “It’s My Money and I Need It Now!,” 11 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 262 (2011)
[hereinafter Butler, It’s My Money].
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I do not believe that we should abandon the goal of a comfortable
retirement supported by the combined efforts of government, employers,
and ourselves. Retirement and our various retirement programs arose in
response to economic and business necessities, as well as to a personal
desire for a well-deserved rest after a lifetime of labor. None of those has
gone away. We just have to figure out how to make our programs serve
our interests instead of becoming slaves to them.12
Finally, a tradition needing no authority for its support is the great American
tradition that tells us we should leave the next generation a world that is better off
than the one we inherited.13
I. RETIREMENT’S THREE-LEGGED STOOL—SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WEAKENED FIRST
LEG
Social Security stands for a simple proposition: no matter how life works out,
whether prosperity or ruin, no one will be left penniless in old age or because of
disability or being orphaned.14
Social Security is by far the most popular federal government program, the best
funded federal program, and the strongest remaining piece of our badly frayed
system of social benefits. It is also under relentless attack by those who would kill
it.15
A. Social Security Benefits
Social Security retirement benefits are received in the form of a lifetime annuity
that begins at full retirement age that is sixty-five for those born before 1938 and
gradually increases to sixty-seven for those born after 1960. Workers qualify for
Social Security benefits when they have forty full quarters of covered work in the
system,16 and have the option of taking a reduced benefit at age sixty-two or an
enhanced benefit by delaying the start of benefits beyond normal retirement age up
to age seventy, at which time benefits must start.17 A beneficiary taking benefits
prior to normal retirement age and earning more than a prescribed amount will have
his or her benefit reduced by a percentage of earned income above that prescribed
amount.
12

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at xvii-xviii.

13

Id. at xviii.

14

David Cay Johnson, Foreword to ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at xiii.

15

Id. The authors describe Social Security as the largest children’s program and largest
disability program providing income security for millions of families. Id. at 16.
16

On this “quarter system” one credit is received for each quarter worked if the person
earned $1,200 (in 2014) during the quarter. Survivors Planner: Planning for Survivors, SOC.
SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/survivorplan/onyourown.htm (last visited Apr. 24,
2016) [hereinafter Planning for Survivors]. Survivor and disability benefits for younger
workers and their families can be paid if he earned a minimum of six credits in the three years
prior to his death. Id.
17

The adjustment made to the benefit based on when the individual retires is “intended to
be actually fair, so that a person’s total lifetime benefits will have an approximately equal
value regardless of the age at which he or she begins collecting them.” ALTMAN & KINGSON,
supra note 8, at 3.
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The initial Social Security retirement benefit uses the worker’s “average indexed
monthly earnings” (AIME) over a thirty-five-year period,18 and the “primary
insurance amount” (PIA) to calculate the initial benefit by applying percentages to
defined increments of the AIME.19 The first increment (currently up to $816) is
multiplied by 90%, the amount in the next increment ($816 up to $4,917) is
multiplied by 32%, and the final increment up to the maximum AIME ($4,917 up to
$8,890) is multiplied by 15%.20 The result is a progressive formula providing a
greater overall percentage of AIME to lower income workers than higher income
workers.
The retirement benefit is perhaps the most important benefit because it provides
insurance against “bad labor market outcomes” that carry over into retirement.21 It
contains a redistribution scheme by providing low-wage workers with an “adequate
income” even when their working careers are unsuccessful.22 The retirement benefit
provides a retirement for those who are too short-sighted to provide for their own
retirement thereby providing an acceptable mandatory minimum standard living for
the elderly.23
The lifetime annuity also protects against the risk of outliving your retirement
income.24 In addition, it is unique in that once the initial benefit is determined it will
annually be adjusted based on increases in the cost-of-living index (COLA) to keep
pace with consumer prices and protect the retiree’s purchasing power.25
18

The Congressional Budget Office describes the impact of the initial benefit as follows:

For the purpose of calculating average earnings to determine the initial benefit, the
amounts earned in earlier years are converted to current-year earnings in the economy
as a whole. Because average national earnings are projected to grow faster than
inflation that indexation will cause average initial benefits to grow in real (inflationadjusted) terms and will keep the average replacement rate stable. (In later decades,
the replacement rate will be slightly lower for workers with average earnings who
claim benefits at age 65, mainly because of the scheduled increase in the full
retirement age.)
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS 2010, at 3 (2010). In other words,
“the procedure converts a worker’s past earnings to approximately average-wage-indexed
equivalent values near the time of his or her benefit eligibility.” THE BD. OF TRS. OF THE FED.
OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 2014 ANNUAL REPORT
109 (2014) [hereinafter THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT].
19

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 8-9.

20

Id. at 9.

21

See generally EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT
SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY (2015) (strongly supporting the function of government in
providing social insurance against such adverse effects).
22
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 120-21. This protection against a failure to provide sufficient
income outside Social Security may be due to causes outside an individual’s control but could
just as likely represent poor choices in spending patterns.
23

Id. at 121.

24

Id. at 122.

25

Id. at 121-22.
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Another critical element of the retirement benefit is that the spouse of a
beneficiary is entitled to a benefit at least equal to one-half the benefit of the primary
wage earner.26 The spouse is entitled to his or her own benefit if that benefit is
greater than one-half of the primary beneficiary’s benefit.27 When the primary wage
earner dies the surviving spouse takes the deceased spouses benefit if it is larger than
their own benefit.28
1. Disability and Survivor Benefits Under Social Security
In addition to retirement benefits, Social Security provides survivor and disability
benefits.29 Survivor insurance is built into the current Social Security system and is
funded by the Social Security taxes paid by the individual. Upon a beneficiary’s
death, benefits are paid to the surviving spouse, and in some cases a former spouse;30
children under age eighteen,31 and other dependents.32
The amount of any benefit is based on the decedent’s “insured status,”33 lifetime
earnings, disability status (if applicable), and the maximum amount of benefits he
26

Id. at 120.

27

Id. at 120-21.

28

As noted later in this Article, the non-working spouse’s receipt of a 50% benefit creates
a much larger return for those family units who are often higher income individuals. Some
people think of the spousal benefit as a means of offsetting effects of the progressive objective
of the benefit formula. Id. at 120-21.
29

M. L. Reig, The Unspoken Poor: Single Elderly Women Surviving in Rural America, 9
ELDER L.J. 257, 260 (2001).
30
Divorced widows or widowers may also be eligible. See Social Security Survivor
CAREGIVERS
LIBR.,
http://www.caregiverslibrary.org/caregiversBenefits,
NAT’L
resources/grp-money-matters/hsgrp-social-security/social-security-survivor-benefitsarticle.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2016); LEXIS TAX ADVISOR–FEDERAL TOPICAL § 6A:5.06
(discussing the applicability of state law to determine whether there was a state marriage,
common law marriage, or a deemed marriage). Furthermore, being a child of the deceased
worker does not automatically make the individual a qualified child.
31

Social Security is provided only to children under eighteen years old. ALTMAN &
KINGSON, supra note 8, at 120-121 and 214; Amy Foster, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY GUIDE
FOR BEGINNERS, 41 (2016). But see Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2029 (2012) (stating
children conceived after a parent’s death are not entitled to survivor benefits if state law
forbids it); LEXIS TAX ADVISOR, supra note 30 (“[A]n individual may be eligible for child’s
benefits if the individual is . . . (2) under age 19 and a full-time elementary or secondary
student; (3) 16 years or older but became disabled prior to reaching age 22.”).
32

See 22 C.F.R. § 19.11–1 (2106). The beneficiary’s age (spouse, child, or dependent)
also affects the benefits a person can receive. For example, a spouse under the age of
retirement will have their monthly benefit reduced based on a specified formula. “The formula
for spousal benefits, based on the number of months entitlement before full retirement age, is:
25/36 of 1% for each month of the 36 months reduction; and 5/12 of 1% of each month of
reduction in excess of 36 months.” LEXIS TAX ADVISOR, supra note 30, at § 6A:5.06[b]. In the
case of a qualified divorced spouse, the formula is very similar, but it has three additional
requirements. Id. at § 6A:5.06[c].
33

An individual can be “currently insured, fully insured, insured for disability, or
transitionally insured.” LEXIS TAX ADVISOR, supra note 30, at § 1N:8.06. A “currently
insured” person must have “quarter coverage,” by having a minimum level of earnings for six
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would have received if he were still living.34 Normally a beneficiary cannot receive
more benefits than the deceased would have during his life, but the maximum family
benefit is between 150 and 180% of the deceased’s full retirement age benefit.35
Survivor benefits, in the case of a wage earner’s premature death, rarely occurs (less
than .025%) and the progressive benefit structure has the effect of redistributing
wealth.36
Social Security also provides disability insurance that extends earnings protection
to people unable to support themselves by working.37 While the definition of
disability is stringent, people who qualify for disability often stay on disability until
they qualify for early retirement benefits under Social Security.38 Recently, there has
been criticism of the disability benefit in that many people used disability as a means
of extending their unemployment insurance. Although in need of considerable
revision, disability insurance protects against a moderate risk of 2%.39
Beyond the benefit for the individual at retirement, the spousal, dependent, and
disability benefits look like a game with innumerable twists and turns with various

calendar quarters out of the last thirteen quarters of his life. Meeting this requirement qualifies
for coverage but does not affect the benefit amount, which is limited. See Survivors Planner:
How
Much
Would
Your
Survivors
Receive?,
SOC.
SECURITY
ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/survivorplan/onyourown5.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2016) [hereinafter
Survivors
Receive];
Quarter
of
Coverage,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/oact/cola/QC.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2016) [hereinafter
Quarter of Coverage]. A person with “fully insured” status receives “virtually all of
retirement and death benefits of the deceased.” Reig, supra note 29. To be fully insured the
decedent must have one quarter of coverage for each year which has elapsed since “1950 (or,
after the year in which he or she became 21 if after 1950) and before the year he or she died or
(if earlier) the year in which she or he attained age 62.” Short-range Projects for the Social
Security
Program,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/as115/as115_VI_H.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).
34

Survivors Receive, supra note 33 (showing the amount a survivor may obtain based on
the relevant factors, and explaining the maximum benefits a qualified beneficiary may receive
cannot be greater than the amount the decedent would have received while he was living); see
also Survivors Planner: Survivors Benefits For Your Widow or Widower, SOC. SECURITY
ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/survivorplan/onyourown2.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2015)
[hereinafter Widow or Widower] (explaining the amount a spouse may obtain based on the
stated factors).
35

Planning for Survivors, supra note 16; see also 21 KIPLINGER’S RETIREMENT REPORT,
YOUR QUESTIONS ANSWERED: FAMILY MAXIMUM SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 14 (2014).
36

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 119.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 119-20.

39

Calculations similar to those for survivor benefits provide a progressive benefit
structure for disabled workers. The benefit for disabled workers is based on their wageindexed average earnings through the time of disability. Id. The disability benefit paid is
progressive such that the replacement rate (the ratio of benefits received to a worker’s past
earnings) is higher for people with lower average earnings that for people with higher
earnings. Id.
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winners and losers.40 For example, a sixty-two-year-old man with three children
under eighteen can take an early-reduced retirement benefit and his three children
can claim dependent benefits of an additional $1,800 per month.41 A married couple
could face up to 625 options for claiming benefits; divorced spouses also have
numerous options for claiming benefits based on a former spouse’s status.42
Notwithstanding numerous criticisms, Social Security is a valuable part of
retirement planning. One study found Social Security comprised one-third of the
assets of people between the ages of sixty three to sixty-seven in 2000; the remaining
two thirds were equally divided between employer pensions and retirement
savings.43
B. Social Security’s Long-Term Financial Problems
Social Security is the largest single federal program and is often referred to as the
most successful federal program.44 It provides benefits to retired workers, their
survivors and dependents, through Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), and to
people with disabilities, through Disability Insurance (DI).45 For people over the age
of sixty-five, the benefits are a major source of income, 50% or more of total income
for 67% of those families, and 90% or more of total income for almost a third of
such families.46
Social Security is funded through two primary sources of dedicated tax revenues:
payroll taxes and taxes on benefits. Approximately 97% of the revenues are from a
payroll tax of 12.4% levied on earnings and split evenly by workers and their

40

Social Security pitfalls and windfalls: Playing the game right can add more to your
monthly
check,
CONSUMER
REP.
(Feb.
12,
2015,
5:00
PM)
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2015/02/7-social-security-pitfalls-andwindfalls/index.htm.
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 125 (noting that the top and bottom 10% of wage earners
provided unique situations and were not included in the study and concluding, “[a]nyone who
contends that it is not a retirement program, albeit one with a number of unique features, is
ignoring the facts”).
44

STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 138. Marin, suggests that the Social Security program had
its origin, not in the great depression of the 1930s but “in the English Poor Laws enacted in
mother England in 1601 and brought over on the Mayflower in 1620 as part of the Puritan
Ethic and Anglo history of caring for the poor, aged, and indigent. MARIN, supra note 2, at 58.
This fervent sense of self-determination and independence that came with the Puritan Ethics
made this the exception in social policy, not the norm.” Id.
45

THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 1.

46

Id. at 2. The report notes that OASI accounts for 82% of the benefits and DI for 18%.
Id. AARP identifies the percentage of the population over sixty-five in each state that depends
on Social Security for at least 90% of their income. News From Your State, AARP BULL.,
June 2014, at 36(C). The range is between 14.5% (Alaska) and 32.7% (Tennessee). Id. Eleven
states in the Southeast (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, and WV) have between
27.2% and 32.7%, while nine states are below 20% (AK, CA, CT, HI, MD, NE, OR, WA, and
WY). Id.
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employers at 6.2% each.47 The tax applies to taxable earnings up to a maximum of
$117,000 in 2014, and up to $118,500 in 2015 pursuant to annual adjustments.48
Social Security taxable wages constitute approximately 83% of covered earnings
(i.e. wages and self-employment income).49 Approximately 3% of the revenues come
from taxes on Social Security benefits received by high-income beneficiaries.50 The
current 12.4% rate presents a stark contrast to the original 2% rate in the Social
Security Act in 1935.51
Two trust funds have been created to receive tax payments and distribute
payments to beneficiaries. One is for the OASI program, and the other one is for the
DI program, although they have often been described collectively as the “OASDI
trust funds.”52 Whenever tax revenues exceed expenditures, creating a surplus, the
excess funds are loaned to the federal government to fund general operations and are
considered a loan from the trust fund to the government, which will eventually be
repaid with interest credited to the trust fund on a regular basis.53
In 2013, payments into the OASDI trust funds, exclusive of interest, totaled
$752.8 billion while expenditures, benefits, railroad retirement financial exchange,
and administrative expense, totaled $822.9 billion.54 The $70.7 billion deficit was
covered by the $102.8 billion in interest credited to the trust fund so that the trust
fund grew by $32.1 billion to $2,764.4 billion.55
47

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 36. Noting that during the formative states in the
development of Social Security:
Everyone was convinced that a national program that did not include contributions
from workers and their employers would almost certainly have to include means
testing. Virtually all students of social insurance found means test demeaning and
beneficiaries of traditional welfare programs that included such testing were
commonly considered to be personal failure by the broad cross-section of society.
Id. The contributory nature of the system gave the beneficiaries a “right” to their benefit so
that they could say, “I have paid for my benefits.” Id. at 37. The failure to provide for one’s
retirement was viewed not as a personal failure, but as a failure of the industrial system.
48

THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18.

49

Id.

50

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 36.

51

The final provisions of the 1935 Social Security Act provided for a 1% tax on the first
$3,000 of income on both the employee and the employer. That Act scheduled 0.5% increases
in the payroll tax every three years until the rate reached 3% on each the employee and the
employer in 1949. Id. at 40. In subsequent debates leading the 1939 Amendments over
whether the system should be pre-funded or simply pay-as-you-go, the date of the scheduled
increase was gradually pushed back until 1950 while benefit increases were incorporated into
the system. Id. 56-57. These changes pushed the system toward pay-as-you-go and left it for
future generations to worry about the funding and left some people concerned over leaving the
public unawares of the ever-growing debt in excess of the acknowledged debt of the United
States. Id.
52

THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 136.

53

For 2013, the trust funds effective annual rate of interest was 3.8%. Id. at 7.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 22.
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Since 2010, tax revenues into the trust fund have been insufficient to fund
benefits so that payments into the fund from general tax revenues in the form of
interest on the trust fund assets were needed to make up the shortfall.56 These
payments, although built into the system, reversed the dynamic in the federal budget
in which excess Social Security revenues were used to decrease the deficit. The first
decrease in the trust fund occurred unexpectedly in 2015.57 Now repayment of those
revenues will increase the deficit. The amount needed to repay trust funds will grow
annually so that by 2033 the trust fund will be exhausted.
By 2035, the number of people over age sixty-five will have grown by 90%
while those between twenty and sixty-four will have grown by only 10%.58 In
addition, the life expectancy of the older generation is increasing. Reflecting these
changes, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the percentage of
gross domestic product (GDP) dedicated to paying benefits will grow from 4.8% in
2010 to 6.2% in 2035, as the Baby-Boomer generation moves through retirement,
and then decline over the next fifteen years to 5.95% in 2050.59
When making projections, the Trustees of the OASDI trust funds make certain
assumptions regarding demographic, economic, and programmatic criteria.
Recognizing that such assumptions are critical to any projection, the Trustees make
projections using a “low-cost,” “intermediate-cost,” and “high-cost” scenario.60
Unless otherwise indicated, the intermediate-cost scenario is presented because it
represents the Trustees’ best estimates of future experience.
The Trustees use several tests to evaluate the status of the system. One such test,
the Short-Range Actuarial Estimate, seeks to measure financial adequacy by looking
at the trust fund ratio over a ten-year period (e.g. 2014 through 2023).61 The trust
fund ratio is the projected trust fund reserves at the beginning of each period to the
projected program cost for that year. Maintaining a ratio of 100% is a good

56

Id. (Trust fund revenues, exclusive of interest, have been insufficient to pay benefits
since 2010.).
57

Jed Graham, Social Security Trust Fund Fell, First Time Since 1983, INV. BUS. DAILY
(Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.investors.com/politics/capital-hill/social-security-trust-fund-ends32-year-streak/.
58

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 4.

59

Id. After 2050, it is anticipated that the trajectory will resume its upward climb
reaching 6.3% in 2080. Id. Another common measure is the ratio of workers to beneficiary,
which fell below 3:1 in 2010 and will decline to 2.1:1 by 2035. THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT,
supra note 18, at 113-14 (indicating that the ratio was stable at 3.2 to 3.4 to 1 from 1974 until
2008 when this measure began to decline due to the economic recession and the beginning of
the demographic shift caused by the baby boomers).
60

THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 8 tbl.II.C1 (showing long-range values
of key assumptions for the 75-year projection period). Factors affecting the low-cost,
intermediate cost, and high-cost assumptions include, among others, fertility rates (children
per woman) are 2.3, 2.0, and 1.7, respectively; net immigration (in thousands) are 1,430,
1,125, and 830, respectively; average wage in covered employment from 2025 to 2088 are
5.16, 3.83, and 2.52, respectively; and Consumer Price Index (for 2020 and later) are 3.40,
2.70, and 2.0, respectively. Id.
61

Id. at 9.
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indication that the program can meet its obligations over the succeeding year.62
Based on these criteria, the asset reserves of the OASI trust fund and the combined
OASI and DI trust funds exceed the 100 % criteria over the ten-year period.
The DI trust fund individually has a ratio of 0.62% and, as of 2014, was
projected to be depleted in 2016.63 Thus, a challenge to the political powers to patch
or resolve the disability program will occur in the context of the 2016 presidential
election year.64 In anticipation of the disability trust fund’s depletion, the Obama
Administration initially proposed transferring $350 billion in Social Security
revenues into the DI trust fund over five years so it will be solvent until 2033,
thereby delaying reform for a generation. However, in the 2015 budget deal, a
Republican controlled Congress and a Democratic President temporarily avoided the
crisis by reallocating 0.57 percentage points of the Social Security tax to the DI Trust
from 2016-2018 without raising the total payroll tax.65 The current crisis is a result
of the expansion of the criteria in 1984, which ultimately doubled the percentage of
the working age population on disability. Once on disability, few people ever return
to active full-time work since qualifying entitles one up to $15,000 in cash and
$9,000 in Medicare benefits with the option to earn more than $13,000 without
losing benefits.66
62

Id.

63

Id. at 9. The DI trust fund is expected to be exhausted in 2016 and the OASI trust fund
in 2034. After the DI reserves are exhausted, the income would only support expenditures at a
level of 81% declining to 80% by 2088. In 1994, when the DI trust fund was nearly exhausted,
funds were redirected from the OASI trust fund to make up the difference. Id. at 23. Such
action, it is suggested, would likely delay much needed reforms to the DI program. Id.; see
also Lanhee J. Chen, A Capsizing Disability-Insurance Program, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/lanhee-j-chen-a-capsizing-disability-insurance-program1421802230 (predicting that Congress will take a short-term view in 2016 to shore-up the
system and suggesting ways to tighten up the criteria for disability and eliminate barriers for
workers to leave disability and return to work).
64
See Disabling a Budget Con, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/disabling-a-budget-con-1421367558 (noting that disability
income used to be a last-resort insurance and is now a “middle-age retirement”). In 1990, one
dollar in ten social security dollars went to disability but now it is one in five. Disability roles
doubled between 1990 and 2008 and spiked an additional twenty-one by 2012. A recent rule
change in Congress would prohibit moving money from one trust fund to the next and perhaps
force Congress to address the underlying problem and fix the eligibility requirements for
disability. A similar article that acknowledges the need and opportunity for reform in 2016
suggests any reform would take years before the benefit was realized and that Social Security
would likely have to be reformed at the same time but laments the fact that politicians will
likely do nothing. See Disability insurance, Not working, ECONOMIST (Jan. 24, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21640367-many-disabled-people-can-workwashington-prevents-them-ruinous-cost-not-working.
65
Kat Lucero & Stephen K. Cooper, Congress Passes 2-Year Federal Budget, 149 TAX
NOTES 642, 642 (2015) (the additional 0.57% increases raises the Disability program share to
2.27% from 1.8%). The two-year budget contained a revenue raiser in reducing the required
pension contribution rates. Id.
66
Andrew G. Biggs, Averting the Disability-Insurance Meltdown: The out-of-control
$150 billion program is in urgent need of reform, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2015, 6:19 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/andrew-g-biggs-averting-the-disability-insurance-meltdown1424733559.
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To assess the actuarial status of the system over the seventy-five-year time
period, the Trustees use three tests: (1) annual cash-flow measures, including income
rates, costs rates, and balances; (2) trust fund ratios; and (3) summary measures, such
as actuarial balances and open group unfunded obligations.67 These are expressed in
percentages of taxable payroll or GDP and in dollars. An additional indication of the
long-term status of the system is the infinite horizon values.68
According to the first measure, the annual cash-flow, under the intermediate
assumption, the combined OASDI trust fund remains positive until it is exhausted in
2032.69 After 2032 continuing income could only support expenditures at a level of
77% decreasing to 72% by 2088.70
According to the second measure, the trust fund ratios, the OASI, DI, and
combined OASDI all peaked in 2014 and are projected to be depleted in 2034, 2016,
and 2033 respectively.71
The third measure, referred to as the summary measures, is the actuarial balance,
which includes the beginning period asset reserves, all costs and income during the
period, and the cost of reaching the reserve objective at the end of the period. Thus,
the actuarial balance, or deficit if negative, is essentially, “the difference between the
present values of income and cost from 1937 through the end of the valuation
period.”72 It is expressed as a percentage of the taxable payroll needed over the
valuation period to bring the balance to zero.
Under the intermediate-cost assumption the actuarial deficit for the combined
OASI and DI trust funds is 2.88% of taxable payroll.73 The Trustees estimate the
total unfunded liability to be $10.6 trillion through 2088 representing 2.73% of
67

THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 10.

68
Id. at 10, 49. An additional test is the long-range close actuarial balance which requires:
(1) the trust fund satisfies the short-range financial adequacy and (2) the trust fund ration stays
above zero through the seventy-five-year projection period assuring that benefits would be
payable on a timely basis. The OASDI and individual OASI and DI trust funds all fail this test
under the intermediate-cost assumption. Id. at 10-11.
69

Id. at 11.

70

Id. at 11. The combined OASDI trust funds reserves will increase through 2019 because
the interest credited to the trust funds will make total revenues exceed total costs. Id. at 3.
After 2019, total costs will exceed total revenues and the combined trust funds will be
gradually depleted until they are exhausted in 2033. See id. at 24. The exhaustion of each trust
fund occurs at different times. Finally, the ratio of workers per beneficiary remained stable at
3.2 to 3.4 from 1974 through 2008 when, because of the economic recession and beginning of
the “demographic” shift drove the ratio down, the ratio fell to 2.8. It will continue down to 2.1
over the next 20 years. Id. at 13. The 2014 Trustees Report details the short-range estimates
under all three cost assumptions by year. Id. at 39-48. As expected, the high-cost assumption
has the trust funds being exhausted in 2028, while the low-cost assumption does not have the
trust funds being exhausted through 2090 and actually increasing at that point. Id. at 18-19,
fig.II.D7.
71

Id. at 15.

72

Id. at 16.

73

Id. at 16; see also ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 217 (recognizing that closing
this deficit would require increasing the tax rate from 6.2% to 7.64% on both the employee
and the employer, making the total tax roughly 15.28% of covered payroll).
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taxable payroll and 1.0% of GDP for the seventy-five-year period.74 The actuarial
deficit is higher than the unfunded liability because the former includes the cost of
having an ending period trust fund ratio of 100%.75 These figures over the seventyfive-year period do not necessarily produce “sustainable solvency” for the system,
which is “achieved when the projected trust fund ratio is positive throughout the 75year projection period and is either stable or rising at the end of the period.”76
To correct this imbalance the Trustees project the following options: 77
For the combined OASI and DI trust funds to remain fully solvent
throughout the 75-year projection period: (1) revenues would have to
increase by an amount equivalent to an immediate and permanent payroll
tax rate increase of 2.83 percentage points (from its current level of 12.40
percent to 15.23 percent; a relative increase of 22.8 percent); scheduled
benefits during the period would have to be reduced by an amount
equivalent to an immediate and permanent reduction of 17.4 percent
applied to all current and future beneficiaries, or a 20.8 percent if the
reduction were applied only to those who become initially eligible for
benefits in 2014 or later; or (3) some combination of these approaches
would have to be adopted.78

74

THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 16.

75

Id. at 17.

76

Id. at 17 n.1.

77

Because of various demographic assumptions the projections in the 2014 Trustees
Report may differ from those used by the CBO in its report on the future budget outlook.
Under the CBO’s extended baseline, it would take an additional 4% of payroll (or a
combination of tax increase or benefit cuts) to bring the system into actuarial balance through
2088. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S 2014 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 50 (2014)
[hereinafter CBO 2014 REPORT]. That is equivalent to 1.4% of GDP through that period. Id. at
49-50. To be consistent with the Social Security Trustees Report, which shows a smaller short
fall, it is pointed out that the CBO believes life expectancy will increase at a faster rate than
the Trustees, the incidence of disability will be higher under the CBO estimate, and the
interest rate used for the discounting would be slightly lower. Id. at 50 n.13 (referencing and
comparing estimates from the THE 2013 TRUSTEES REPORT, infra note 84). No significant
changes to Social Security are reflected in the CBO’s 2015 Report, and changes are unlikely
to occur until the new administration takes office in January 2017. For example, the increased
payroll tax percentage to meet the seventy-five-year Social Security shortfall increases to
4.4% increase but continues to be equivalent to a 1.4% of GDP. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
CBO’S 2015 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 53-54 (2015) [hereinafter CBO 2015 REPORT].
78
THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 23. To make the program “permanently”
sustainable would require increasing the payroll tax by 4.1%. Id. at 69. Any estimate of future
solvency requires assumptions about future demographic conditions that may or may not
prove accurate in actual practice. Included are assumptions about fertility, mortality,
immigration, marriage, divorce, productivity, inflation, average earnings, unemployment, real
interest rates, disability incidence, and termination. Related to these assumptions are
independent factors such as total population, life expectancy, labor force participation, gross
domestic product, and program-specific factors. Id. at 75. If the needed changes are delayed
until the trust funds are exhausted in 2033, it would be necessary to increase the payroll tax
rate by 4.2% to 16.6% in 2033, which would then increase to 17.7% by 2088. Id. at 24.
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The actuarial deficit calculated in 2013 through 2087 was 2.72% of payroll and
had the only change for 2014 been an increase of one more year to the valuation date
the actuarial deficit calculated in 2014 would have been 2.78% rather than the 2.88%
noted above. The addition of 0.1% was the result of changes in methods,
assumptions, and starting values combined. Had such assumptions not occurred in
2014, the “open group” unfunded obligation would have been $10.1 trillion in 2014
rather than $10.6 trillion.79 Looking beyond the seventy-five-year period to the
infinite horizon reflects an estimated unfunded obligation equivalent to 4.1% of
taxable payroll or 1.4% of GDP, which is $24.9 trillion.80 Thus, there is a significant
cost of delay.81
One final measure is the “closed-group” unfunded obligation that was reported in
the Trustees’ 2013 Report, but not in the 2014 Report. The closed-group unfunded
obligation is the shortfall the system would incur if Social Security were closed to
anyone under the age of fifteen.82 The calculation considers only the income and
costs associated with persons aged fifteen years and older on the date the calculation
is made and does not permit new entrants.83 The closed group unfunded obligation
for past and current participants is $23.7 trillion, whereas the unfunded obligation for
the infinite horizon for all participants is $23.1 trillion.84 Thus future participants
will pay $0.6 trillion into the system more than they receive out of the system. The
report summarizes the implications:
This accounting demonstrates that some generations are scheduled to
receive benefits with a present valued exceeding the present value of their
dedicated tax income, while other generations are scheduled to receive
benefits with a present value less than the present value of their dedicated
tax income whether past general fund reimbursements are included or not.
Making social Security solvent over the infinite horizon requires some
combination in increased revenue or reduced benefits for current and

79

Id. at 16, 68-69. The actuarial balance is a percentage of the taxable payroll over the
seventy-five-year period to indicate the size of the surplus or shortfall. Id. at 49. Similarly,
“[t]he open group unfunded obligation indicates the size of any shortfall in present-value
dollars” and does not take into account the ending period trust fund balance. Id.
80
Id. at 18, 69, 191-92. The trustees further note that a more accurate measure is 4.3% of
payroll because the 4.1% infinite horizon is an actuarial deficit that does not reflect “a
behavioral response to tax rate changes.” Id. at 191 n.1. “In particular, the calculation assumes
that an increase in payroll taxes results in a small shift of wages and salaries to forms of
employee compensation that are not subject to payroll tax.” Id.; see also Mark J. Warshawsky,
The 2014 Social Security and Medicare Trustee Reports, 144 TAX NOTES 967, 968, 969
(2014) (summarizing information from THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18).
81

THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 68.

82

CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 50-51.

83

Id.

84

THE BD. OF TR., FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL
DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, THE 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 69 (2013) [hereinafter THE
2013 TRUSTEES REPORT].
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future participants amounting to $23.1 trillion in present value, 4.0
percent of future taxable payroll, or 1.4 percent of GDP.85
The 2013 Report further compares the unfunded obligation through 2087 ($9.6
trillion) with the unfunded obligation through the infinite horizon ($23.1 trillion).86
The $13.5 trillion difference reflects the significant financing gap for the years after
2087.87 It could be concluded that continuing the present program would cost $9.6
trillion over the next seventy-five-year period whereas closing the program to
persons under fifteen would cost $24.3 trillion until the death of the last person
currently fifteen years or older. It is much easier to just kick the can down the street.
C. Federal Government’s Long-Term Fiscal Problems
Any discussion about Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and the Affordable
Care Act must include consideration of the impact these programs are projected to
have on the overall federal budget. The changes to correct the system would be small
if the impact were small, but the growth of the national debt and the inability to
project anything but deficits into the future threatens the fiscal soundness of the
nation and the well-being of every citizen. Correcting the system will require drastic
change.
The total federal debt held by the public is 74% of GDP, is the highest it has been
in our nation’s history, except for a brief period around World War II, and it is
almost twice the percentage as the end of 2008.88 While the percentage is expected to
decrease slightly over the next couple of years, it will eventually grow again such
that by 2024 it will reach 78% of GDP and by 2039 it will reach 106% of GDP.89
While the projections do not incorporate the impact of higher debt levels on the
overall economy, they are significant and would severely limit the economic well
being of the country.90 The CBO’s projected impact of continued spending and
taxing under current law (the “Extended Baseline”)91 is illustrated in the following
summary:

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 68.

88

CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 1.

89

Id. at 10.

90

Id. at 13. The 2014 CBO Report summarizes the effects as:

The high and rising amounts of federal debt held by the public that CBO projects for
the coming decades under the extended baseline would have significant negative
consequences for the economy in the long term and would impose significant
constraints on future budget policy, in particular, the projected amounts of debt would
reduce the amounts of national savings and income in the long term; increase the
government’s interest payments thereby putting more pressure on the rest of the
budget; limit lawmaker’s flexibility to respond to unforeseen events; and increase the
likelihood of fiscal crisis.
Id. Chapter 6 of the report expands on these results under various scenarios. Id. at 69-86.
91

Id. at 10.
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Table 1
Note: All Numbers are Percentages of
2014
2024
2039
Gross Domestic Product (% of GDP)
Spending Category
Social Security
4.9%
5.6%
6.3%
Medicare (Net of Offsetting Receipts)
3.0%
3.2%
4.6%
Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange
1.9%
2.7%
3.4%
Subsidies
Other Mandatory
2.5%
2.2%
1.7%
Discretionary
6.8%
5.1%
5.2%
Net Interest
1.3%
3.3%
4.7%
Total Spending
20.4%
22.1%
25.9%
Total Revenues
17.6%
18.3%
19.4%
Deficit
-2.8%
-3.7%
-6.4%
Debt Held by the Public at the End of
74%
78%
106%92
the Year
Projected Spending and Revenues in Selected Years
Under CBO’s Extended Baseline93
Notably, the growth in expenditures as well as taxes as a percent of GDP over the
next twenty-five years greatly exceeds past growth averages. For example, total
federal spending would increase to 26% of GDP while it was 21% in 2013 and
20.5% on average over the past forty years.94 This represents an increase to 14%
92
Buttonwood, Land of the falling yield: The return of an old relationship between asset
prices, ECONOMIST 79 (June 7, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-andeconomics/21603448-return-old-relationship-between-asset-prices-land-falling-yield (noting
that Japan’s government debt is currently 230% of GDP and has been at such levels for some
time without overwhelming the economy).
93

CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 10. The 2014 CBO Report states:

CBO’s base line projections are not a forecast of future outcomes. They are
constructed in accordance with provisions set forth in the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974. As those laws specify, CBO constructs its baseline
projections under the assumption that current laws will generally remain unchanged;
the projections can therefore serve as a benchmark against which potential changes in
law can be measured. However, even if federal laws remained unchanged for the next
decade actual budgetary outcomes could differ from CBO’s base line projections,
perhaps significantly, because of unanticipated changes in economic conditions and
other factors that affect federal spending and revenues. CBO’s updated baseline
projections incorporate the effects of legislation and administrative actions through
April 1, 2014.
Id. at 10; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED BUDGET PROJECTIONS 2014-2024, at 2
(2014), http://cbo.gov/publication/45229.
94

CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 3; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2016 TO 2026, at 4 (2016) (projecting that a 2016 deficit will be
$544 billion which is $105 billion more than the deficit recorded in 2015, and explaining that
the deficit represents 2.9% of GDP and the expected shortfall for 2016 will mark the first time
that the deficit has risen in relation to the size of the economy since peaking at 9.8% in 2009).
The estimated cumulative deficit from 2017 to 2026 is $9,378 billion. Id. at 2. Further, in 2026
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from an average of 7% over the past forty years for Social Security and the
government’s major health programs.95 The government’s net interest payments
would increase to 4.7% of GDP compared to an average of 2% over the past forty
years.96
The growing costs of both Social Security and Medicare have a significant
impact on the long-term federal deficit. In 2014, the total contributions from general
revenues will be $80 billion for Social Security, $25 billion for Medicare
Hospitalization Insurance (known as Part A), and $248 billion for Supplementary
Medical Insurance (known as Part B).97 The total, $352 billion or 2% of GDP, will
more than double to 4.4% by 2040.98
At the same time there will be increased demands on the federal budget including
increasing debt service as interest rates rise. At that point, payroll tax increases may
be unpalatable and the only decision will be whether to cut Social Security benefits
or Medicare benefits.99 Notwithstanding the looming crisis, a number of people
advocate increasing benefits in various ways.100
the ratio of debt held by the public to GDP is estimated to be 86% ($23,817 to $27,660 (in
millions)). Id. at 2; see also Jed Graham, Deficit To Hit $544 Billion This Year CBO
Forecasts, INV. BUS. DAILY, Jan. 20, 2016, at A1.
95

CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 3.

96

Id.

97

SOC. SEC. & MEDICARE BDS. OF TR., STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE
PROGRAMS:
A
SUMMARY
OF
THE
2014
ANNUAL
REPORT
7
(2014),
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/TRSUM/tr14summary.pdf.
98

Id. at 974. The relative size of any changes will be determined by the timing of such
changes. Without changes, it is estimated, in 2010, that benefits under current formulas would
have to be cut by 20% in 2040 to have benefits paid and equal taxes received. CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 18, at ix. That number would rise to a 24% cut by 2084. Id. at 6.
99

It is suggested that, because the CBO finds the health care cost to dominate the future
deficit requirement, Social Security and health care can be addressed separately. One
observation is that:
Under the CBO projections, health care is clearly the heart of the adverse outlook.
Some people view these projections as an indicator that Social Security is not causing
our financial dilemma and that we can address its financing imbalance in the narrow
context of its own operations. But this is akin to the homeowner behind on his
mortgage payments who asks his banker to finance a new car. While the banker sees a
creditor already in over his head wanting to take on more debt, the applicant insists
that his mortgage is the problem and the new car a separate issue.
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 311-12.
100

Id. at 313 (citing surveys showing a high percentage of respondents believe various
benefits should be added or increased such as extending benefits to children of deceased or
disabled parents from nineteen years to twenty-two years; increasing the benefit by fifty
dollars per month for retirees age eighty-five; improve benefits of widowed spouses; make
benefits for early retirees at least the at the poverty level; and giving service credits for
persons taking time off to care for children). Often those who seek to increase benefits tend to
ignore the impact of private employer plans (both defined benefit and defined contribution
plans) on retiree security. Id. When the benefits under private employer plans are combined
with benefits under Social Security retirees in the United States compare favorably with
retirees in other developed economies. Id. at 315-16. However, when the focus is on lower
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The most important causes of the projected growth in Social Security and the
major health care programs through 2039 are aging (55%); Excess Cost Growth
(24%); and Expansion of Medicaid and Exchange subsidies (21%).101 Using the
figures in Table 1, between 2014 and 2039, Social Security will grow by 29%;
Medicare by 53%; Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies by 79%; and interest
payments by 262%.102 As long as the deficit percentage of GDP exceeds the rate of
growth of the economy, the percentage of GDP dedicated to national debt will
continue to grow with the likelihood that interest will grow accordingly.
While the CBO projections do not incorporate the impact of higher debt levels on
the overall economy, this level of growth of debt will restrain future budget policy
and severely limit the economic well being of the country and its ability to respond
to future crises.103 One prominent study suggested that debt level exceeding 90% of
GDP posed particular problems.104
earners there is concern that the favorable comparison does not hold true so that an across the
board reduction in social security benefits would impact the lower earners more than higher
earners. Id. at 317.
101

CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 23. Within the major health care programs alone
the impact of aging is less through 2039. The causes are aging (39%); Excess Cost Growth
(33%); and Expansion of Medicaid and Exchange subsidies (28%). Id.
102

ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 18. The authors suggest the problem is not
spending on seniors but the result of rising health care costs, both public and private and the
tax cuts benefitting the very well-off. The authors further state that changes to Social Security
will reflect our “priorities, what kind of a society we want for ourselves, our children, and our
grandchildren.” Id. at 19.
103

CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 13. The 2014 CBO Report summarizes the effects

as:
The high and rising amounts of federal debt held by the public that CBO projects for
the coming decades under the extended baseline would have significant negative
consequences for the economy in the long term and would impose significant
constraints on future budget policy, in particular, the projected amounts of debt would
reduce the amounts of national savings and income in the long term; increase the
government’s interest payments thereby putting more pressure on the rest of the
budget; limit lawmaker’s flexibility to respond to unforeseen events; and increase the
likelihood of fiscal crisis.
Id. Chapter 6 of the Report expands on these results under various scenarios. Id. at 69-86.
Loss of flexibility in dealing with domestic and international problems while carrying a high
level of debt is particularly worrisome. The CBO recognizes that the ability to address the
recession of 2008 and 2009 was available because the debt was lower. To this point, the CBO
states:
Several years ago, when federal debt was below 40 percent of GDP, the government
had some flexibility to respond to the financial crisis and sever recession by increasing
spending and cutting taxes to stimulate economic activity, providing public funding to
stabilize the financial sector, and continuing to pay for other programs even as tax
revenues dropped sharply because of the decline in output and income. As a result,
federal debt almost doubled as a percentage of GDP. If federal debt stayed at its
current percentage of GDP or increased further, the government would find it more
difficult to undertake similar policies under similar conditions in the future. As a
result, future recessions and financial crises could have larger negative effects on the
economy and on peoples’ well-being. Moreover, the reduced financial flexibility and
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1. Intergenerational Inequality
Another recent analysis points to the fiscal imbalance in spending which
overemphasizes spending on the elderly compared to an under emphasis on the
young. Federal spending consumed by the elderly is $26,355 per person compared to
$3,822 being invested per child.105 Taking it a step further, between 2012 and 2022
federal spending will increase by $1.19 trillion of which $780 billion (66%) will be
spent on programs benefitting the elderly,106 while $29 billion (2.22%) will be spent
on children.107
Most of the future spending priorities are mandatory and will prevent addressing
spending alternatives. As stated: “Whatever the merits of Keynesian and supply-side
economics, these schools of thought gave our legislators a license to pass the cost of
tax cuts and increased spending to future generations.”108 Ending open-ended and

increased dependence on foreign investors that accompany high and rising debt could
weaken U.S. leadership in the international arena.
Id. at 14. The inability to address financial crises can be costly for many countries. See id.
(citing Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, The Aftermath of Financial Crises, 99 AM.
ECON. REV. 466 (2009)); Carmen M. Reinhart & Vincent R. Reinhart, After the Fall,
Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead, FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY JACKSON HOLE
SYMP. (2010), https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2010/Reinhart_final.pdf; see
also Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, Systemic Banking Cries Database: An Update, (Int’l
Monetary
Fund,
Working
Paper
No.
12/63,
2012),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12163.pdf.
104
CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009). But see Free Exchange, the 90% question,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2013, at 82 (noting that the Reinhart-Rogoff study is challenged as to the
drop in GDP growth after debt exceeds 90% of GDP).
105

Charles McElwee, Nation’s financial peril will be physical peril soon, PUTNAM METRO
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.metroputnam.com/article/20140928/ARTICLE/140929375/
(citing STEUERLE, supra note 4).
106

For example, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid other than for children.

107

See STEUERLE, supra note 4 (finding deficits as a symptom of a broader disease, which
is “the effort by both parties to control the future”). Steuerle’s thesis is:
Both parties have conspired to create and expand a series of public programs that
automatically grow so fast that they claim every dollar of additional tax revenue that
the government generates each year. They also conspire to lock in tax cuts that leave
the government unable to pay its bills. The resulting squeeze deprives current and
future generations of the leeway to choose their own priorities, allocate their own
resources, and reach for their own stars. Those generations are left largely to maintain
yesterday’s priorities.
Id. at 4; see Martin A. Sullivan, Treat All Parts of The Budget Equally, 144 TAX NOTES 312,
314 (2015) (describing Steuerle’s book and his solution which is to free up assets by limiting
automatic growth of entitlement spending, as well as tax expenditures, by reforming the
budget process).
108

Sullivan, supra note 107, at 313.
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automatic spending for retirement and healthcare could change the current
downward trend for spending on infrastructure, education, and research.109
Altman and Kingson explain that although Social Security’s primary
goals are not alleviating poverty or income inequality, the program does
more to rectify income inequality and prevent poverty among older
Americans than any other program, public or private, while also providing
crucial protections for orphans and the disabled. More important, they
prove that the widely made claims that Social Security adds to the federal
governments perennial budget deficits have no basis in fact.110
Notwithstanding the Altman and Kingson arguments, maintaining the current
Social Security system with the growing intergenerational inequality will strain and
even curtail the federal government’s ability to address other pressing needs
including those needs of the youngest members of society.
2. Standard Solutions to Social Security Financing
Fixing Social Security can be a simple process. Increase revenues or decrease
benefits. The time when the economy could outgrow the entitlement crisis is past.111
However, Social Security is not referred to as the “third rail of American politics”
for nothing. Whenever you bring Social Security reform up, there are strong
emotional responses by large numbers of voters ready to penalize any politician bold
enough to propose any changes. Changes are talked about in general terms with little
prospect of effecting change before the problem reaches a level of crisis. With that in
mind, it is necessary to acknowledge that Social Security has a long history of
change that resembles a lobster in the soup pot. At first the water is cool, but
gradually the water is heated to a boil and the lobster realizes its predicament and is
cooked.
For the first couple of years after its adoption in 1935, the rate of Social Security
contribution was 1% on a tax base of $3,000 by the employee and the employer.112
The contribution level was to increase to 3% by 1939, but was delayed until 1950.113
Subsequent increases raised the contribution level to 4.4% on a tax base of $6,600 by
1967 and to 4.8% on a tax base of $7,800 by 1969, resulting in covered payroll being
82% of total United States earnings.114
109

Id. at 314.

110

ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at xiii.

111

Amity Shlaes & Ike Brannon, Get Real: We Can’t Grow Out of Entitlement Mess, INV.
BUS. DAILY (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.investors.com/politics/brain-trust/entitlements-mustbe-reformed-we-cant-outgrow-their-costs/. Shlaes and Brannon point out that federal
government payments to individuals grew from 5% of GDP in 1964 (before Medicare and
Medicaid), to 10% in 1980 before President Ronald Reagan took office, to 15% today. Id.
They believe the time has come to address the entitlement question since failure to do so will
likely block other spending options. They suggest starting by delinking pensions from
economic growth. Id.
112

GEOFFREY KOLLMAN, SOCIAL SECURITY: SUMMARY OF MAJOR CHANGES IN
BENEFITS PROGRAM 1 (2000), https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/crsleghist2.html.
113

Id. at 3.

114

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 72.
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Congress gradually and periodically increased the benefit and expanded the
coverage as prompted by then Commissioner of Social Security, Robert M. Ball.115
In 1965, Medicare added a medical benefit for seniors and thereafter Commissioner
Ball continued his efforts to increase benefits for all current and future retirees.116
Following significant increases in 1969, 1971, and 1972, a beneficiary went from
receiving a $500 benefit in 1969 to receiving $759 in 1972 (a 52% increase) while
the cost of living index rose by only 20%.117
In 1972, the indexing of benefits was instituted so that benefits were indexed
based on increases in the consumer price index.118 Benefit increases continued until
the 1977 amendments, which reduced benefits for the first time so that, by 2010
retirees classified as low earners would receive 33% less, average earners 25% less,
and maximum earner s 31% less than a comparable worker in 1977.119 The slow
pace of benefit increases came to an end.120
As the working age population was increasing relative to the number of retirees
and wage growth exceeded the growth of benefits, it appeared any funding
insufficiency could be easily accommodated with a modest tax increase. Prominent
economist Paul A. Samuelson found the beauty of Social Security in the fact that it
was actuarially unsound so that everyone could get benefits far in excess of any
amount they paid into the system, a phenomenon he would explain stems:
[F]rom the fact that the national product is growing at compound interest
and can be expected to do for as far ahead as the eye cannot see. Always
there are more youths than old folks in a growing population. More
important, with real incomes going up at some 3 percent per year, the
taxable base on which benefits rest in any period are much greater than
the taxes paid historically by the generation now retired. Social security is
squarely based on what has been called the eighth wonder of the world—
compound interest. A growing nation is the greatest Ponzi game ever
contrived.121

115

Id.

116

Id. Wilber Cohen, the first member of the Social Security Board, and Robert Ball,
Social Security Commissioner from 1962 to 1973, envisioned a grand plan of “cradle to
grave” social insurance. Cohen recognized that the grand plan could only be taken in small
steps because it could not be consumed in a single bite. Id. at 71-72.
117

Id. at 73.

118
The 1972 changes applied the indexing to the initial benefit, which itself automatically
reflected inflationary wage growth and productivity increases and a double benefit was
created which was soon recognized as a catastrophic mistake which was rectified in 1977
legislation that decoupled the wage indexing from the benefit indexing. Id. at 76.
119

Id. at 78.

120

Id. at 76.

121

Id. at 74 (citing Paul A. Samuelson, Social Security, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 1967, at 88).
Samuelson had previously published a very influential article suggesting that a pay-as-you-go
system could be sustained so long as the workforce grows over time relative to the retiree
population. See Paul A. Samuelson, An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or
without the Social Contrivance of Money, 66 J. POL. ECON. 467 (1958).
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Notwithstanding such optimism, the inevitable funding crisis arrived in the early
1980s and a bipartisan commission chaired by Alan Greenspan was formed to make
appropriate recommendations.122 The result was to increase the retirement age
gradually from sixty-five to sixty-seven over an extended period of time, slightly
reduce benefits, and increase taxes so the system would be solvent for a seventyfive-year period.123 The projections proved to be inaccurate and the solvency period
was reduced to approach fifty years.124
Nevertheless, the Commission’s changes combined with the large population of
Baby Boomers in the workforce caused significant surpluses to accumulate, and a
debate developed over whether to keep the surplus or go back to a pay-as-you-go
system, which would eliminate any surpluses.125 Ultimately, the surplus was kept
and loaned to the government who used it to reduce the deficit.126 Some observers
concluded that the surplus permitted excessive and wasteful federal spending
referring to it as “thievery or embezzlement.”127 Today the numbers are reversed as
large numbers of Baby Boomers are retiring and thereby accelerating the growth of
the dependent population, eliminating the surplus, and creating a deficit requiring
actual transfers from general revenues to make required benefit payments. Such
transfers will continue, at least until the accumulated surpluses and the accrued
interest is exhausted.128
Because initial benefits are based on past earnings and are indexed to the average
growth of wages reflecting productivity increases that grow faster than the cost of
122
See GREENSPAN COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM (1983).
123
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 86. The President, the Speaker of the House of
Representative, and the Senate Majority Leader each appointed one-third of the Commission
to be known as the Greenspan Commission. The changes effected by the Greenspan
Commission, as well as subsequent changes which began taxing up to 85% of Social Security
benefits, have been severely criticized as benefits cuts up to 7% over a lifetime. ALTMAN &
KINGSON, supra note 8, at 60-61; see also RAVI BATRA, GREENSPAN’S FRAUD: HOW TWO
DECADES OF HIS POLICIES HAVE UNDERMINED THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11-46 (2005).
124

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 85-86 (noting that in 1983 the system was projected to be
solvent through 2063 but the projection was reduced to 2049 in the 1985 trustee’s report and
to 2029 1n the 1995 trustee’s report).
125

See, e.g., Kilolo Kijakazi & Wendell Primus, Would Using the Budget Surplus for Tax
Cuts or Entitlement Expansions Affect Long-Term Social Security Solvency, CTR. ON BUDGET
POL’Y & PRIORITIES (Mar. 13, 1998), http://www.cbpp.org/archives/313socsec.htm.
126

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 96.

127

A commission created by President Bush concluded that the 1983 funding legislation
that resulted in surpluses which could theoretically be used to increase national savings:
[T]aught the nation a clear lesson about how unlikely this is as a practice. The Social
Security surpluses have enabled the government to finance other government
spending, rather than raising current year taxes and effectively saving Social Security
funds for the future.
Id.
128

As a result of the unemployment during 2007 and 2008 Social Security experienced its
first annual deficit since the passage of the 1983 amendments. SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 100.
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living, future beneficiaries will have greater purchasing power than current ones. The
following table demonstrates the increased purchasing power in 2061 (in 2011
dollars) for low, medium, and maximum earners.
Table 2
Age 65 SS
2011
2061
Increased
Benefit129
(in 2011 dollars)
Purchasing Power
Low Earner
Medium Earner130
Maximum Earner

$ 10,232
$ 16,860
$ 26,573

$ 17,080
$ 28,143
$ 45,466

$ 6,848 (67%)
$ 11,283 (67%)
$ 18,893 (71%)

A 2010 report suggested indexing initial benefits to prices rather than wages so
the average benefit would be one-third lower by 2060 and one-half lower by 2080.131
Further, by reducing COLAs after benefits commence would also reduce benefits.
Under current adjustments, 25% of benefit payments by 2040 will be the result of
COLA adjustments.132
While future retirees’ benefits will have greater purchasing power, the
contribution levels will also increase. Therefore, a single male turning sixty-five in
2014 whose lifetime earnings were 60% of average, between $25,000 and $30,000,
will receive lifetime benefits worth only $0.91 for every dollar of payroll taxes paid
on his behalf accumulated with interest.133 Medium earners and maximum earners
would receive benefits worth $0.67 and $0.46 per dollar invested respectively.134
Considering the poor investment that Social Security has become, Schieber asks:
Given that many low earners today are getting back less than the value of
lifetime contributions on their earnings and higher earners are doing
worse—and that every additional dollar we put into the system will make
the outcome worse—how much more money do we want to pump into
this system? With total obligations for benefits in excess of $20 trillion
that have already been earned by people who are now alive we cannot
walk away from the program but we can choose to constrain the future
losses.135
Not only has Social Security become a poor investment for most people but it
also is not sufficient for most people to retire. Considering the lifetime cost of health

129

Id. at 114.

130

ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at xv (suggesting the average benefit is roughly
equal to the gross pay of someone working full time at the federal minimum wage).
131

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 5.

132

Id. at 4. After 2050, it is anticipated that the trajectory will resume its upward climb
reaching 6.3% in 2080. Id.
133

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 283.

134

Id.

135

Id. at 241.
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care and retirement savings, an average earner can expect to dedicate 31% of their
lifetime earnings to these two costs alone.136
Benefits received by early participants in Social Security were far larger than
could be justified based on their contributions to the system. One analysis compared
the present value of the benefits received for a given level of contributions made to
the system to the present value of a private insurance annuity that could be
purchased with those contributions. To the extent that the present value of the
benefits received exceeded the present value of the private insurance annuity, the
beneficiary received a “windfall.” The analysis considered people retiring in 1940,
1970, and 1980 whose income level, compared to those retiring in the respective
year, was (i) 40% of such average income (the “low earner”), (ii) 100% of such
average income (the “average earner”) (iii) was 1.6 times such average income (the
“high earner”), and (iv) the maximum income for the year (the “maximum
earner”).137 The table below demonstrates the windfall received for retirees in three
cohorts. These windfalls may help explain the popularity of the Social Security
system and how, at one time, it could be said that: “The way our Social Security
system was structured, we could give away literally trillions of dollars in unearned
benefits and yet almost all the windfall recipients had the sense that they had paid for
what they received.”138
Windfalls received by retirees in three different age cohorts in constant 2009
dollars:139
Table 3
Income Level
1940
1970
1980
Low Earner
$ 38,000
$ 115,000
$ 73,000
Average Earner
$ 50,000
$ 146,000
$ 106,000
High Earner
$ 59,000
$ 160,000
$ 126,000
Maximum Earner
$ 77,000
$ 159,000
$ 126,000
The windfall has largely dried up such that it can now be said:
From 2,000 onward, on average, the “return” for workers in each retiring
cohort will be less than it would be from a funded pension program
invested solely in government bonds. Having spent younger worker’s
contributions on inflated “start-up” benefits for earlier retirees meant the
program had to forego the interest income on those contributions. So as an
investment vehicle, Social Security could not match a funded system no
matter how conservative the funded system’s investments.140
136

See infra tbl.6, n.749 and accompanying text.

137

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 64-65.

138

Id. at 65.

139

Id. at 66. Another commentator estimated that in 1980 a two-earner couple making the
average, who retired at sixty-five, would have paid $219,000 of Social Security and Medicare
taxes in their lifetimes, but would receive $635,000 worth of benefits, and a similarly situated
one-earner couple would have paid $110,000 in taxes and would receive $547,000 in benefits.
STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 50 n.6 (citing C. EUGENE STEUERLE CALEB QUAKENBUSH, SOCIAL
SECURITY AND MEDICARE TAXES AND BENEFITS OVER A LIFETIME: 2013 UPDATE 2013).
140

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 65.
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To some extent the windfall continues in spousal benefits where a non-working
spouse, who never contributed to the Social Security system, qualifies for a benefit
equal to one-half the working spouse’s benefit, or when a working spouse’s benefit
is less than one-half of the higher earning spouse’s benefit.141 In either case if the
higher earning spouse dies first then the lower earning spouse will receive a benefit
equal to that earned by the higher earning spouse.
The spousal benefit makes a marked difference in the overall return received by
family units. Since the 1960s, there has been a rapid increase in the employment of
women in the workforce.142 To some extent, women entered the workforce to
supplement family income when wages were depressed because of the large number
of Baby Boomers entering the workforce.143 This additional wave of female workers
created significant wealth and swelled tax revenues during those years.144 Thus the
spousal benefit may be less significant today than in the past, but neutral observers
might still find it unfair and open the door to an avenue of change.
In a 2000 survey, Social Security assets were approximately 48% of total
dedicated retirement assets for respondents ages sixty-three to sixty-seven.145
Table 4
Earnings Level
Single
Single
One-earner
Two-earner
male
female
couple
Couple
Very low
1.25
1.41
2.47
1.41
Low
0.91
1.02
1.81
1.03
Medium
0.67
0.76
1.36
0.77
High
0.56
0.63
1.12
0.64
Maximum
0.46
0.52
0.92
0.52
Expected Value of Social Security Benefits Relative to Accumulated Lifetime
Contributions with Interest for Hypothetical Workers Born in 1949, Retiring at Age
65,by Earnings Level146
The Table assumes that a hypothetical twenty-one-year-old began working in
1970, worked continually through 2013, and began retirement at age sixty-five in
2014. The very-low single male earner will receive benefits 1.25 times the value of
his contributions (and his employer’s contribution on his behalf) accumulated at trust
fund interest rates. The chart confirms that, except for “one-earner couple”

141

Id.

142

See generally Lisa Quast, Causes and Consequences of The Increasing Numbers Of
Women
In
The
Workforce,
FORBES
(Feb.
14,
2011,
12:03
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lisaquast/2011/02/14/causes-and-consequences-of-theincreasing-numbers-of-women-in-the-workforce/#55c29c71c76d.
143

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 372.

144

Id. at 371-73.

145

Id. at 281.

146

Id. at 283 tbl.24.2. The payroll taxes are accumulated over a lifetime at the applicable
rates and are credited with interest at the rates that the bonds in the Social Security trust fund
earned interest. Id. at 282. In calculating the benefits, the actuaries considered the
comprehensive package of benefits including retirement, disability, and survivor benefits. Id.
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households, all medium, high, and maximum earning households receive a negative
return on their Social Security contributions.147
Converting the percentages from the previous chart into dollars (without
accounting for the value of the survivorship or disability benefits), the single male
medium earner at age sixty-five will have $353,800 from his lifetime (from age
twenty-two) payroll taxes accumulated at the trust fund interest rates. The benefits
received by this same taxpayer using a present value of expected benefits would be
$273,049 for a net loss of $80,751. If the medium earner were a single female, the
lifetime benefit would be $304,767 for a net lifetime loss of $49,033. If the medium
earner were a one-earner couple, the lifetime benefit would be $554,229 for a
lifetime gain of $200,429. Similar analysis can be done for the two-earner couple
and for a very low, high, and maximum earner.148
The spousal benefit might have made sense when most families had one member
in the workforce; however, today most families have two wage earners so that the
lower wage earner is paying into the system, but will likely receive no greater benefit
than if he or she stayed out of the workforce.149 One solution to this problem could
be providing a joint and survivor annuity that reflects the value that each spouse paid
into the system.150 The myriad of family situations makes equalizing the benefits
based on lifetime contributions a complicated task.151
Raising the age at which workers qualify for benefits would be an obvious way
to reduce costs but such a proposal is one of the most politically sensitive areas of
discussion in any Social Security proposal.152 Fifty years ago men worked five years
longer and women seven years longer than current workers, and that was at a time
147

Id. at 93, 282.

148

Id. at 284-85 tbl.24.3 (providing the results of the full analysis by the author).

149

The pattern of Social Security was set with the 1939 amendments. Social Security has
not kept up with the changing times. In 1950, less than 40% of the women between twenty
and sixty-four were in the workforce. Id. at 367. By the beginning of the twenty-first century
nearly 75% were working outside the home including a majority of those with children under
school age. Id. The age when one starts work has changed, as has the age of retirement. Id. at
366-69.
150

Id. at 340.

151

STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 144. Steuerle recognizes that, at the margins, Social
Security has performed poorly and states:
A well-designed minimum benefit and perhaps a minimum credit for child-bearing
years would greatly help achieved the goal of a minimum standard of living in old
age. Meanwhile, we should also reform current spousal and survivor benefits that
discriminate unjustifiably against many groups: single heads of household (who pay
for but do not get spousal and survivor benefits); those who have children before age
40 (who pay for but do not get the children’s benefits provided to the men and
occasionally women who have children at a late age to supplement their retirement
benefits); and those who divorce before ten years of marriage (who can lose hundreds
of thousands of dollars in spousal and survivor benefits because they failed to delay
their divorce by as little as one day or until the marriage lasted ten years and
additional spousal and survivor benefits become available).
Id. at 144-45.
152

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 326.
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when work was more physically demanding and life expectancy was shorter than
today.153 There is evidence that both men and women are beginning to work longer
hours, which may be explained by the shift over the past two decades from defined
benefit plans to defined contribution plans.154
Today’s expectation of retirement grew out of an era when life spans were
shorter, the working age population was growing, and companies were able to
finance defined benefit plans and retiree health care plans from current income.155
Although the retirement age has crept up slightly, there are tremendous advantages
for individuals to continue working an extra year or so, which would lighten the
burden on other workers and reduce the time for which an individual’s savings
would have to cover.156 One way to encourage the elderly to continue working and
enhance the equity of the system is to exempt the earnings from Social Security
taxation when the person arrived at either full retirement age, or age seventy, when
the enhanced benefit reaches its maximum.
Other areas of change could come from changing elements in the Social Security
calculation, such as reducing the wage indexing of initial benefits for determining
AIME, or adjusting the bend points and percentages used in the PIA to reduce some
benefits. The payroll tax cap could also be raised to 90% of covered earnings, trust
funds could be invested in the stock market, or other taxes, such as the estate tax
receipts, could be dedicated to Social Security.157
Any changes to the system will create winners and losers. Recent proposals have
been reluctant to impact persons aged fifty-five and above. The idea is that they have
planned on the current system and it would be unfair to change it in a way that it
would be too late to make up the difference. Since most everyone in the system
benefits by the excessive benefits, they could be asked to participate in the fixes that
affect all participants.158 By failing to act in a timely fashion the youngest cohort of
Baby Boomers will turn age fifty-five by 2019, which is fast approaching. We are

153

Id.

154

Id. at 326 (noting this shift in the type of retirement plan means that, rather than
depending on the employer to take care of the annuity, the employee will have to do it
themselves).
155

Id. at 326.

156

Id. at 373.

157

Id. at 318. The options considered in the 2010 Report did not include the possibility of
private accounts, options to draw general revenues into the system, or investment of Social
Security moneys in securities other than government debt. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note
18, at 8-10. Although Sylvester Schieber supported private accounts when he served on an
advisory council in the 1990s, he has come to a different conclusion today:
But realistically, I have come to believe that we ought to drop the subject. The
conversation about individual accounts had been so poisoned by the accompanying
political discourse that all rationality has been lost. Further argument on the subject
simply delays our progress in tackling an urgent problem.
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 330.
158
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 344 (suggesting that those nearing retirement and retired
should bear some of the cost of reform).
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nearly, if not already, at the point when any change will totally exempt the entire
Baby Boomer generation.159
It is generally recognized that Social Security cannot be considered the sole
source of income during the retirement years, at least, for most people desiring to
live in a manner commensurate with their standard of living during their working
years. Thus, Social Security must be considered in the context of private retirement
savings and overall healthcare needs.160 For example, a typical family of four with an
average income of $50,000 has a surplus of only $9,400 after payment of Federal
Taxes ($3,600); state/local taxes ($1,400); property taxes ($2,000); food costs
($7,800); utility, phone, cable, internet expenses ($3,800); mortgage payment
($13,000); and health care costs ($9,000).161
That $9,400 must pay for everything else, including charitable contributions,
movies, restaurants, family vacations, car expenses, childcare, braces for kids,
tutoring or counseling, and saving for college and for retirement. Today, many
young families have the additional cost of paying student loans that burden the
family for twenty-five or more years after graduation.162 Furthermore, employee
compensation is reduced by the employer costs of Social Security, retirement plan
contributions, and healthcare costs all of which affect the employee’s take-home pay.
Considering these demands it is no wonder that many individuals have very little
extra savings for retirement and rely almost exclusively on Social Security for most
of their retirement income.163
The American dream, coined by James Truslow Adams is the “dream of a land in
which life should be better and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for
each according to his ability or achievement.”164 The American dream also includes
the desire that each generation would leave the world a better place and that our
159

ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 181 (suggesting that exempting reflects a strategy
to undermine the system by passing the burden on to today’s young people and children).
These authors see a vast conspiracy to undermine Social Security that has been going on for
decades. They devote a chapter to this conspiracy entitled “There They Go Again: Why
Supporters of Social Security Must Remain Vigilant.” Id. at 185-99.
160

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 370.

161

Howard Gold, Social Security can’t save us from the poor house, MARKETWATCH
(Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/social-security-cant-save-us-from-thepoorhouse-2014-04-04 (reproducing data attributed to “Bankrate, National Associations of
Realtors, Maliman, and Whitefenceindex.com.”).
162

The College Board reports that between 2009 and 2013 Private Non-Profit average
tuition and fees (in 2013 dollars) rose from $26,356 to $29,593 (a 12% increase) while that for
Public institutions rose from $7,008 to $8,821 (a 26% increase). COLL. BD., TRENDS IN
COLLEGE PRICING, at tbl.2B (2013), http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/collegepricing-2013-full-report.pdf. Accompanying these tuition increases, student debt from 2009 to
2013 for graduates receiving a bachelor’s grew at Private Non-Profit institutions from $18,000
to $19,500 (an 8% increase) and at Public institutions from $11,700 to $14,300 (a 22%
increase). Graduating to Debt: Why student loan debt is on the rise, ONINVESTING (2014)
(referring to the College Board 2014).
163

See infra note 741 and accompanying text.

164

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 365 n.3 (citing JAMES TRUNSLOW ADAMS, THE AMERICAN
EPIC 404 (New York: Blue Ribbon Books, Inc. 1931)).
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children would have a better start than we did. Social Security leaves no inheritance
for the heirs of the deceased beneficiary. It is noted that: “Psychologists tell us that,
as humans age, they are wired to want to leave a legacy. A Greek proverb says the
societies become great when old men plant trees whose shade they know they will
never sit in.”165
Social Security has grown from a simple pension system in which pay-as-you-go
was an easy funding device that was deceptively simple. There were many
contributors but few beneficiaries. However, underneath the surface a huge unfunded
federal liability was growing that today is creating significant long-term budgetary
problems in which any solution will involve considerable complexity as the change
filters through a diverse population with diverse family situations.
3. The Easy Solution—Not So Easy
Making Social Security sustainable for the long run is often seen as a problem
involving relatively simple mathematics. You can raise taxes, cut benefits, or a
combination of the two. But the discussion does not remain simple when it expands
to all kinds of retirement benefits that are supported by the government tax system.
The discussion might suggest that reducing other retirement subsidies or tax
expenditures should be done to save Social Security. High-end taxpayers may not
give up their very lush benefits easily to fund the changes to save Social Security. In
reality, it is a question of who is going to suffer to make the system work and none
of the players are particularly interested in helping the solution.
At some point, the demands of the retirement crisis will significantly impinge on
other government spending and the country will look to raise taxes. When this
happens, it may be that the large and untaxed 401(k), IRA, and other large retirement
assets may be the target of greater taxation. Some people think the efforts are already
under way when they look at the problems in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy
where overspending and over borrowing has become a problem for which these
countries are looking to Germany to bail them out. Of course, Germany may be
strong today, but, as noted above, it has its own looming unfunded pension
problem.166
Those political activists seeking to bring federal spending into balance should not
expect revolutionary change. The move to greater spending and greater deficits and
debt seem irreversible. It has been observed:
The fact that even Ronald Reagan could not “curb the size and influence
of the federal establishment,” as he promised in his 1981 inaugural
address, indicates that the battle between liberals and conservatives over
165

Paul Taylor, Mending the Safety Net, AARP BULL., Oct. 2014, at 18, 20.

166

MARIN, supra note 2, at 46. Marin states:

I contend that if you plumb the depths of Angela Merkel’s consciousness, you will
find an acute awareness that the problem Germany faces with regard to its own
looming pension crisis . . . and their severely underfunded status and aging population
make Merkel very unwilling to tackle the problems of Southern Europe . . . who
ALSO have their own pension crises looming behind the current overborrowing crisis.
And the other pillar of the European Union, France, is . . . in even worse shape than
Germany and entirely unable to shoulder this burden.
Id. at 46-47.
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the welfare state is fundamentally asymmetric. What’s at stake in their
political contest is not whether the permanent liberal project of expanding
the welfare state will or won’t go forward, but whether it will proceed
rapidly or slowly. Liberal victories advance liberalism; conservative
“victories” postpone liberalism.167
Several balanced proposals have been put forward, but have not received serious
attention in Congress. The Simpson-Bowles Proposal, which was sponsored by a
committee appointed by President Obama, did not receive any serious consideration
either at the White House or in Congress although it received an inordinate amount
of press coverage.168
In the face of severe deficits and growing debt, there are proposals being made
that would expand Social Security in significant ways both to expand the coverage
and to raise the funds necessary to pay for them.169
Social Security has just passed its 80th birthday and seems more ingrained in the
American system than ever before. Yet, in spite of the many defects and inequalities
built into the system, and the many proposals for change, the dependence of so many
people on the system is likely to militate against any significant change. At some
point the weakness of this first leg of retirement planning will need to be reformed.
II. JUSTIFYING SOCIAL SECURITY
A. Stay the Course with the Present Social Security Structure
New York University Law Professor Daniel Shaviro sees the Social Security
issue as one between the existing system and a system modeled after private
insurance. He generously refers to the issue as whether Social Security should be
more “market-based.”170 Expanding on that issue, Professor Shaviro states:
What makes it non-obvious whether Social Security and Medicare should
be more market-based . . . is the fact that these programs specifically
address problems of market failure and defective consumer choice.
Accordingly, . . . one needs to assess the issue of more versus less marketbased design in terms of how it would affect achieving the underlying
objectives that one has already agreed markets do not provide. In addition,
one has to ask how political choice problems would change within the

167

WILLIAM VOEGELI, NEVER ENOUGH, AMERICA’S LIMITLESS WELFARE STATE 212
(2010).
168
See, e.g., Brain Faler, The ghost of Simpson-Bowles, POLITICO (Oct. 25, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/the-ghost-of-simpson-bowles-haunts-2014-112199.
169

ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 107-08.

170

Daniel Shaviro, Should Social Security and Medicare Be More Market-Based?, 21
ELDER L.J. 87, 90 (2013) (stating, more specifically, “that of whether the retirement programs
should be made more market-based, with differences from privately offered insurance being
mainly limited to the fact that the government mandates, regulates and subsidizes retirees’
private coverage”).
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new structure, rather than presuming that they would go away, given that
the government will be heavily involved in any event.171
Although Social Security and Medicare have insurance like characteristics,
Shaviro says the two programs are quite distinct:
[T]hey are deliberately designed to limit people’s ability to make their
own choices—in particular, with regard to how much or little to save for
retirement; how to invest these savings; and how to structure the eventual
payout. While limiting choice may sound bad, . . . it turns out to be well
justified in this context. Both paternalism (however dubious an approach
in many contexts) and externality problems provide convincing grounds
for imposing the life cycle planning equivalent of requiring people “to eat
their spinach.”172
Shaviro describes Social Security as a “widely accepted conceptual structure that
reflects the deliberate linkage between its taxing wages and its offering retirement
benefits that creates a sense of ‘earned entitlement’ even if the taxes one pays are not
present value-equivalent to the benefits one eventually receives.”173 This
arrangement is justified based on two analogies. The first, by economist Paul
Samuelson, set out in his 1958 article,174 and the second, by Professor Shaviro, in his
book on Social Security published in 2000.175 Samuelson posits that, with the demise
of a social structure where children cared for parents in old age, a stable system was
created in which one generation supported the prior generation with the expectation
that they will be similarly supported by the succeeding generation.176 While the first
generation gets a “free ride” because they pay so little into the system, each
succeeding generation will support the prior generation and receive support from the
next succeeding generation. The system works and is stable so long as the
generations continue. The last generation, of course, is cheated; although, this will
not occur as long as the nation endures.
Shaviro draws three conclusions from Samuelson’s model. First, there is no
inherent reason the program would be unsustainable since the model simply posits
that the money paid into the system by the succeeding generation will be taken out
by the first generation.177 This merely says that what is taken in is given to the senior

171

Id. at 90 (asserting that proponents of market-based approaches have conceded that
markets cannot entirely handle the core problems that make the programs necessary—leaving
them in a posture of merely “haggling about the price.”)
172

Id. at 92.

173

Id. at 93.

174
Paul A. Samuelson, An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the
Social Contrivance of Money, 66 J. POL. ECON. 467 (1958); see also Shaviro, supra note 170,
at 93 n.21; SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 10-11.
175

DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY (2000).

176

Samuelson, supra note 174, at 480.

177

Shaviro, supra note 170, at 93-94.
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generation. So long as payroll tax funding is constant relative to wage levels,
benefits will not explode and will likely not grow faster than the economy.178
The second conclusion is from the standpoint of the working-age participant.
This “pay-as-you-go” system with fixed payroll tax funding creates an implicit
financial instrument with no rate of return, because each generation takes out of the
system the same amount that it put into the system.179 However, if the population of
the junior generation increases or wages grow beyond what was true of the prior
generation, an investment return will be realized by the senior generation.180
Samuelson’s model posited a situation in which participation in Social Security was
the only investment option but suggested that a return in excess of that provided by
the capital market could be realized if the population or wages grew significantly.181
If his suggestion is correct, it supports the idea that ever-increasing benefits not
funded in advance could be continued until the last generation in the program.182
As Shaviro notes, Social Security sustainability in practice has suffered from
adverse conditions inconsistent with Samuelson’s model.183 Birth rates have fallen,
life expectancies have increased, and wage growth has slowed in the past several
years putting pressure on the effectiveness of Samuelson’s “ever increasing benefits”
analysis. Nevertheless, Shaviro finds the analysis constructive since any imbalance
in the system can be addressed “so long as the needed changes to taxes and/or
benefits were adopted in a timely fashion.”184
The third conclusion, involves the political economy of obtaining approval from
one generation to pay taxes with the promise of ultimately receiving a return in
retirement based on assumed fixed parameters.185 The idea was to overcome the
selfish impulses by approving a system with an assumed fixed payroll tax rate and a
pure pay-as-you-go benefit payout.
While recognizing that the program has continued for over fifty years since
Samuelson’s model, and many changes have occurred, including the clear separation
of the payroll tax rate from the benefit formula, Shaviro notes: “Yet the two sides of
the ledger will only be in balance, either for a given year or over the long term if

178

Id. 95-96.

179

Id. at 96.

180

Id. at 97.

181

Id. at 97-98 (citing Henry J. Aaron, The Social Insurance Paradox, 32 CAN. J. ECON. &
POL. SCI. 371 (1966)). In his article, Aaron provides an algorithm proving that “social
insurance can increase the welfare of each person if the sum of rates of growth of population
and real wages exceeds the rate of interest.” Aaron, supra, at 372. He calls his theorem the
“social insurance paradox” such that he can assert that “if no reserve is accumulated in the
financing of old age pensions, each person will receive a larger pension than he has paid for . .
. .” Id. at 372. Of course, if the combined rate of population growth plus the wage growth fall
below the prevailing interest rate the system will leave everyone with a smaller pension than
was paid for. Id. at 374.
182

Shaviro, supra note 170, at 97.

183

Id. at 99-100.

184

Id.

185

Id. at 100-01.
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Congress adjusts them suitably and without undue lag, as demographic events alter
the fiscal relationship between the two sides of the ledger.”186
Shaviro suggests Social Security is sustainable, even with a lack of pre-funding,
so long as benefits do not grow too fast relative to the size of the economy, because
“simply increasing taxes relative to benefits over the long term” can fund system
benefits.187 Although the terms of the “ever increasing benefit” analysis has in
practice encountered certain “risk factors” (e.g. adverse demographic growth and
wage growth), Shaviro does not see any “inherent” reason the system should not
continue to be sustainable so long as adjustments to taxes and/or benefits are made in
a timely fashion.188 However, the policy of one generation paying for the next has
become weaker as the fiscal situation has deteriorated. The large senior age cohort
has created a “third rail” of politics in Social Security and Medicare that makes
solving the fiscal problem of who will pay either in the form of higher taxes or lower
benefits politically difficult.189
The second model Shaviro uses to help conceptualize Social Security comes
from his earlier book, Making Sense of Social Security Reform, which does not focus
on the system but instead focuses on the individual in the system.190 Here, he
outlines Social Security as a three-part system in which the benefit (B) is equal to the
taxes paid (T) plus the return on taxes paid (rT) plus an amount (X) needed to adjust
the system into balance.191 The formula (B = T + rT + X) allows Social Security to
be viewed as distinct programs wrapped together.192
“T” is viewed as an amount of forced savings to acquire a benefit that is simply a
fixed lifetime annuity that cannot be transferred or assigned. “rT” represents a
restricted portfolio choice over which the participant has no opportunity to choose
between alternate investments.193 “X” is either a positive, if someone benefits from a
wealth transfer, or a negative, if one’s benefit is reduced.194 The redistributive
feature represented by “X” is a “modestly progressive” and seldom-understood
factor that favors one-earner married couples over two-earner couples and single
individuals.195

186

Id. at 98.

187

Id.

188

Id. at 100.

189

Id. at 100-01.

190

Id.

191

Id. at 102.

192

Id.

193

Id.

194

Id. at 102-04.

195

Id. at 104 (raising questions as to whether the transfers are good policy, whether the
transfers should be done within or outside the system, and whether the relationship between
taxes paid and benefits received should be more transparent). Descriptions of Social Security
as a plan of forced savings and as a redistributive program are elaborated in an earlier book,
see SHAVIRO, supra note 175, at 29-32.
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In recognizing that the sytem is financially challenged, Shaviro states that
making Social Security self-financing is simply a matter of arithmetic:196 “All it
takes is some combination of increasing its tax financing and/or reducing projected
future benefits. One of the most important issues raised here is what mix between
changes to these two sides of the ledger should be utilized.”197
Suggested changes include increasing the retirement age and indexing benefits to
increases in life expectancies, making the benefits less generous to high-income
earners, or changing the inflation index for benefits.198 Regardless, making the
system more progressive by reducing the benefits to higher earners seems inevitable.
Such a change might escape economic inefficiences if the system is simply viewed
as a tax on work, but would likely create further obscurities in the tax/benefit
relationship and raise issues of political economy as higher earners may be less
inclined to continue supporting the system. This problem was recognized by Social
Security architects, as Shaviro notes:
Social Security architects, such as Wilbur Cohen and Robert M. Ball,
famously argued that “a program for the poor will end up being a poor
program,” and that universality was thererfore needed to keep the
program politically strong. If this is correct, a more progressive benefit
skew might endanger poor retirees’ benefits over time.199
A strong political consideration is that any change in benefits may affect current
retirees and those close to retirement who have planned on certain levels of benefits.
However, such benefits are not legal obligations and may be legally changed by
Congress.200 Recent discussions have sought to reassure such persons by stipulating
that changes (i.e. reducing benefits) would not affect those fifty-five years or older.
On the other hand, Social Security benefits and taxes are often considered
independently such that raising taxes means greater “forced” savings having the
same effect as a benefit reduction.201 Under the current system taxes could be raised
by raising the rate of tax or by lifting the ceiling on the tax base that is subject to the
tax. Raising the rate affects all taxpayers but lifting the ceiling will affect higher
income taxpayers who may not need the increased benefit but may see the increased
redistributional effects and be less willing to support the system.202
Finally, Shaviro believes that the label, as well as, the substance of any change
implementeed should be evaluated. In one plan he mentions, taxes were increased by
making health benefits received by an employee subject to the Social Security tax.
196

Shaviro, supra note 170, at 105. Other commentators describe the needed adjustments
at “slight increases.” ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at xii.
197

Shaviro, supra note 170, at 105.

198

Id. at 105-06.

199

Id. at 107 (citing EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, ROBERT BALL AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL
SECURITY 4 (2005)).
200

Id. at 107-08.

201

Id.

202

Id. at 107-09. Shaviro finds the current system of placing a ceiling on the tax base
subject to the Social Security tax reflects a “high political economy value” on limiting the
actual and apparent redistribution effects. Id. at 108-109.
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Such a change allows one to argue that at least the observed rate of tax was not
increased when in fact the tax revenue increased primarily among those lower
income persons who are below the wage ceiling.203
B. Arguments for Forced Savings
That some element of forced savings should be instituted is supported by three
arguments—paternalism, market failure, and externalities. Paternalism suggests that
optimal lifetime behavior requires people be forced to save for, and throughout,
retirement based on their own self-interest.204 The theory of declining marginal
utility from consumption within a time period leads to the conclusion that smoothing
out consumption between periods should be a common objective regardless of your
income level. Thus, forced saving for retirement is consistent with one’s ability to
maintain a constant level of consumption throughout retirement making Social
Security’s lifetime annuity highly desirable even though it might mean that person’s
wealth is exhausted at the time of death with no intergenerational transfer.205 Finally,
looking to psychological studies, some people concentrate more on present
consumption and therefore act in such a way as to undermine their ability to
maintain their level of consumption in future years.206 Some level of forced savings
should be required and failing to do so would be a mistake.207
Market failure is the second argument for forced savings. Here, the idea is that
the government can do a better job of addressing the failures of the market than
private firms. Further, by using income tax and transfer payments the government
can provide better insurance against individual career or planning failure that does
not provide adequate retirement than can private firms. The government guarantee
provides everyone at least a minimal level of living. Thus, under the economic
principle of the declining marginal utility of money, the amount taken from a high
income individual and given to a low income individual has greater utility (e.g.
value) to the low income person than the utility lost by the high income person
thereby creating net social utility.208
Private firms are unable to provide this type of insurance because it can create an
incentive for someone to intentionally have a low income and collect from the
insurance company. It also allows for adverse selection in which the purchaser of a
203

Id. at 109-10.

204

Id. at 122.

205

Id. at 123.

206

Id. at 125.

207

Id. at 124-25.

208

Declining marginal utility is a concept that economists consider so obvious that needs
no proof. See 7 FRED GOTTHEIL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 108-12 (2013). Nevertheless, the
concept is the primary justification for the graduated income tax notwithstanding that no one
is able to quantify utility or any decline in utility. However, no one is able to determine the
appropriate tax rate that equalizes the economic sacrifice between taxpayers. Thus, when
someone states that it is important for the wealthy to pay his or her fair share of taxes, it is
impossible to determine his or her fair share. Such comments also misuse the term “wealthy,”
since the income tax taxes income and not wealth. Perhaps the best one can say is that your
fair share is what Congress determines is your fair share. See infra note 703 and
accompanying text.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/5

36

2016]

ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS

805

life annuity has better information than the insurer on his or her own health and life
expectancy. Only a stable government requiring the entire population to participate
in the program can provide this type of insurance.209 Shaviro argues that the
government must, to some extent, have a fixed demographic; although, if demand is
sufficiently large, it may be possible for private firms to provide the required
annuities on somewhat more actuarially fair terms than is presently available.210
Fiscal and altruistic externalities support forced savings, arguing that, when
individuals fail to save or insure against the exigencies of retirement, they become a
burden on the national, state, or local treasuries.211 It is also unsettling to others who
observe the elderly suffering in old age because of a failure to save adequately for
retirement. These concerns are alleviated by a forced savings plan.212
Portfolio choice is the final argument Shaviro addresses, which, for Social
Security, is no portfolio choice. He posits that departures from optimal investor
behavior present errors and negative externalities that could be prevented by
paternalism.213 Optimal investor behavior varies depending on the investor’s degree
of risk aversion, which in turn reflects the declining marginal utility of money.214
Optimal investor behavior requires broad diversification of investments that are
often unavailable to the private investor such that Shaviro sees this criticism of
Social Security as speculation.215 Investor error is expected and likely to lead to bad
results, thereby raising questions of negative fiscal and altruistic externalities.216
Since most private saving account “PSA” proposals restrict investment options
during accumulation and retirement, Shaviro characterizes the argument about
investment choice as merely a “haggling about the price” and deems PSAs as
unrelated to future Social Security sustainability.217
C. Arguments Favoring Investor Participation
Three basic arguments are presented in favor of allowing participants to trade
their future benefits for an investment in a diversified stock or bond portfolio. First,
Social Security is the bottom tier of anyone’s retirement, and everyone investing this
basic amount exhibits an inordinate amount of risk aversion.218 Someone who
prefers more risk could invest other monies in risky assets to make the overall risk
209

Shaviro, supra note 170, at 125-27.

210

Id. at 127.

211

Id. at 128.

212

While arguing that Social Security is an insurance program rather than a welfare
program proponents of Social Security expansion stress the needs of “older women, people of
color, the LGBT community, low-wage workers, many early retirees, and the oldest old.”
ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 49.
213

Shaviro, supra note 170, at 134.

214

Id. at 134.

215

Id. at 135.

216

Id. at 135-36.

217

Id. at 136.

218

Id. at 137.
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consistent with that person’s objectives. Second, the private sector trend of shifting
from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans, where one’s retirement
success depends on the success of investment decisions, should be extended to
Social Security.219 Resistance to this trend generally is strongest among collective
bargaining units (primarily in the public sector), who point out that the private sector
trend is being initiated by the employer and not the employees.220 Therefore, Shaviro
argues that diversification would require that one’s retirement is not entirely
dependent on the financial markets and that some “defined benefit” is preserved.221
Finally, the volatility of the financial markets in the past few years suggests that
returns on such investments are not as assured as some have asserted; and, since
people are risk adverse, they should not invest in risky investments until such time as
they are assured of some base of retirement savings.222
Characterizing a flat rate payroll tax as a form of “forced savings” might suggest
some element of investor participation. However, the dedicated payroll tax was
implemented for a different purpose which was to insure that people would feel they
had paid for the benefits and politicians would be reluctant to interfere with them in
the future.223 There is only a general relationship between the payment of taxes and
benefits, but not on a dollar for dollar basis. In fact, the system has a significant
wealth distributional effect such that lower income individuals receive a higher
percentage of their preretirement income (the so-called “replacement rate”) than
higher income individuals.224 The ceiling on the earnings covered by the Social
Security tax can be justified on the grounds that the purpose of the program is to
insure that every person has a minimum amount at retirement and persons with
incomes higher than a certain level will likely have additional savings of their
own.225
Creating a distinct relationship between taxes and benefits could make Social
Security more efficient by making the relationship more transparent in that a person
219

Id. at 137-38.

220

Id. at 138.

221

Id. at 138.

222

Id. at 139-40 (noting that even people who do not hold stock already bear some of the
risk associated with market performance through the market’s macroeconomic impact).
223

Id. at 140. In response to an inquiry from a reporter challenging the economic
incentives in the system, President Roosevelt stated:
I guess you are right on the economics, but those taxes were never a problem of
economics. They are politics all the way through. We put those payroll tax
contributions there so as to give the contributor a legal, moral, and political right to
collect their pensions . . . . With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap
my social security program.”
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 66; see also SHAVIRO, supra note 175, at 117 (noting that with
Medicare only part A was given a dedicated tax because of the “popularity of Social
Security’s program design” but unlike social security, the more you pay does not correlate to
greater benefits but since this relationship is “sufficiently obscure to the general public” the
dedicated finance might protect this program as well as Social Security).
224

Shaviro, supra note 170, at 140-41.

225

Id. at 141-42.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/5

38

2016]

ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS

807

who views the tax as a burden on labor can more easily see how the extra work could
result in an additional benefit.226 But Shaviro suggests the lack of transparency is no
accident, and notes the political economy argument that a “program for the poor” is
often a program because it can easily be cut when voters refuse to support it.227 The
opacity also served to allow the first generation, which suffered during the Great
Depression, to do very well with little or no payment into the system, although such
a transfer may be justified.228
Finally, even though Social Security does not provide a benefit of inheritability,
consumer failure, market failure, or altruistic or fiscal externalities would not be
alleviated by a provision for inheritability.229 Shaviro, having made a strong case for
Social Security, challenges anyone desiring to replace it with PSAs must be prepared
to address the following criteria:
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

Since $100 can be invested in treasury bonds, other bonds, or stock,
each investment is said to be “equally valuable,” although risk and
expected return may be different. Noting that the Social Security
benefit (T + rT + X) is one such investment, choosing something
other than Social Security should reflect a basis for concluding a
riskier portfolio is better.” If the riskier portfolio is preferable overall,
PSAs are unnecessary and the government could make the alternative
investments.230
Since PSAs will also offer limited investment choice, proponents are
merely “haggling about the price” such that proponents must
demonstrate the merits of “greater choice” in relationship to Social
Security’s accepted purposes.231
If desirable, a PSA system could be made “progressive” by
transferring funds from higher income PSA owners to lower PSA
owners.232
PSAs make the marginal relationship between contributions and
benefits transparent and encourage work, an effect that could also be
achieved under Social Security.233
Actuarial conventions make PSAs look attractive by, among other
things, under-estimating the cost of implicit government guarantees

226

Id. at 143.

227

Id.

228

Id. at 143-44. Other reasons include the Samuelson thesis discussed earlier, the extreme
poverty caused by the depression, and a belief in the progressivity provided by rising lifetime
incomes. Id.
229

Id. at 145-46.

230
Id. at 112-13 (noting that this approach seemed viable in the 1990s when the internet
bubble caused large market returns making stocks look “artificially reliable,” but the stock
market performance in the years subsequent have dampened enthusiasm for this approach).
231

Id. at 113-14.

232

Id. at 114 (citing SHAVIRO, supra note 175, at 152-56).

233

Id. at 102-04.
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or overemphasizing their safeguards against future government
interference.234
Shifting money into PSAs will reduce any Social Security surpluses
and limit government’s ability to use those funds for other programs.
Since the surpluses have been largely eliminated, general revenues
are needed to pay current benefits and PSAs will increase that
need.235

Eliminating investor participation based on the Samuelson/Aaron analysis is not
as clear as it seems. That analysis can be simplified by positing a society in which
there are 1,000 participants at every age so that there are 1,000 one-year-olds, 1,000
ten-year-olds, 1,000 sixty-six-year olds and so forth. Assume everyone enters the
workforce at age twenty and leaves at age sixty-five and dies at age eighty. If
everyone between age twenty and sixty-five produces $400 worth of goods then
those 45,000 persons will produce $18,000,000. If we divide the product between all
persons twenty and older (age eighty), 60,000 people would each receive $300.00. If
the population increases or if the workers become more productive, there is more to
distribute and everyone is better off. Of course, if the population begins to decline or
becomes less productive then everyone will have a reduced standard of living.
However, reality sets in, because the individual impact varies due to differences
in longevity, waves of population growth and decline, earnings, and an infinite
variety of other conditions all of which can be addressed by policy makers (called
“ethical observers” by Samuelson) who select the winners and losers.236
Nevertheless, this ideal suggests, as does Samuelson, that the system could generally
be sustainable.
If the system is sustainable, the next step is to make appropriate allocations to
achieve some “equitable” or “optimal” state. Recognizing that free markets might
reach a “Pareto efficiency,”237 achieving an “ethically optimal” distribution would
require governmental interference with the market results by using taxes, subsidies,
fiat, or other such action.238 To achieve the ethically optimal distribution mankind
enters into a Hobbes-Rousseau social contract instructing the young that if they

234

Id. at 114-15.

235

Id. at 115-16 (noting that Social Security surpluses caused increased government
spending in the past is no longer the case as the process is now reversed and payments are
now needed for interest on the trust fund).
236

Samuelson, supra note 174, at 480. These conditions must be addressed by policy
makers and the views of economists can be helpful for as Samuelson states:
We economists have been told . . . to economize . . . in the sense that we want what
there is to go as far as possible. But it is also the task of political economy to point out
where common rules in the form of self-imposed fiats can attain higher positions on
the social welfare functions prescribed for us by ethical observers.
Id.
237
Pareto efficiency, or Pareto optimality, is a state of allocation of resources in which it is
impossible to make any one individual better off without making at least one individual worse
off. Id. at 479-80.
238

Id. at 479.
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support the aged then the unborn will be charged with supporting them.239 Although
social coercion is used on the young, “the young never suffer, since their successors
come under the same requirement. Everybody ends better off. It is as simple as
that.”240
The end result of the Samuelson/Aaron analysis is a series of governmental
interferences which are not necessarily preferable to the choices made by investor
participation. With investor participation the “ethically optimal” distribution would
reflect at least some element of self interest.
D. Acknowledged Faults
Shaviro acknowledges a number of caveats that have a tendency to
weaken his argument, which supports the current system, including the
following:
1. Social Security provides greater security against loss than private
investments, assuming that the government is solvent and politically
stable.241
2. If payroll taxes and benefits to be received were allocated on an
“actuarially fair individual basis,” a PSA structure would be
preferable to the current system.242
3. Social Security lacks transparency between the taxes paid and
benefits received. Few understand the wide disparity of benefits
between individuals because of marital status.243 There is also a lack
of transparency when it comes to the national debt, where the
unfunded liability of Social Security is not listed as a separate item.
4. If a failure to leave an inheritance constituted an irrational decision
then consumer failure might be implicated and should be addressed
by Social Security.244
5. Medicare over emphasizes relatively routine care relative to high-end
catastrophic coverage.245
6. The political situation has acknowledged the unsustainability of
Social Security for over a quarter century, but, in spite of
considerable dialogue and acknowledgement, the political situation
has been unable to take action and has allowed the problem to grow
worse and more costly to repair.
239

Id. at 479-80.

240
Id. at 479. In this way, Samuelson asserts it is “easy” to set the rules to get to an
optimum solution that is better than everyone insisting on a “quid pro quo” where we end up
with each person being worse off. Id.
241

Shaviro, supra note 170, at 140-41.

242

Id. at 140-41.

243

Id. at 145. The opacity of the system obscures the disparity between household types
such as between one and two wage earner couples and between single individuals and one
wage earner couples that cannot easily be justified on the basis of distributional grounds or
grounds that the biases are offset in other areas of the fiscal system. Id.
244

Id. at 146.

245

Id. at 92.
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Immigration could upset the system.246

Part II has set forth Professor Shaviro’s arguments supporting the present Social
Security system but has also acknowledged some of its weaknesses. The next section
will demonstrate the inability of state and local governments as well as private
employers to fulfill pension promises. That the federal government can succeed
where so many other entities have failed reduces the case for Social Security to the
public’s reliance on the federal government’s power to control the supply of money.
III. ABANDONING LEG TWO: DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
A prime advantage of having Social Security sponsored by the federal
government is the perception of long-term solvency and stability. The dramatic
drops in the stock market in 2000 and 2008 have enhanced this perception, leaving
the impression that the only stability retirees have is Social Security. However, there
is evidence of long-term stability in the returns on stocks. From 1980 to 2014, a
period of thirty-four years, the Dow Jones Industrial Average grew from 1,000 to
over 17,000— a return of approximately 8% per annum.247 During the same period,
the gross federal debt (including debt held by the public as well as debt held in
government accounts) grew from nearly $1.0 trillion to just under $18 trillion with
deficits projected as far into the future as can be estimated.248
The long-term solvency and stability of the United States government and
whether it will continue funding unsustainable programs is in question. The wisdom
of continuing the Social Security program in its current state becomes questionable
when one looks around the world at the ability of governments as well as private
companies to sustain defined benefit plans. The next few sections look at the ability
of cities, states, countries, and corporations to sustain defined benefit plans. In a
sense, these plans have traditionally been the second leg of the three-legged
retirement security plan in the United States.
A. The Municipal Bankruptcy: Detroit
Detroit is a city that watched its tax base decline as a result of business
relocation, citizen flight, and growing obligations for pension and retiree healthcare
costs that rely on current taxes to fund them.
In July 2013, Detroit filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy in what was the largest-ever
municipal bankruptcy with debt totaling about $18 billion.249 The $18 billion debt
included unfunded pension liabilities of approximately $2 billion owed to city
246

Id. at 99.

247

Dow Jones Industrial Average, Jan. 1, 1980 – Dec. 8, 2014, MARKETWATCH,
http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/
index/djia/charts?symb=DJIA&countrycode=US&time=100&
startdate=1%2F4%2F1980&enddate=12%2F8%
2F2014
&freq=1&compidx=none&compind=none&comptemptext=Enter+Symbol%28s%29&comp=
none&uf=7168&ma=1&maval=50&lf=1&lf2=4&lf3=0&type=2&size=2&style=1013
(last
visited Mar. 8, 2016).
248

Historical Tables, supra note 5; CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 2 & 3.

249

Ashley Woods, A Guide To Detroit’s Chapter 9 Default And How Bankruptcy Could
Change The City, HUFFINGTON POST (July 24, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
07/24/detroit-bankruptcy-chapter-9_n_3640734.html.
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retirees and employees in the General Retirement System (“GRS”) and $1.25 billion
owed to the Police and Firefighter Pension System (“PFRS”).250 The other major
creditors are holders of bonds issued by the city for various purposes that include
funding the escalating costs of pension and retiree health care.251
1. Urban Flight and the Anemic Tax Base
Critics point to the Detroit riots in 1967 and the recession in the early 1980s that
impacted the auto industry and its component suppliers, resulting in significant
losses of tax revenues to the city as the beginning of Detroit’s decline.252 The city
responded to the loss of tax revenues with tax increases, which caused many
corporations, residents, and non-resident workers to move out of the city into the
suburbs.253 Detroit was left with the highest combined property and income tax for
the state of Michigan; and, as a consequence, in 2012, the State of Michigan
drastically cut its revenue sharing to the city.254 Mismanagement also played a part
in Detroit’s decline.255
2. Adverse Demographic Shifts
Pay-as-you-go pension systems are heavily impacted by decreases in the
taxpayer base and increases in the longevity of beneficiaries. Detroit was impacted
by both demographic effects, seeing its ratio of employees to pensioners fall from
two to one in 1960 to one to one in 1991 to one to two in 2012.256 The life

250

Lawrence J. McQuillan, Detroit bankruptcy reveals 401(k)’s virtues: Column, USA
TODAY (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.usa today. com/story/opinion/2014/08/18/detroitbankurptcy-trial-pension-column/14228253/; Andrea Riquier, Detroit Bankruptcy Deal
Largely Spares Pensions, INV. BUS. DAILY, Apr. 28, 2014, at A1 (noting that, prior to the
bankruptcy, the unfunded liability was listed as approximately one-fourth of the $3.5 liability
determined by the Emergency Financial Manager Kevyn Orr).
251

See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland/The Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts
Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never Die . . . and How They
Are Killing Cities Like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 778 (2014) (“[f]inally, there are
the city’s creditors/lenders, including general obligation bondholders, some of whom were
promised that the city’s taxing power and/or dedicated revenue streams would be available for
repayment, but who now are being told that they should expect substantial losses. Put simply,
Detroit is faced with toxic stew of competing rights and obligations, and it cannot simply tax,
cut or borrow its way out of economic distress.”).
252
Nathan Borney & John Gallagher, How Detroit Went Broke, SUNDAY FREE PRESS, Sept.
15, 2013, at 12A.
253

Id.

254

Chung, supra note 251, at 793.

255
The City’s mismanagement is epitomized by its mayor from 2002 to 2008, Kwame
Kilpatrick, who is now in prison. See Can Detroit recover? Chapter 9 draws to an end,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2014, at 36.
256
The employee to pensioner ratio in Detroit in 1960 was 26,386 employees to 10,629
pensioners; in 1991 it was 18,548 employees to 18,615 pensioners; and in 2012 it was 10,525
employees to 21,113 pensioners. Borney & Gallagher, supra note 252, at 14A.
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expectancy for men was 66.6 years in 1960, but it increased to 76.2 years by 2010.257
During this same time frame, Detroit’s population decreased by 57%.258 These
changes, coupled with pensioners’ unwillingness to reduce benefits while looking
for cost of living increases, made the pension system unsustainable. Further, in 1997,
when the Michigan moved from a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution
plan, Detroit failed to follow suit and its legacy costs continued to increase.259
3. Inaccurate Projections of Financial Returns
Pension management requires making complex financial projections of receipts
from the City and/or workers, returns on pension fund investments, and benefit
estimates. If a high investment return is estimated, the fund can be balanced with
lower contributions from the City and the workers. In administering Detroit’s two
pension plans, the pension board members were union officials who employed static
return percentage (most recently 7.9% annual rate of return) far exceeding the actual
returns realized on the pension funds.260 Allegedly, political pressure on plan
administrators to use artificially enhanced investment return estimates reduced the
City’s annual contribution.261 With the adverse forces described above in play, this
257

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2015 (2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus15.pdf.
258

FAZLEY SIDDIQ, FIFTY YEARS OF GROWTH
UNITED STATES 1960-2010, at 14, 18-20 (2013).
259

AND

DECLINE

OF

LARGE COUNTIES

IN THE

Borney & Gallagher, supra note 252, at 14A.

260

Estimates made on assumptions of return as high as 8% have been seen as unrealistic.
William K. Tabb, If Detroit Is Dead, Some Things Need to be Said At the Funeral, 37 QUEENS
COL. J. URB. AFF. 1, 8 (2015). It has also been observed:
That is, the pension obligations of the city constitute an expense equal to almost 200%
of the city’s total payroll. Most departments and operations of the city of Detroit are
understaffed and layoffs have occurred. Currently in the cases of both plans, active
members constitute less than 40% of the members. That is, over 60% of the members
of these funds are not contributing to annuity funds which are invested in the capital
markets to grow the amount of money available to fund the plans’ obligations.
Moreover, the market values of the assets held by such funds were significantly lower
than the value of those assets assumed in the actuarial analysis of the funds.
Mark P. Franke, The Detroit Pensions Bankruptcy Trust: A Proposal for the Resolution of
Detroit’s Pensions Obligations under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 23 BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 2, art. 5 (2014) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
261

Fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption in the city’s two pension funds and all employee
benefit programs were also alleged. The emergency manager ordered an investigation into
possible violations. Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Detroit Division, Jury
Convicts Former Detroit City Treasurer, Pensions Officials of Conspiring to Defraud
Pensioners Through Bribery (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/detroit/ pressreleases/2014/jury-convicts-former-detroit-city-treasurer-pension-officials-of-conspiring-todefraud-pensioners-through-bribery. An executive responsible for $200 million in real estate
investments pleaded guilty earlier this year to conspiring to bribe a city treasurer. Id. The
former city treasurer also is under indictment. Id. In addition, a federal grand jury indicted a
former general counsel for Detroit's police and fire pension fund. Id. The government claims
that people that had business with the city pension extorted thousands of dollars in the form of
payments to individual trustees. Id.
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situation could not go on forever and plan administrators sought to alleviate the
problem by investing large sums into alternative high-risk investments, which,
unfortunately, did not provide the return hoped for.262
4. The Approved Workout Plan
On November 7, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes issued an oral opinion
confirming the City’s eighth amended plan of adjustment.263 The opinion approved a
reduction in both pensions and the amount to be paid to bond holders.264 The City’s
art collection held by the Detroit Institute of Art (“DIA”) was an asset sought by
creditors, which the City desperately wanted to protect.265 The plan reflected
compromises and settlements of various claims, which the court found reasonable,
fair, equitable, nondiscriminatory, and feasible.
The pension settlement was part of what was called the “Grand Bargain,” a
collection of settlements among parties interested in the two pension plans and a
desire to protect the City’s art.266 The settlements include the pension settlement, the
state contribution, and the DIA. The Grand Bargain allows an unfunded accrued
actuarial liability (the “UAAL”) in the amount of $1.879 billion for GRS and $1.25
billion for PFRS.267 Under the Grand Bargain, the art will be preserved for the City
and the City’s two pension plans will receive $816 million over twenty years to be
paid by the State of Michigan, the Detroit Institute of Arts, and a number of
charitable foundations and individuals.268
Under the Grand Bargain GRS pensioners’ benefits are reduced by 4.5% and the
cost of living adjustment (COLA) is eliminated while the PFRS pensioners’ receive

262

This type of hedge fund investing, coupled with other alternative investments such as
venture capital and private equity has steadily increased in the last thirty years and now
account for 20% of public pension fund allocations. Detroit also made very speculative and
ultimately disastrous derivative deals in relation to their debt offerings in connection with its
special financing offer, which was basically a Band-Aid over a large wound. See THOMAS
SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT xx
(2014) (“In 2005 [Mayor Kwame] Kilpatrick approved the largest municipal restructuring to
date. A ‘veritable army’ of financial professionals from the nation’s top investment banks and
insurance companies put together a $1.44 billion deal to fund the city’s unfunded pensions
liability using innovative but complex and highly risky derivatives and credit default swaps . .
. But just a few years later, the deal, like many of the high-risk credit deals that proliferated in
the 1990s and 2000s, unraveled.”).
263
Oral Opinion on the Record at 1, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich.
Nov.
7,
2014),
http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/notices/
Oral_Opinion_on_Detroit_Plan_Confirmation_Judge_Rhodes_FINAL_for_Release.pdf
[hereinafter Detroit Oral Opinion].
264

Id. at 4-6.

265

Id. at 12-13.

266

Id. at 3.

267

Id. at 4 (finding through June 30, 2023 the pension plans will use a 6.75% discount rate
to value liabilities and a 6.75% assumed investment return rate to estimate future growth of
assets).
268

Id.; see also Can Detroit recover? Chapter 9 draws to an end, supra note 255.
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no benefit cut; however, their COLA is reduced from 2.52% to 1%.269 In approving
the plan the court determined that federal bankruptcy power was sufficient to impair
municipal pension rights even with state constitution protection.270
The pension settlement also relates to a voluntary savings plan called the Annuity
Savings Fund that was comingled with the GRS and was credited with excessive
interest accruals.271 The settlement provided that, subject to certain caps, excess
interest accrued between 2003 and 2013 would be repaid to the GRS, amortized at
6.75% over the participant’s life expectancy and deducted from the participant’s
monthly pension check.272 This part of the settlement is estimated to recoup $190
million into the GRS.273
To settle the claims consistent with Michigan Constitution article IX, section 24,
which prohibits the impairment of municipal pensions, the State of Michigan will
make an immediate payment of $194.8 million to settle pension claims.274 The DIA
Settlement involves the transfer of the City’s art to a permanent trust in exchange for
contributions to be paid over a twenty-year period into the GRS and the PFRS in the
269
Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 263, at 4-5. The pension plans were frozen as of July
1, 2014 and current employees will get a less generous hybrid pension plan. Each pension
claimant will receive an adjusted pension amount. Projected funding targets for 2023 are 70%
for GRS and 78% for PFRS with full funding by 2053. The plan was approved by 73% for
GRS and 82% for PFRS. Id. This settlement was a victory for current pensioners since they
were initially offered a plan, called the “Hybrid Plan,” that would rectify the pension situation
by immediately reducing the benefits for GRS pensioners by 35% and eliminating their cost of
living increases and by reducing benefits for PFRS pensioners by 10% but maintaining their
cost of living increases. McQuillan, supra note 250; see also Chris Isidore & Melanie Hicken,
Detroit
vote:
Key
to
comeback,
CNN
MONEY
(May
6,
2014),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/06/news/ economy/detroit-bankruptcy-vote/. Additional cuts
are proposed to health care benefits promised to retirees. Id.; see also Andrea Riquier,
Detroit’s Pensions Largely Avoid Cuts In City Bankruptcy: Precedent For Future Flops?,
INV. BUS. DAILY, Apr. 29, 1014, at A1. Voting on the proposal took place in July 2014, and
both the General Pensioners (73% of retirees and employees with pension benefits who voted
supported the plan) and Police and Firefighter Pensioners (82% those eligible for a police or
fire pension who voted supported the plan) approved the plan. David Sirota, Detroit’s latest
pension disgrace, SALON (July 24, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/07/24/
detroits_pension_disgrace_a_gaudy_new_stadium_at_retirees_expense_partner/ (last visited
7/29/2014).
270
Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 263, at 5. The court rejected challenges to the
settlement under the Michigan constitution as well as arguments that the art at the DIA should
be available for sale to fund the pension obligations. In fact, the court felt that the pension
reduction were “minor” compared to any foreseeable result at the time the bankruptcy was
filed and was only possible because of the Grand Bargain. Id. at 6-7.
271

Id. at 8.

272

Id. The recoupment is limited to 20% cap of the highest value of the participant’s ASF
account or of the participant’s annual pension. The settlement of the ASF claim will net
approximately $190 million for the GRS. Id.
273

Id.

274

Elizabeth Pratt, Legislation Related to the Detroit Bankruptcy, ST. NOTES, Summer
2014,
at
1,
http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/Publications/Notes/2014Notes/NotesSum14lp.pdf.
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amounts of $100 million from contributions guaranteed by the DIA and $366 million
from various local and national charitable foundations.275
The overall bankruptcy settlement included six settlements beyond the Grand
Bargain.276 The parties settled a claim for other post-employment benefits (OPEB),
which includes healthcare and life insurance benefits.277 The allowed amount of
OPEB claims was $4.3 billion of which $2.1 billion was for GRS retirees and $2.2
billion for PFRS retirees.278 In settlement of these claims, the City established two
associations to administer the claims and provided funding to the level of 10% of
what the claims asserted.279 The remaining five settlements reflected recoveries
ranging from 13% to 74% of the amount claimed.280 Overall, the City was able to
reduce its unsecured liabilities by $7 billion out of the $18 billion owed by going
into bankruptcy.281
In settling the claim, the City was given approval to borrow $325 million in exit
financing.282 However, the court admonished the City’s labor unions, retirees, and
the State of Michigan to take actions to make sure this never happened again.
Finally, the court also admonished the Governor regarding the composition of the
Financial Review Commission responsible for ensuring the long-term feasibility of
the plan and the City’s fiscal health that is composed of seven members, two of
which are elected City officeholders.283 The court’s concern was that these two
members have an interest in advocating for the City’s position rather than providing
oversight.284 That meant only seven members are independent, thereby requiring five
out of remaining seven members to overturn any action proposed by the City.285
The Detroit bankruptcy raised two important issues that were settled without the
requirement of a court decision, aside from whether the settlement was fair and in
275

Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 263, at 12. The Court also found in its discussion
regarding the settlement being in the best interests of the creditors that “[t]o sell the DIA art
would be to forfeit Detroit’s future” and that the City made the right decision in refusing to
sell the art. Id. at 24; see also Sirota, supra note 269 (noting that the $816 million represents
the present value of Detroit’s world-class collection of the Detroit Institute of Arts, which the
City has indicated would be placed in a separate trust, and finding concerning that, at the same
time pensioners were seeing their pensions cut (“slash” according to Sirota), billionaire
owners of the Detroit Red Wings, the Ilitch family, unveiled details of an already approved
taxpayer-financed stadium for the professional hockey team).
276

Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 263, at 2.

277

Id. at 14.

278

Id. The City claimed the OPEB liability was $3.8 billion and the retirees asserted it was
$5 billion with the difference resulting from certain actuarial assumptions and discount rates.
Id.
279

Id.

280

Id. at 15-20.

281

Can Detroit recover? Chapter 9 draws to an end, supra note 255.

282

Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 263, at 37.

283

Id. at 43.

284

Id.

285

Id. at 42-43.
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the best interests of the creditors. These issues were the extent and application of the
constitutional provision prohibiting the impairment of municipal pensions, and
whether art is subject to a trust that prohibits the City from selling it to pay debts.
These issues await another day, but Detroit is out of bankruptcy and the only clear
winners are those providing services to the bankruptcy who have received $126
million thus far, and are estimated to receive a total of $150 million, which is in
excess of the GM bankruptcy ($110 million) and the Chrysler bankruptcy ($77
million), but no way near the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. bankruptcy ($2.2
billion).286
B. The States: New Jersey, California, Illinois287
Just as Detroit’s fiscal insolvency led to bankruptcy, many states are in a similar
position as a result of irresponsible borrowing, unfunded pensions, and healthcare
liabilities. Unlike municipalities, bankruptcy courts are not available to states.288
In a recent report using 2012 data, the fifty states were ranked according to the
state’s “financial health based on a variety of measures, such as cash on hand to pay
its current bills, budget surpluses or deficits, unfunded liabilities and ability to
provide adequate public services.”289 The report notes that, although the Great
Recession290 is now history, states still struggle with the repercussions of the
economic downturn and balancing budgets continues to be a problem for the states
due, in part, to rising healthcare costs and the cost of funding state and local
pension.291 New Jersey, Illinois, and California are three states ranked among the

286
Matthew Dolan, Cost of Detroit’s Historic Bankruptcy Reaches $126 Million, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cost-of-detroits-historic-bankruptcyreach-126-million-1410557043 (noting that such fees are for lawyers, accountants, financial
advisers, and experts on everything from police work and pension funds to art appraisals and
public relations). The Bankruptcy Judge’s oral opinion noted that the fees in this case would
exceed $100 million. Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 263, at 27.
287

Frank, supra note 3, at x.

288

Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 7 (2013).

289

John Merline, New Jersey Dead Last In U.S. For Fiscal Solvency, Study Finds, INV.
BUS. DAILY, Jan. 17, 2014, at A1. “Cash solvency” looks to how much cash a state can easily
access to pay near-term bill. “Budget solvency” is mainly a measure of a state’s per-capita
budget surpluses or deficits. “Long-term solvency” looks at a state’s ability to pay its longterm obligations, such as guaranteed pension benefits and infrastructure maintenance. Id.
“Service solvency” examines whether a state has sufficient resources to provide its residents
with an adequate level of services, such as public safety and education. Id. The article was
based on a study from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Sarah Arnett, State
Fiscal Condition: Ranking the 50 States (Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper
No. 14-02, 2014).
290

“The ‘Great Recession’ is a term used to describe the nationwide United States
recession that lasted from December 2007 to June 2009 . . . .” Arnett, supra note 289, at n.1
(citing US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES.,
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html).
291

Arnett, supra note 289, at 3.
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five lowest and have recently been in the news for their pension difficulties.292 Their
ranking is as follows:
Table 5
Name of
Rank by
Rank by
Rank by
Rank by
Overall
Fiscal
State
Cash
Budget
LongServiceRank:
Conditio
Solvency Solvency
Run
Level
Fiscal
n
293
Solvency Solvency Condition
Index294
California
48
45
46
31
46
-2.01
(-2.58)
(-1.37)
(-2.67)
(-0.96)
Illinois
50
46
49
29
48
-2.42
(-2.66)
(-1.37)
(-4.81)
(-0.50)
New
36
50
50
39
50
-2.81
Jersey
(-1.72)
(-2.84)
(-5.12)
(-1.99)
Ranking by Fiscal Condition (Fiscal Year 2012)
In describing the results, the report suggests the bottom performers were
especially hit hard in two categories: Budget Solvency and Long-Run Solvency.295
These states’ status reflects years of poor financial management, adverse economic
conditions, and/or a combination of both.
New Jersey and Illinois are similar in that; (1) tax revenues have not kept up with
spending, (2) budget practices only appear to balance the budget, (3) bonds are
issued without the means of paying for them, and (4) pension liabilities underfunded
by billions of dollars.296 Calculating unfunded liabilities is always difficult, in that
the choice of an appropriate discount rate will often determine whether the fund is in
deficit or surplus.297 It also seems that in times of economic downturns, states will
underfund pension obligations and use the funds for other purposes.298
292

Id. at 3. For a broader list of states that are in the winner and in the loser category, see
MARIN, supra note 2, at 13 (identifying the winner states as Delaware, Idaho, North Carolina,
Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin, and the loser states as Arkansas, Connecticut,
California, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and
Rhode Island.) The winners made provision for retirement and post retirement medical needs
of workers and the general population while the losers did not and are now faced with playing
catch up through tax increases and service cuts. Id.
293
Note: Solvency indices are in parenthesis next to the rank whereas the index of fiscal
condition is in the separate last column. For each index the all state mean is 0.00. The top
rated state in each category are as follows: Cash Solvency: Alaska (15.25); Budget Solvency:
Alaska (7.76); Long-Run Solvency: Nebraska (8.77); Service-Level Solvency: Nevada (6.93);
and Fiscal Condition: Alaska (8.80). Arnett, supra note 289, at 34-40.
294

Arnett’s State Fiscal Condition identifies the fiscal condition index as “the sum of the
cash, budget, long-run, and service-level solvency indices weighted as follows: (0.35 x cash
solvency score) + (0.35 x budget solvency score) + (0.2 x long-run solvency score) + (0.1 x
service-level solvency score).” Id. at 38.
295

Id. at 34-40.

296

Id. at 24.

297

Arnett describes the method of selecting an appropriate discount rate as follows:

The method used to calculate a state’s unfunded pension liabilities is a point of much
discussion. The controversy centers on how to determine the appropriate discount rate,
which is the interest rate used to determine the future value of pension assets. The
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1. New Jersey
On September 25, 2014, a specially appointed commission to study the status of
New Jersey’s pension and health benefit systems issued the “NJ Status Report.”299
The Report outlined New Jersey’s fifteen-year history of underfunding its state and
local pensions. New Jersey’s 2014 budget called for $700 million in pension
spending and $2.8 billion in health benefit spending, for current employees and
retirees, out of its $33 billion state budget.300 Fully funding New Jersey’s pension
obligation would require an additional $3 billion.301 Looking at the long-range
prospects the unfunded pension liability is at $37 billion and the unfunded postemployment health benefit liability is at $53 billion.302
unfunded pension liabilities presented in this section of the paper come from state
estimates. State pension plans currently use their own rate-of-return and discount-rate
assumptions, resulting in underestimated liabilities that are different to compare
between states. To address this difficulty, Moody’s Investors Service, a credit rating
agency, proposed that state pension plans use a common rate of return/discount rate
base on a high-grade bond index. Changing the discount rate in accordance with
Moody’s proposal would result in higher estimated unfunded liabilities that most
estimates currently report. For example, using Moody’s new methodology, Illinois’s
estimated unfunded pension liability would be over $200 billion. When New Jersey’s
unfunded pension liability is calculated using a method consistent with private-sector
accounting standards, the state’s unfunded liabilities rise to over $273 billion. For the
purposes of calculating the long-run solvency index, this paper uses the total longterm liabilities figure reported in state CAFRs [Comprehensive Annual Financial
Reports produced by state and local governments], which includes pension liabilities.
Id. at n.18 (internal citations omitted). Another method that understates pension liabilities
occurs when an out of date table of mortuary experience is used which underestimates the
anticipated life expectancy. See Jean Lotus, Police and fire pension funds report $200,000
shortfall: Actuarial change leads to property tax boost to cover pensions, FOREST PARK REV. 2
(Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.forestparkreview.com/News/Articles/9-9-2014/Police-and-firepension-funds-report-$200,000-shortfall-/ (reporting that Forest Park, Illinois used GAM1971, a 1971 actuarial table, rather than RP-2000, a 2000 actuarial table, that showed an
additional four years of life expectancy thereby increasing the amount of the unfunded
liability).
298

Arnett, supra note 289, at 16.

299

TRUTH & CONSEQUENCE: STATUS REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY PENSION AND HEALTH
BENEFIT STUDY COMMISSION (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pdf/
NJPHBSC.pdf [hereinafter NJ STATUS REPORT]. Governor Christie in Executive Order No.
161, signed on August 1, 2014, appointed a ten member commission to examine the status of
the pension and health care systems of the State of New Jersey. The status report is factual and
explanatory in nature and a final report will offer solutions. Id. at 2.
300

Id. at 3.

301

Id. (stating the unfunded liability is for the pension funding only since the health care is
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis).
302

Id. at 4 (the combined $81 billion is almost three times the state’s annual budget). The
funded pension liability is $44 billion making the pension funded at the level of 54%. Id. The
unfunded liability is defined as the “present value of: 1) the cost of providing pension benefits
to current retirees and 2) the pension benefits earned through that date by current employees.”
Id. at 5. In making the calculation, a 7.9% expected rate of return was used which is a number
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The states underfunding is blamed on the drag on plan asset values caused by the
2000-2002 downturn, the Great Recession of 2008-2009, as well as, elected officials
of both political parties making long-term commitments for benefits based on
assumptions that were unduly optimistic.303 Reforms initiated by Governor Chris
Christie in 2010 and 2011 helped by reducing benefits for new employees,
increasing contributions, and temporarily suspending the cost of living adjustment;
however, many saw them as a political compromise and not a permanent solution.304
It remains to be seen whether Governor Christie will again seek to curb pension and
health care costs or even make the promised contributions given current budget
constraints.305
2. Illinois
One recent report identified Illinois as the worst state in terms of pension funding
with their plans only 39% funded, followed by Kentucky at 48%; Connecticut at
49%; and New Jersey at 54%.306
Officially, in 2011 the combined unfunded pension liability for Illinois’ five
state-run pension plans was $83 billion, using an expected return of 8% to value the

used by other states. Id. A lower rate of return would increase the amount of the unfunded
liability.
303

Id. at 6. Local governments in New Jersey participate in the same plans but their plans
have funded ratio of 75% compared to the state’s funded ration of 54%. Id.
304
Id. at 7. The changes in 2010 and 2011 are currently being challenged in litigation. Id.
Suspending COLAs reduced the unfunded liability by $11.5 billion. Id. Health care is
particular problem because the plans provide little incentive for employees to reduce costs,
and, when the “Cadillac Tax” under the Affordable Care Act becomes effective in 2018, New
Jersey will likely see an excise tax imposed in the amount of $58 million rising to $284
million in 2022. Id. at 7-8. Citing Pew Charitable Trust data, the Report points out that the
annual cost of individual health insurance coverage in New Jersey is $9,096 compared to a
public and private national average cost of $5,884 and for family coverage $19,488 in New
Jersey compared to $16,351 for the national average. Only Alaska and New Hampshire had
higher costs. Id. at 24.
305

Elise Young & Terrence Dopp, Christie Pension Fixes Range From Unlikely to
Unpalatable, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0804/christie-pension-fixes-range-from-unlikely-to-unpalatable. The article also notes that West
Virginia adopted a defined contribution plan in 1991, but changed back to a defined benefit
plan in 2005 because they found it was cheaper to administer over the long run. Id.
306

NJ STATUS REPORT, supra note 299, at 6. Regarding Kentucky’s problems, see CHRIS
TOBE WITH KEN TOBE, KENTUCKY FRIED PENSIONS: EXPANDED WORSE THAN DETROIT EDITION
9 (2d ed. 2013) (noting: “[T]he two states most corrupt in their funding practices are also
corrupt in their investment practices. In the cases of Illinois and Kentucky the plans seem to
be linked in a strange quid pro quo in which the retirement systems look the other way at their
underfunded plans, while the legislature and governors look the other way and turn a blind eye
to the investment corruption. As put by Matt Taibbi in Rolling Stone ‘With public budgets
carefully scrutinized by everyone . . . the black box of pension funds makes it the only public
treasure left that’s easy to steal.’”); see also Timothy W. Martin, Despite Cuts, More Pension
Woes, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/kentuckys-governor-mattbevin-prepares-another-pension-overhaul-1453842769 (describing the efforts of Kentucky’s
new governor to overhaul Kentucky’s state pension system).
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funds.307 Moody’s Investment Service, a bond-rating agency, found the short fall to
be $135 billion, using a 5.67% discount rate.308 For 2012, Moody’s used a discount
rate of 4.1% under the agency’s new methodology, at which time the unfunded
liability approached $200 billion.309 To cover its annual pension obligations, Illinois
has issued bonds, which now constitute 60% of Illinois’ outstanding debt.310 Illinois
is using long-term borrowing to cover current obligations and squeezing other
spending to accommodate its pension underfunding.311
In 2012, Illinois attempted to control retiree healthcare costs by eliminating the
statutory standards for determining the state’s contribution to health insurance
premiums for certain retirees, and instead placed responsibility for allocating the
health insurance premiums to the director of a public agency.312 The beneficiaries
challenged the legislation, alleging, among other things, the legislature’s action
violated the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.313 In July
2014, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the health insurance benefit was a
“benefit of membership” under the plain and ordinary meaning of the constitutional
provision, and was therefore within that provision’s protections.314 The case was
remanded for the plaintiffs to proceed with their claims.315

307

Ted Dabrowski, Illinois Pension Debt to Double as New Moody’s Methodology Kicks
In, ILL. POL’Y INSTIT. BLOG (June 17, 2013), http://www.ilinoispolicy.org/illinois-pension debt-to-double-as-new-moodys-methodology-kicks-in/.
308

Id.

309

Id. (finding the Illinois state pension system is squeezing out everything from prisons to
education and state pensions are grossly underfunded with unfunded liabilities of $100 billion
and assets of 39%). Illinois has all the problems common to other pension systems and is
trying all the common solutions from raising taxes to extending age limit, and eliminating
(Jan.
26,
2013),
retiree
health
care.
Squeezed,
ECONOMIST
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21570733-illinois-lawmakers-fail-tackle-statespension-crisis-squeezed.
310

Dabrowski, supra note 307.

311

Arnett, supra note 289, at 21–22 (estimating that the unfunded liability approaches
$200 million using Moody’s Investors Service proposed state discount rate); see also
Dabrowski, supra note 307; Money to Burn, ECONOMIST (May 4, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21577088-muddle-headed-worldamerican-public-pension-accounting-money-burn.
312

Retiree Health Insurance Ruling to Increase State Costs by $128 Million, INST. ILL.
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY (July 17, 2014), https://www.civicfed.org/iifs/blog/retiree-healthinsurance-ruling-increase-state-costs-128-million.
313
Kanerva v. Weems, 13 N.E.3d 1228, 1239 (Ill. 2014); ILL. CONST. 1970, art. XIII, § 5
(“Membership in any pension or retirement system of the state . . . shall be an enforceable
contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.”).
314

Weems, 13 N.E.3d at 1239. In its examination of the floor debate on the pension
protection clause during the drafting of the state constitution in 1970, the opinion says:
The intent of the pension protection clause was “to guarantee that retirement rights
enjoyed by public employees would be afforded contractual status and insulated from
diminishment or impairment by the General Assembly. In light of the constitutional
debates, we have concluded that the provision was aimed at protecting the right to
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In December 2013, while the healthcare litigation mentioned above was ongoing,
the Illinois Legislature passed a pension reform law that decreased cost-of-living
adjustments, capped pensionable salaries, and raised retirement ages while
decreasing employee contributions by one percentage point.316 The legislation was
immediately challenged under the Illinois Constitution and the reforms were placed
on hold pending the outcome of the litigation.317 During the 2014 gubernatorial
election, Governor Pat Quinn and the Republican gubernatorial candidate, Bruce
Rauner, avoided definitive pension proposals while waiting for the outcome of
litigation. Governor Rauner won the election and plans to propose replacing the
defined benefit plan with a defined contribution plan that would reduce current costs,
but would do nothing to address the burden of paying for the accrued unfunded
liabilities of the old plan.318After the November election, the Sangamon County
Circuit Court overturned the 2012 health care reforms and the case proceeded to the
Illinois Supreme Court, which upheld the circuit court, finding a violation of the
pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution.319 Governor Rauner’s efforts to

receive the promised retirement benefits, not the adequacy of the funding to pay for
them.”
Id. at 1242. Interestingly, the court noted language in the debates that recognized the
importance of providing pension assurance to “those persons who have worked for often
substandard wages over a long period of time could at least expect to live in some kind of
dignity during their golden years.” Id. The court cited two other cases reaching opposite
conclusions based on similar constitutional language. Everson v. State of Hawaii, 122 Haw.
402, 228 P.3d 282 (Haw. 2010) (holding health care benefits covered by the provision); In re
Lippman, 487 N.E.2d 897 (1985) (holding that health benefits were not covered and the
provision only extended benefits directly related to the terms of the retirement annuity). The
Everson court found the decision in In re Lippman unpersuasive, and the Weems court agreed.
Weems, 13 N.E.3d at 1243; see also Paul Merrion, Pension reform dealt blow by Illinois
Supreme Court, CRAINS (July 3, 2014), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140703/
NEWS02/140709930/pension-reform-dealt-blow-by-illinois-supreme-court#
(emphasizing
Justice Burke’s dissent stating that the court did not decide that the 2012 law was an
unconstitutional diminishment or impairment of the constitutional rights).
315

Weems, 13 N.E.3d at 1230. Justice Burke dissented, pointing out that the clause in the
constitution was titled “Pension and Retirement Rights,” which implied that only pensions
were covered and that there was no discussion at the time the provision was adopted about
health care benefits. Id. at 1245,1247 (Burke, J., dissenting). The dissent also objected that the
remanding of the case did not definitively answer the issued raised by the appeal. Id. at 125152.
316

Charles Chieppo, The Real Culprits in Illinois’ Pension Disaster, GOVERNING STATES
& LOCALITIES (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/col-real-culprits-illinoispension-underfunding-voters.html. The changes were intended to save $145 billion and fully
fund the state pension system by 2044. Id.
317

Id.

318

Steven Malanga, A Pyrrhic Pension Victory: Illinois public workers may pay dearly for
a court decision to overturn retirement reforms, CITY J. (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.cityjournal.org/html/pyrrhic-pension-victory-11470.html.
319

In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ill. 2015). The Illinois constitution
provides:
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balance the Illinois budget caused deadlock in the state capital.320 Indeed, the failure
to approve a budget has delayed state aid to colleges and universities for low-income
students forcing them to fail to return to school.321
Not only is the State of Illinois having problems, but the city of Chicago is as
well. Although not in bankruptcy, Chicago has a more serious pension problem than
Detroit. Detroit’s aggregate unfunded public-worker pension liabilities are estimated
at $4,100 per resident, while Chicago’s is at $18,200.322 Chicago also faces the
problem of decreasing population that has gone from 3.6 million in 1950 to 2.7
million today with 200,000 leaving in the first ten years of this century.323As reforms
have taken shape, unions have threatened suit to stop the legislation from taking
effect and suggest that Chicago instead borrow and raise taxes to fund the
pensions.324 Prior Chicago administrations used one-off sources of cash, such as
selling the right to collect parking fees until 2084.325 More recently, newly re-elected
Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local
government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an
enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or
impaired.
ILL. CONST. 1970, art. XIII, §5. The court in In re Pension Reform Litigation found that the
term “benefits” in the pension protection clause does not “only include the right to receive
payments in the amount determined by the most recent calculation” and that a retiree “has a
right in the existing formula by which his benefits are calculated as of the time he began
employment and any beneficial modifications made during the course of his employment.” In
re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 21-21 (citing Fields v. Elected Officials’ Retirement
Plan, 320 P.3d 1160, 1165-68 (Ariz. 2014).
320

Aaron M. Renn, It’s Reform or Misrule In Basket Case That’s Illinois, INV. BUS.
DAILY, Jan. 4, 2016, at A13 (describing the budget stalemate between Illinois’ Republican
Governor and Democratic Legislature). “Short-term solutions and tax increases will never
solve Illinois’s problems: unsustainable public pensions and health care benefits, coupled with
a complete lack of fiscal responsibility. But Democrats and their union backers say they have
ruled out the substantive changes necessary to shore up the state’s financial future.” Emily
Zanotti, The Man Stopping Illinois From Digging a Deeper Hole, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-man-stopping-illinois-from-digging-a-deeper-fiscal-hole1454715881.
321

Douglas Belkin, Illinois Budget Deadlock hits College Enrollments, WALL ST. J., Jan.
19, 2016, at A2.
322
Chicago: Rahmbo’s toughest mission, ECONOMIST, June 14, 2014, at 25 (referencing
Civic Federation; Morningstar). Mayor Rahm Emanuel was encouraged by a pension reform
bill that required a 29% increase in contributions from existing city-government employees
for a “smaller” pension and raises an additional 50 million dollars in taxes. Id. Emanuel still
has to address the issue with teachers and with police and firefighters. Id. The latter groups
comprise approximately 39 million employees and retirees. Id.
323

Id.

324

Id.

325

Id.; see also Charles Chieppo, Can Chicago Ever Dig Itself out of Its Pension Hole?,
GOVERNING STATES & LOCALITIES (Nov. 4, 2014), www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/colchicago-public-pensions-cut-benefits-increase-contributions.html (noting that Chicago’s
pension contribution in 2013 was $476 million and is scheduled to double by 2016 and
escalate thereafter but even in 2016 the contribution would be barely half of the $2.2 billion
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Mayor Rahm Emmanuel suggested allowing gambling casinos in the city with
revenue dedicated to paying the City’s pension obligation as a way to address the
pension problem.326
3. California
California, unlike New Jersey or Illinois, has seen its fiscal condition improving
slightly as a balanced budget was proposed for the 2013-2014 fiscal year with a $1.2
billion surplus after years of billion-dollar deficits and sever political gridlock.327
California has been the victim of many unrealistic expectations about the
sustainability of pension benefits, such as assuming liability greater than funding
available, and the lack of adequate contingency planning.328 Estimating the size of
California’s unfunded pension obligations is often in the eye of the beholder, but one
bipartisan study estimated the unfunded liabilities of the ten largest public pension
plans, encompassing over 90% of the assets and participants in public pension plans,
at $240 billion.329 The two largest public pension funds in the United States are in
California: the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), which is
estimated to be 61% funded, and California State Teachers Retirement System
(CalSTRS), which is estimated to be 58% funded.330
In 1998, CalSTRS was fully funded for the first time primarily due to a thriving
stock market, increased state contributions, and a robust economy from the dot-com

payment the city should make under the Governing Accounting Standards Board
requirements). Chicago is likely a Detroit in the making.
326

Allysia Finley, Rahm Emmanuel Rolls the Dice to Pay Chicago’s Pension Bills, WALL
ST. J., June 6, 2015, at A9. The Chicago schools started 2016 with a $480 million shortfall
driven by pension payments and a decline in state funding. Illinois Governor Rauner is calling
for a state takeover of the Chicago and legislation that would allow the school district to file
for bankruptcy. Mark Peters & Kris Maher, Schools in Detroit, Chicago Seek State Help,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2016, at A3.
327

Arnett, supra note 289, at 24-25; see also Beermann, supra note 288, at 3 (discussing
the pension crisis in California).
328

David Crane, Dow 28,000,000: The Unbelievable Expectations of California's Pension
System, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052748703315404575250822189252384 (written by an advisor to former
Governor Schwarzenegger).
329

LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, PUBLIC PENSIONS FOR RETIREMENT SECURITY ii, 3, 4, 21
(2011). California’s state retirement system has eighty-five separately managed “definedbenefit” plans and forty-six “defined contribution” plans covering a total membership of 4.4
million workers and retirees in California. Id. at 3. By 2015 California’s largest cities could be
devoting one-third of their budgets to pension costs. Id. at 21. Beermann cites studies showing
the estimated unfunded liability of public pensions as high as $4.6 trillion while another study
estimates it as low as $647 billion. See Beermann, supra note 288, at 11-12 and studies cited
therein.
330

LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 329, at 4. CalPERS covers over one-half of all
California government workers and CalSTRS provides uniform benefits for all K-12 teachers
and administrators and community college faculty, was started in 1913, and is under strict
state control. Id. at 4-5.
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boom.331 Seeking a political advantage from the positive developments, the
Legislature and Governor enhanced teachers’ pension benefits believing that stock
market gains would absorb the increased cost.332 The retirement of teachers who
worked twenty-five years was calculated based on their highest single year of salary
rather than a three year average of the top three.333 Longevity bonuses and
supplemental retirement accounts were also created, and, at the same time, state
contributions were reduced while teachers and school system payments went
unchanged.334 In 2001, the dot-com bubble burst, which led to a $20 billion shortfall
and the Legislature, relying on a 40% chance of covering it with market gains, did
nothing.335 Then, with the 2008 recession, the funding levels plummeted to a level
many considered unhealthy.336
CalSTRS is on the road to insolvency337 and the government can no longer rely
on stock market returns to close the deficit.338 Tax hikes or cuts in government
services will have to be used to compensate. In the fiscal year ending in June 2014,
payments into CalSTRS by school employees, school districts, and the state were $6
billion, creating the need for additional $4.5 billion if investment returns do not meet
expectations.339 While California expects to have a budget surplus this fiscal year,
lawmakers also have other expenditures to consider.340
CalPERS, the nation’s largest public employee pension fund, administers health
and retirement benefits for more than 3,000 city, state, and local agencies with over
1.6 million retirement system members and 1.4 million health plan members.341 Like
CalSTRS teachers, CalPERS members received generous plan increases in 1999 that
could allow workers as young as fifty-years-old to retire with lifetime pensions up to
331
Chris Megerian, No Easy Fix for California’s Teacher Pension Crisis, L.A. TIMES (Feb.
20, 2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-teacher-pensions-20140221story.html#page=1.
332

Id.

333

Id. (referring to a sixty-two-year-old teacher who retired in 2013 with twenty-five years
of service receiving a monthly pension of $3,980).
334
Id. State contributions into the pension fund were reduced from 2.6% to 2% of the
statewide teacher payroll. Id. Teachers continued to pay in 8% of their salaries, as they have
since 1972. Id. Schools have contributed 8.25% of their payrolls since 1990. Id.
335

Id.

336

Id.

337

Id.

338

David Crane, Teachers' pension crisis: How it happened, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/mar/08/david-crane-calstrs-fundingnightmare/.
339

Megerian, supra note 331.

340
Crane, supra note 338. With the recent stock market surge, pension plans are finding
some relief while unions are thinking about how to raise pensions with the increased returns.
Steven Greenhut, Pension funds cheer good news. So why do they need us?, PUB. SECTOR INC.
(Aug. 4, 2014).
341

Facts at a Glance, CALPERS, www.CalPers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/facts-at0aglance.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2014).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/5

56

2016]

ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS

825

90% of final year salaries.342 This bill was the largest issuance of non-voterapproved debt in California’s history, and CalPERS assured (some say misled) the
Legislature that investment returns would cover the cost of the pension
enhancements.343
In 2012, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law the California Public
Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013.344 The law was essentially aimed at
reducing pension payments for newly hired workers, but was somewhat undermined
when CalPERS’s board approved nearly one hundred different types of extra pay
that count towards pensions (referred to as “pension-spiking”) for workers hired
since 2013.345 A 2014 bill aimed to fund CalSTRS over a thirty-two year period by
increasing school district contributions.346
Reforms in California are hindered by politics and judicial decision. In 2014, San
Jose Mayor Chuck Reed proposed amending the California Constitution to permit
government employers to change pension and healthcare benefits earned by public
employees going forward and, when pension and healthcare retirement benefits are
underfunded and are impeding the government from providing essential services, to
reduce pension payments, increase employee contributions, decrease cost of living
342
Crane, supra note 338. SB 400 signed into law in 1999 by then Governor Gray Davis
increased pension benefits retroactively and prospectively for all public sector employees. Id.
343

Id. Allegedly, CalPERS “failed to disclose . . . that (1) the state budget was on the hook
for shortfalls . . . , (2) those assumed investment returns implicitly projected the Dow Jones
would reach roughly 25,000 by 2009 and 28,000,000 by 2099 . . . , (3) shortfalls could turn
out to be hundreds of billions of dollars, (4) CalPERS’s own employees would benefit from
the pension increases and (5) members of Calpers’s board had received contributions from the
public employee unions who would benefit from the legislation.” Id.
344

Assemb. B. 340, 2012 Assemb., (Cal. 2013) (making several changes to pension
benefits that may be offered to new employees, hired on or after January 1, 2013, affecting
contribution rates and funding in California public retirement systems, and these changes
include, among others, a new maximum, a lower-cost pension formula that increased the age
and service requirements for retirement and a cap on pensionable compensation, as well as
increasing the period used to calculate final average compensation to three years). The bill
also included pension-spiking reform for new and existing employees. See generally
CALPERS, SUMMARY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ PENSION REFORM ACT OF 2013 AND RELATED
CHANGES
TO
THE
PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES’
RETIREMENT
LAW
(2012),
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/summary-pension-act.pdf.
345
Tim Reid, California Governor decries Calpers vote on pensions, REUTERS (Aug. 20,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/20/us-usa-pensions-calpersidUSKBN0GK23220140820. California Governor Jerry Brown opposed this vote since the
action would increase the costs of state pensions which are calculated on the total amount of
pensioners’ monthly income. Id.; see also Steven Greenhut, California Embraces PensionSpiking
Bonanza,
HUM.
EVENTS
(Aug.
27,
2014),
http://humanevents.come/2014/08/27/californai-embraces-pensin-spiking-bonanza/ (providing
pension-spiking techniques such as including extra pay for clerical workers for typing and
taking dictation, extra pay for police officers taking physical fitness programs, maintaining
licenses required for the job and other similar items to employees hired after January 1, 2013
thereby undermining the recent legislation).
346
Victor Nava, California’s Pension Reforms Don’t Go Far Enough, ORANGE CNTY.
REG., (July 29, 2014) (lamenting that the reform did not address the overly optimistic assumed
rate of return on investments).
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adjustments, or increase retirement age.347 The initiative was scheduled for the
November 4, 2014 ballot but was withdrawn by its sponsor after the Attorney
General of California, Kamala Harris, released the ballot language and summary of
the bill. Reed thought that the language misrepresented the bill by focusing on the
pension takeaways rather than the positive side of the initiative.348 Litigation is
ongoing and the initiative may be reset for the 2016 election.349
The 2014 pension reform initiative was aimed at the so-called “California Rule,”
a judicially created rule significantly restricting California’s ability to initiate
decreases in public sector pensions.350 In a series of cases beginning in 1917,
California courts began a process to secure state pensions, even those not yet earned,
by linking pensions to unbreakable contracts.351 By 1955, in the Allen v. City of Long
Beach decision, the final link in the “California Rule” fell into place when the court
held that “changes in a pension plan which result in a disadvantage to employees
should be accompanied by comparable new advantages.”352 One commentator, who
concluded that the California Rule is inconsistent with both contract law and
economic theory,353 describes the most significant criticism:
California courts have put in place a highly restrictive legal rule that binds
the legislature without the court ever finding clear and unambiguous
evidence of legislative intent to create a contract. This break with
traditional contract clause analysis is potentially the most troubling in that

347

California
Pension
Reform
Initiative,
BALLOTPEDIA
(2014)
http://ballotpedia.org/California-Pension-Reform-Initiative-%282014%29#text-of-measure
(last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
348

Id.

349

Id.; see also Tim Reid, Democrats Feud Over California Pension Reform Measure,
REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/04/us-usa-californiapensions-idUSBREA131EH20140204; Editorial, CalPERS About to Undo Pension Reform,
L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20140814/calpersabout-to-undo-pension-reform-editorial.
350

LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, PUBLIC PENSION AND RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: AN
INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNOR’S PROPOSAL 18 (2011).
351
O’Dea v. Cook, 169 P. 366 (Cal. 1917); see also Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as
Contracts? The “California Rule” and Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV.
1029, 1052 (2011) (describing O’Dea v. Cook as the first step of departure from the traditional
position that pensions were gratuities that the legislature could amend as it saw fit). Through
the court’s dicta that pensions, “as a form of compensation” became “in a sense a part of the
general contract of employment,” O’Dea was the first court “to suggest that pension statutes
might create contracts; however, the court developed this idea without authority for the
position and without an examination of legislative intent.” Id. at 1053, 1076. Later courts
would build on that dictum.
352
Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955). Allen has been described
as a “bombshell” in that it ignored any inquiry into legislative intent to create a contract it
impliedly held that reasonable modifications could be made to pensions so long as any
detrimental change was offset by a comparative new advantage. Monahan, supra note 351, at
1060.
353

Monahan, supra note 351, at 1029, 1044, 1075-82.
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it infringes on the power of the legislative branch without apparent
authority.354
A “flawed legal theory” creates a “flawed economic theory.” Locking one part of
a compensation package (i.e. pension accruals) in place355 while other areas of
compensation can be bargained for or eliminated creates a distorted economic
plan.356 The California Rule has also been criticized because the court found a
contractual relationship contrary to the well-established “presumption that statutes
do not create contractual rights absent clear and unambiguous evidence that the
legislature intended to bind itself.”357
States protect pension plan participants from significant modifications to their
plans under both constitutional and contract law theories.358 While there are distinct
protections under state provisions as compared to federal law, “the considerations
state judges use to decide whether to protect pensions under state law are very
similar to the considerations they use to determine whether a reform violates the U.S.
Constitution’s Contract Clause.”359 Present and future pension promises are
contractually protected under the California Rule from the first day of hire.360 Illinois
and Michigan, along with five other states, have state constitutional protection
354

Id. at 1070.

355

Id. at 1079. There is some authority in California that prior to retirement an employee
does not have an absolute right to a particular pension but only to a substantial or reasonable
pension. Beermann questions how far this “flexibility” would go. Beermann, supra note 288,
at 41, and cases cited therein.
356

Monahan states, “Yet California courts have held that even though the state can
terminate a worker, lower her salary, or reduce her other benefits, the state cannot decrease the
worker’s rate of pension accrual as long as she is employed.” Monahan, supra note 351, at
1033.
357

Id. at 1032 n.5 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
470 U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985)). Beermann does not accept this criticism because he believes
that pensions are different than other contracts since persons who accept employment with the
government usually have options, which they give up to accept the employment thinking the
pension is a firm commitment. Beermann, supra note 288, at 58-59. Another commentator,
while finding nothing invalid about the California Rule, states: “But the rule is unsound as a
policy matter, insofar as it locks governments and public employees into compensation
structures different than what they would otherwise negotiate, and makes it harder for states to
reform their pension systems.” ALEXANDER VOLOKH, OVERPROTECTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
PENSIONS: THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND THE CALIFORNIA RULE 4 (2013),
http://reason.org/files/overprotecting_pensions_california_rule.pdf. Volokh would agree with
Monahan that there was no explicit promise that the state would not change the pension. He
notes cases that have struck down changes to a COLA. Id. at 5.
358

Beermann, supra note 288, at 36 n.118 (citing Amy Monahan, Public Pension Plan
Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 617 (2010)).
359

“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also Beermann, supra note 288, at 36 n.116.
360
Beermann, supra note 288, at 37 n.119 (citing Monahan, supra note 351, at 1032).
Monahan references twelve other states which have followed the California Rule, as
announced including Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington. Id. at 1071.
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although Illinois protects present and future benefits while Michigan protects only
accrued benefits.361 Some state courts find protection under the Contracts Clause of
the United States Constitution once a contractual relationship is found under state
law.362 Federal bankruptcy, while available to municipalities, is not available to
states.363
4. Future of State Pensions
Illinois, New Jersey, and California allow public employees in their fifties to
retire with 90% of final pay, which is often increased by excessive pension spiking;
this is unsustainable.364 The major problem with public retirement plans is the lack
of transparency and enforcement.365 The Governmental Accounting Standards Board
has set standards, but there is no enforcement mechanism when the states do not
comply. One federal proposal was to eliminate the tax exemptions on bonds issued
by non-compliant states. However:
The record of private plans suggests that consistent and uniform
disclosure encourages more rigorous oversight by stakeholders. It is time
the federal government intervened to make sure the residents of state and
local jurisdictions are fully aware of the pension obligations their local
governments are creating for them. Beyond that, the states and local
governments are going to have to adjust their commitments to levels that
their taxpaying citizens can afford and will support.366
States are being forced to allocate large portions of their limited revenues to
satisfy high pension costs at the expense of education and other essential state
361
Liz Farmer, How Are Pensions Protected State-by-State, GOVERNING (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.governing.com/finance101/gov-pension-protections-state-by-state.html; see also
Beermann, supra note 288, at 37-38.
362
A question might arise as to when the contract is effective. Some courts look to a
“vesting” requirement while more generous courts might find a contract upon the employee
“accepting” employment thereby limiting the State’s ability to amend the contract without
consideration or employee consent. Other states view the employee as having a reliance
interest after working for an extended period of time, which may limit the benefit to those in
effect during his employment. Beermann, supra note 288, at 38-41, and cases cited therein.
363
Under federal bankruptcy law, current and retired municipal workers’ pensions can be
reduced or eliminated if the balance of equities favors revision or rejection. This is seen in In
re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 14 (E.D. Cal. 2012), where the bankruptcy court denied the
retirees’ request for an injunction to restore their benefits to pre-bankruptcy levels, mainly on
the ground that the court had neither the power nor the jurisdiction to grant such an injunction.
The bankruptcy court in the Stockton also observed that the Contract Clause is no impediment
to adjustment of municipal contracts pursuant to bankruptcy because the Contract Clause does
not apply to federal law. Beermann, supra note 288, at 69-72 n.265. CalPERS opposed the
decision, believing it was their fiduciary duty to do so. CalpERS Performs Its Fiduciary Duty,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/calpers-performs-its-fiduciary-dutyletters-to-the-editor-1424717233.
364

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 354.

365

Id.

366

Id. at 355.
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funded programs. California once had “one of the most comprehensive and
inexpensive higher education systems in the nation,” but is “now finding it
impossible . . . to continue to offer sufficient community college slots for
students.”367 According to Beermann, the pension crisis differs from other deficit
spending because there is a human element involved; people depend on the mostly
modest benefits in their retirement and have made career and personal decisions
based on these promises. The apparent fairness of proposed reductions should thus
be dependent on a multitude of considerations, including:
[T]he magnitude of the contributions made by retirees and employees to
the retirement system; the degree to which pensions were spiked in ways
not related to the true earnings of the employees; the degree to which
employees accepted lower current wages in exchange for generous
retirement benefits; and the other ways in which employees structured
their finances and their personal and professional lives around their
pension expectations.368
Reform centered on closing loopholes, such as elements that allow for inflated
pension benefit calculations (overtime, artificial promotions, etc.) are more likely to
be accepted.369
Government pensioners are only beginning to sense that their pensions may not
be as secure as once thought. Prior to the 2012 presidential elections, candidate Mitt
Romney was unexpectedly recorded saying he would not get the votes of 47% of the
citizens who do not pay taxes.370 However, it was pointed out that this so-called
“tax-gap” is not the deepest divide in the electorate. Indeed, the deepest divide is the
divide between those who have defined benefit pensions with a fixed annuity at
retirement and those who do not. In the early 1980s, 62% of American workers were
covered by some kind of defined benefit plan.371 Around that time, IRAs and 401(k)
plans were introduced with interest rates in the double digits and the great stock
market rally was beginning.372 Today, interest rates are close to zero and although
the stock market is at new highs (17,000), that high is a mere recovery from setbacks
in 2000 (11,700) and 2006 (14,100) caused by incredibly low interest rates and
Federal Reserve Bank quantitative easing, both of which are likely to end.373 In any
367

Beermann, supra note 288, at 84.

368

Id. at 86.

369

Id. at 84-66.

370

Jim Rutenberg & Ashley Parker, Romney Says Remarks on Voters Help Clarify
Position, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/us/politics/inleaked-video-romney-says-middle-east-peace-process-likely-to-remain-unsolvedproblem.html?_r=0.
371

ALICIA H. MUNNELL, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH
EVEN GREATER RETIREMENT RISKS 3 (2012).
372

AT

BOS. COLL., 2010 SCF SUGGESTS

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 358.

373

The Federal Reserve’s third round of quantitative easing ended in late 2014 and the
first rate hike in nearly a decade occurred in late 2015. Patrick Gillespie, Finally! Fed raises
interest rates, CNN (Dec. 6, 2015, 3:23 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/16/news/
economy/federal-reserve-interest-rate-hike/. In making the minimal 0.25% increase in the
federal funds rate, the Federal Reserve suggested there would likely be four additional quarter

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

61

830

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:769

event, the pension divide will likely close as those expecting lifetime annuities from
public pensions are eventually forced to face the reality of underfunding. The market
recoveries after 2000 and 2008 have not improved funding levels of public pension
plans. Many plans were almost fully funded by 1999, but the funding gap grew to
$670 billion by 2013 and $1.0 trillion by the end of 2015.374 Investment return is not
likely to close the gap.375 The conclusion of a 2012 article remains true today: “The
reality is that a big public-pension crash, which will eventually occur no matter who
wins the [2012 or, now, the 2016] election, will make clear that the government
employees won’t get what is promised. It will reveal the truth: We are all in the same
boat fiscally and even financially.”376
5. Impact of the Employer Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”)
Public pension plans are exempt from most ERISA rules, although they are
subject to some IRS requirements.377 In a comparison of wages plus benefits,
multiple researchers concluded that, although wages were comparable between
public sector workers and private sector workers after controlling for differences in
the nature of their work, when benefits were factored in on the basis of equitable
valuations that public sector workers compensation was almost one-third higher.378
Stories abound about public servants padding their final year of service to qualify for
point increases in 2016, but weaker economic data and financial-market volatility in January
2016 following their rate increase caught the Federal Reserve off-guard and caused them to
signal they would likely delay any further increases. Jed Graham, Fed Signals Policy Pause
After Dec. Hike Fallout, INV. BUS. DAILY, Jan. 28, 2016, at A1. Further, the Federal Reserve
action in December 2015 has been confirmed as a bad idea as evidenced by the collapsing oil
and commodity prices, a cratering Chinese economy, and slowdowns in Japan, Brazil, Russia,
and other European countries as well as the United States. Take Fed Hikes Off the Table, INV.
BUS. DAILY, Feb. 1, 2016, at A16. After pumping $2.5 trillion into the financial system, the
Federal Reserve is facing new challenges in trying to pull the cash out and returning to a more
normal interest rate. Katy Burne, Fed Risks New Distortions When It Raises Interest Rates,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2015, at A7; Greg Ip, Fed’s Message Is Key To Soothing Markets,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2016, at C1 (characterizing the Federal Reserve’s inability to control the
long term economic conditions as the “leader of a mob it inspires but doesn’t control.”). “This
creates a dilemma: Even when the Fed sets interest rates correctly for the needs of the
economy, markets routinely overreact, frustrating its plans.” Id.
374

Steven Malanga, Bear Mauls Gov’t Pensions Even A bull Couldn’t Heal, INV. BUS.
DAILY, Jan. 22, 2016, at A13.
375

Id. (noting that the biggest obstacle to real reform is the notion that a few good years of
investment return coupled with some additional contributions will solve most pension
underfunding).
376

Amity Shlaes, War on Pensions Will Make Election Battle Look Tame, INV. BUS.
DAILY, Sept. 28, 2012, at A15; see also Gerald Skoning, Welcome to Illinois, the Deadbeat
State, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2014, at A19 (decrying the debt of state and local governments as
well as the United States government and hoping newly elected republicans can help rectify
the situation).
377

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 216.

378

Id. 220 n.14 (citing Andrew G. Biggs, Are Government Workers Underpaid? No.,
AMERICAN
(June
9,
2010),
http://www.american.com/archive/2010/june-2010/aregovernment-workers-underpaid-no).
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much higher pensions, and many policy makers in government condone such
behavior.379
Using the modern finance theorem the value of an enterprise or activity is
independent of how it is financed.380 Applying that theorem to the valuation of state
pension liabilities would reject the standard 8% valuation discount typically used to
value pensions assets in favor of a more realistic rate of 4% reflecting a relatively
risk free investment such as government bonds.381 With current government bonds
paying practically nothing, it is difficult to conclude that such a rate is risk free while
the government makes every effort to have a 2% inflation rate. One study calculated
a $1 trillion deficit using traditional methods, but a $3.2 trillion deficit using a
treasury rate and $1.3 trillion deficit using municipal bond rates.382
Illinois and New Jersey experimented with issuing bonds to the public with the
expectation that the money could be invested at a greater than the interest rates they
would have to pay on the bonds they issued.383 New Jersey issued $2.7 billion in
pension obligation bonds in 1997 which had to be paid from general revenues when
the market crashed in 2000 and 2002 while Illinois issued $10 billion in general
obligation pension bonds in 2003 with a thirty-year maturity, expecting to invest the
money at the same rate their actuaries were using to discount the state’s pension
obligations (8.5%).384 When the expected 8.5% return was not realized the bonds had
to be paid along with the state’s unfunded obligations.385
The levels of protection given to public pensions vary with some protections
based on contract or property rights, while other pensions, like those in New York
and Illinois, are irrevocably fixed as of the date the employee enters the pension
plan.386
The federal government has three primary pension plans in effect: the Civil
Service Retirement System (CSRS); the Federal Employee Retirement System
(FERS); and the Military Retirement System (MRS). The CSRS was merged into the
FERS for new employees in 1984, but the benefits under the old plan continue to
379

Id. at 223. One report noted that nineteen Miami firefighters had salaries and benefits of
$300,000 and another 161 made $200,000.
380

Id.

381

Id.

382

Id. at 324. One study in 2010, assuming that plans would realize annual returns of 8%
and that contributions would cover normal costs, predicted that Illinois’ public plans would
deplete their assets in 2018; Connecticut, Indiana, and New Jersey will follow suit by 2019;
and Hawaii, Louisiana, and Oklahoma in 2020. Id. (citing Joshua D. Rauh, Are State Public
Pensions
Sustainable?
26-27
(May
15,
2010)
(unpublished),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596679). Of all states, only Alaska,
Florida, Nevada, New York, and North Carolina would still have funds beyond 2047. Id.
Indiana and New Jersey adopted legislation in 2011 to slow the growth of pension obligations.
Id. at 224-25 (internal citation omitted).
383

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 227.

384

Id. at 228.

385

Id. at 225-27.

386

Id. at 229; see also id. at 231-32 (describing the actions of New Jersey Governor Chris
Christie and the ensuing law suit challenging pension adjustments).
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accrue and there seems to be little cost savings from the change.387 As of October
2008, the unfunded liability for the three systems was approximately $1.578
trillion.388
C. Demographic Problems Worldwide Strain Pension Funding
Richard A. Marin did an interesting analysis of the status of pension funding
around the world in his recent book on the pension crisis.389 Marin begins his
analysis by estimating the extent of worldwide wealth and retirement assets. He
estimates worldwide GDP at approximately $70 trillion and worldwide wealth at
$132 trillion.390 Taking the analysis a step further he estimates that, of the worldwide
wealth, approximately $50.4 trillion is allocated to retirement assets.391 Worldwide
the assets allocated to retirement are 72% of global GDP.392 In gross, these numbers
may sound like a solid base to build worldwide retirement; however, Marin takes the
analysis one step further to demonstrate how various countries compare to each
other.
First, he looks at fourteen countries that account for $40 trillion of retirement
assets that equate to 58% of the GDP of those countries.393 The spread of pension
assets to GDP among the countries is disturbing with the United Kingdom at 112%;
the United States at 108%; Australia at 101%; Canada at 84%; Japan at 62%;
Germany at 15%; and France at 7%.394 The adequacy of any level of retirement
assets as a percentage of GDP will depend on the years of retirement and the
discount rate used to value the cost of retirement. The length of retirement is a
function of the average age of retirement and longevity of the taxpayers in a
particular country. Looking to four of the countries noted above the average period
of retirement are: the United States at thirteen years; Japan at sixteen years; Germany
at nineteen years; and France at twenty-two years.395 These are the time periods that
must be funded with retirement assets.
387

Id. at 233-34.

388

Id. at 232-36.

389

MARIN, supra note 2. Marin is the Clinical Professor of Asset Management at The
Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University. He has extensive finance and
management experience with several Wall Street firms, with hedge funds, and with several
firms that he founded. Id. at xv.
390
Id. at 21. Global wealth includes private wealth, pension funds, mutual fund, insurance
companies, and sovereign wealth funds. Id.
391

Id. at 22-23.

392

Id. at 23.

393

Id. at 24.

394

Id. at 24 ex.2.1. The other countries are Ireland at 55%; Switzerland at 118%;
Netherlands at 156%; Brazil at 14%; China at 18%; Chile at 61%; and South Africa at 64%.
Id.
395

Id. at 27 ex.2.2 (noting the average age of retirement, life expectancy, and retirement
period are: for the United States 65, 78, 13; for Japan 68, 84, 16; for Germany 61, 80, 19; and
for France 59, 81, 22 respectively). The table lists the information on all fourteen countries in
the study. Id. at 27 ex.2.2. The United States has a shorter retirement period than the nonUnited States Anglo countries and Japan on the list primarily due to its shorter life
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Funding long-term commitments is tied to the growth of GDP, which is
positively impacted by the growth of population.396 Historically, GDP in the West
has been growing at a rate of 3% long-term, but that appears to be slowing while that
of emerging markets is increasing.397 The GDP multipliers comparing the growth
from 2010 to 2050 for the United States, France, Germany, and Japan are 1.4, 1.7,
2.1, and 1.6, respectively, while those for Brazil, China, and Chile are 2.9, 6.9, and
4.9, respectively.398 France, Germany, and Japan will see their working age
population decline by 2050 while that of the United States will grow slightly due
primarily to immigration.399 With a few exceptions, countries in Central and South
America, the Middle East, and Africa will experience dramatic population growth
and the accompanying GDP growth over the period 2010-2050.400 The dependency
ratio, defined as the percent of the population in retirement, will increase by 2050 in
the United States to 35%; to 45% in France; to 58% in Germany; and to 75% in
Japan.401 In Japan, one worker will support three retirees.402
Using the foregoing factors, Marin estimates a worldwide pension-funding gap of
141% of worldwide GDP through 2050, representing $98 trillion.403 For individual
countries, he estimates a pension-funding gap for the United States of $7.3 trillion,
for France of $7.8 trillion, for Germany of $11.4 trillion, and for Japan of $17.2
expectancy. The shorter life expectancy may be due to a larger immigrant population in the
United States, which have not benefited from the better health care. Id. at 28.
396
Id. at 28-29 (pointing to the fifty-year decline in population in Japan, which appears
directly correlated to the decline in GDP).
397

Max Roser, GDP Growth Over the Last Centuries, OUR WORLD DATA,
http://ourworldindata.org/data/growth-and-distribution-of-prosperity/gdp-growth-over-thelast-centuries/#world-maps-of-real-annual-gdp-growth-max-roserref (last visited Apr. 2,
2016).
398

MARIN, supra note 2, at 31 fig.2.6. Partly as a result of China’s one child policy, its
aging population will likely limit China’s ability to grow its economy. See Ciaran McEnvoy,
China Will Ease ‘Hukou,,’ 1-Child Policy Restrictions, INV. BUS. DAILY, Nov. 18, 2013, at
A1.
399

The world population in 2010 included a “dependency ratio” of sixteen people aged
sixty-five and over for every one hundred adults aged twenty-five to sixty-four–about the
same
as
in
1980.
Age
Invaders,
ECONOMIST
(Apr.
26,
2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21601248-generation-old-people-about-changeglobal-economy-they-will-not-all-do-so (“A generation of old people is about to change
global economy. They will not all do so in the same way.”). By 2035, the number will have
risen to twenty-six overall but vary between countries. Id. Germany will go from thirty-eight
to sixty-six people aged sixty-five and over for every 100 people between ages twenty-five to
sixty-four; Japan will go from forty-three to sixty-nine; and the United States will rise from
about twenty-four to forty-four. Id.; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX
COMPOSITION 2010, C201OBR-03, at 2 (2011) (providing United States dependency ratio for
2010).
400

MARIN, supra note 2, at 33-38, fig.2.7.

401

Id. at 37 Ex.2.8.

402

Id.

403

Id. at 39.
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trillion.404 Marin also shows that the twenty-year gap in the United States could be
closed by increasing taxes to collect an additional 3% of GDP while closing the gaps
in France, Germany, and Japan would require an additional tax of 19%, 23%, and
23% respectively.405
The problem of aging is worldwide. The global population of persons aged sixtyfive or more is estimated to grow from 600 million to 1.1 billion over the next
twenty years.406 The impact of aging is likely to divide the population in unexpected
ways. In America, 65% of men age sixty-two to seventy-four with a professional
degree are in the workforce compared to 32% of those with only a high-school
certificate.407 In the twentieth century, greater longevity meant more years in
retirement rather than more years at work. This shift has led many observers to
expect slower economic growth and a “secular stagnation” in which swelling ranks
of pensioners will bust government budgets.408 Policy changes may be part of the
problem since older policies that pushed people into retirement have been
abandoned.409 Also at the same time, life expectancy is increasing, and defined
benefit pension plans are being replaced with less generous defined contribution
plans forcing seniors desiring a comfortable retirement to work longer.410
A population that is aging, but not growing, suggests three possible outcomes.
First, it will result in lower GDP unless incentives are created to keep older workers
in the workforce or productivity increases to offset the loss of GDP.411 There has
been a trend for older and more educated workers to stay in the workforce longer
than in the past. Second, the aging population may create incentives to innovation
that will reduce the cost of aging.412 Third, if highly skilled and educated seniors
remain in the workforce longer than in the past, the higher income will result in
greater savings and Social Security contributions by this group of workers.413
Considering these possible outcomes, policy responses could include the following:
Age should no longer determine the appropriate end of a working life,
mandatory retirement ages and pension rules that discourage people from
working longer should go. Welfare should reflect the greater opportunities
to the higher skilled pensions should become more progressive (i.e., less
404
Id. at 40 Ex.2.12. The estimates of the long-term pension need is based on taking 60%
of the final earnings level in the individual country reflecting general global retirement
expectations. Id. at 38, 175.
405

Id. at 41 Ex. 2.13.

406

Global Ageing: A billion shades of grey, ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 2014, at 13.

407

Id. It is important to note that the divide being discussed is not between the young
workers and the old idle pensioners, but between the well-educated Baby Boomers putting off
retirement while many less-skilled younger people have dropped out of the work force. Id.
408

Id.

409

Id.

410

See id.

411

Age Invaders, supra note 399, at 24.

412

Id. at 24.

413

Id. at 25.
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generous to the rich). At the same time, this trend underlines the
importance of increasing public investment in education at all states of
life so that more people acquire the skills they need to thrive in the
modern labour market.414
Adverse demographic changes would create problems for any long-term solution
to Social Security financing.415 Recall Aaron’s social insurance paradox that the
Social Security benefits of all participants will increase if the combined rate of
growth for population and productivity equals or exceeds the current rate of interest.
A caveat of Aaron’s analysis is that the paradox may not hold if the provision of
social insurance causes a reduction in the rate of private savings.416 Aging skilled
professionals staying in the workforce may to some extent offset this last caveat.
In the United States, workers can retire at age sixty-two with a reduced amount
of Social Security benefits, which will be further reduced if the person continues to
work prior to reaching full retirement, currently sixty-six.417 The system then
encourages people to continue working by increasing the full retirement amount by
8% per year until age seventy when the person is required to start Social Security.418
One disincentive to continue work after age seventy is that the person will continue
paying Social Security taxes but their benefit will be modestly increased if the
person’s AIME increases.
In the United States, the demographic divide is dramatic. While the younger
generation is becoming a non-Caucasian majority, a record share of the population is
going gray. Primarily due to Social Security and Medicare programs, older adults are
no longer the poorest age cohort of society, having been replaced by young adults
and their children.419 The economic well-being of today’s youth is impacted by “a
witches’ brew of deep recessions, sluggish recoveries, rising inequality, a shrinking
middle class, automation, globalization and soaring student debt.”420 The federal
government spends nearly $7 per capita on programs targeted at people sixty-five
and over versus $1 for every child, all the while accumulating trillions of dollars in
debt for the young people to pay off.421
Marin suggests part of the solution to the pensions crisis lies in the emerging
markets:

414

See Global Ageing: A billion shades of grey, supra note 406.

415

SHAVIRO, supra note 175, at 99-100.

416

Aaron, supra note 181, at 347.

417

In 1956, the government established an early retirement age of sixty-two for women,
and, in 1961, applied the early retirement age of sixty-two to men. This led the way for private
employers to follow suit. Early out plans in the 1980s and 1990s helped open the way for
younger workers. SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 176.
418

Taylor, supra note 165, at 18.

419

Id.

420

Id.

421

Taylor notes that the median net worth of persons in the millennial generation is $3,700
compared to $170,500 for people 65+ and that federal spending is $3,800 per child compared
to $26,400 per person 65+. Id. at 20.
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The emerging markets will be less impacted directly and the more the
emerging countries grow, the more the problem will fade away for them
and perhaps, eventually, the whole world. Their growth is already strong,
and those where population growth is still strong will find themselves
growing out of the problem and, of course, learning from the mistakes of
the developed countries . . . [T]his may be the first time in history where
the growth of countries with higher population growth rates and younger
populations will create a more stable economic environment rather than a
bigger drain on productivity.422
Marin also observes the impact of pension burdens on countries with low
population growth:
The degree of this [pension] burden is clearly a function of economic
growth, and we know that economic growth is very much correlated to
population growth. Therefore, it is likely that in low population growth
countries, where the burden is heaviest, growth will not likely provide a
solution, and, indeed, the pension-funding burden will likely further
impede growth.423
Efforts are underway in many countries facing demographic situations to grow a
workforce capable of supporting the growing over-sixty-five population. In Japan,
where the population is predicted to shrink by one-third over the next fifty years, the
government is not only seeking to convince women to have more children (to
increase the current level of 1.41 children per woman to 2.07), but is also
considering allowing more immigration into Japan.424 If Prime Minister Abe’s
efforts to get Japanese women into the workplace is successful, it could raise female
labor participation to that of men, add 8 million people to the workforce, increase
GDP by as much as 15%, and increase consumer demand. In order to accomplish
this, Abe is focusing efforts on expanding hours for kindergartens and arranging for
breast-feeding outside the home.425

422

MARIN, supra note 2, at 44.

423

Id. at 175.

424

The
Incredible
Shrinking
Country,
ECONOMIST
(May
31,
2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21603076-first-time-proper-debate-starting-aboutimmigration-incredible-shrinking-country (noting that traditionally Japan had a highly
restrictive immigration policy).
425

Holding Back Half the Nation, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2014, at 23. A recent survey of
pregnant women in Japan reported that 21% claimed they were mistreated in the workplace
because of their pregnancy, although 74% reported receiving some sort of consideration
because of their pregnancy. Of the 61% who left their jobs because of pregnancy, 55% said
they wanted to focus on taking care of their baby. Jun Hongo, Survey: One in Five Women
S T.
J.,
Feb.
24,
2015,
Experienced
‘Maternity
Harassment,’
WALL
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2015/02/24/survey-one-in-five-women-experiencedmaternity-harassment/; see also Michael Auslin, Japan’s Gamble on ‘Womenomics,’ WALL
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2015, at A11 (noting that Japan’s Health and Welfare Ministry predicts Japan’s
127 million population will shrink to 87 million by 2060 thereby inverting the entitlements
pyramid leaving one worker supporting more than one retiree).
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Japan is not alone. Many countries are creating incentives to encourage higher
birth rates, particularly in Europe but also in some Asian countries. The normal
replacement rate is 2.1 children per woman; however, some commentators are
questioning that figure, arguing it could be lower in countries with “better-educated”
people since they are more productive and healthier, retire later, and live longer,
thereby making a greater contribution to the dependent population.426 Furthermore,
longer working lives could increase youth unemployment.427
Parts of the world other than Japan, such as Germany, China, and Iran have also
experienced differing impacts on their aging economy due to birth rates. Germany,
which is going through a great reduction in its native population, has encouraged
significant immigration from Turkey to supply its need for workers.428 China, with
its one-child policy, has found that the dramatic decrease in population is causing the
need for additional workers to maintain its growing economy.429 Iran instituted
policies in the 1980s and 1990s to reduce the population but is now making the
following changes since the population is dropping faster than expected:
Rhyming public-health slogans that used to extol “Fewer kids, better life”
have recently been removed. Instead, billboards depict large, happy
families juxtaposed with sad little ones. Budgets for subsidized condoms
and family planning have been cut; paternity and maternity leave, already
generous, has increased. Parliament has passed a bill that aims to raise
Iran’s birth rate. If it is enacted, vasectomies and tubectomies, which were
free until two years ago, will be treated like abortions, punishable by a jail
term of up to five years and payment of diyeh, or blood money.430
426

Why Shrinking Populations May be No Bad Thing, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2014, at 53.

427
MARIN, supra note 2, at 47-48 (noting that youth unemployment in France is 22%, in
the United Kingdom is 21.8%, in Hungry is 26.1%, in Italy is 28.2%, and in Spain is 47.8%,
as listed for 2012).
428
Germany has opened its borders to up to one million refugees from Syria and, although
assimilation creates some problems, refugee children are filling seats in the schools that are
vacant because of falling numbers of native children in many districts. Educating Refugees:
Learning the Hard Way, ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 2016, at 41-42. The same is true of Sweden, who
is also experiencing a declining native population. Id.
429

See MARIN, supra note 2, at 42 (“China, with the backfiring of its incredibly impactful
one-child policy (perhaps the most effective and far-reaching single public policy ever
instituted in the history of mankind) is not far behind [the European Union and Japan] in
seeing its growth engine screech to a halt from its administered demographic shift.”). Marin
further observes: “no single policy in the history of mankind has done more to alter the course
of history than the one-child policy in China. In one generation . . . the largest and fastest
growing population on Earth has not only been halted, it has actually been permanently altered
such that the prevailing cultural belief in China is that the only path to prosperity . . . lies in a
one-child household. This behemoth peaks and starts its downward move in the next 10 to 15
years . . . .” Id. at 52. Marin provides extensive details of the population in China through
2100. Id. at 53-57, tbl.3.2.
430

See Make More Babies, ECONOMIST, June 7, 2014, at 53 (recognizing that the culture
may have changed since the revolution—women are now more educated and marriage has lost
it luster and the divorce rate is climbing, all of which may undermine the government’s effort
to encourage larger families).
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Thus, a country’s decision to create incentives for women to enter the work force
and to have or not have children may well have dramatic consequences on the
country’s fiscal future as well as its culture, home life, and families. 431
D. Protesting Plan Changes and Constitutional Litigation
Litigation will be instituted by unions and other affected parties in connection
with the Detroit bankruptcy and with attempts to control costs of pensions in
California, Illinois, and New Jersey. Such litigation involves contract rights as well
as protections under federal and state constitutions. Political conflict is also involved
as officials seeking to make such changes are challenged when running for election.
The 2014 election cycle demonstrates the difficulty politicians face when seeking
to change pension plans to reflect economic realities. In 2011, Wisconsin Governor
Scott Walker attempted to limit union collective-bargaining rights over benefits for
state employees.432 Democrats in the Wisconsin Senate, who left the state to prevent
a vote on the proposed legislation, first confronted Walker.433 At the same time, state
employees mounted protests in the state capital, including a takeover of the state
house all of which obtained daily and extensive national attention.434 When Walker
secured passage of legislation without the need of the self-exiled Democratic
senators, they returned, but the legislation was already signed.
The next step in the battle was to challenge the legislation in the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, where the legislation was approved, but only by a single vote from a
justice that was elected shortly before the legislation reached the court.435 The
justice’s election was challenged by unions and affected state employees.436 Finally,
the disaffected parties sought to recall the Governor in a statewide election, which
proved unsuccessful, possibly because the electorate did not think the allegations
against the Governor were sufficient for a recall.437

431
Schrieber describes the dramatic increase in labor force participation by women in the
baby boom generation in the United States. SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 178-79.
432

Stephanie Condo, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker Signs Anti-union Bill—but Democrats
Say
They
are
the
Political
Victors,
CBS NEWS (Mar.
11,
2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/wisconsin-gov-scott-walker-signs-anti-union-bill-butdemocrats-say-theyre-the-political-victors/.
433

Bill Glauber et al., Democrats Flee State to Avoid Vote on Budget Bill, J. SENTINEL
(Feb. 17, 2011) http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/116381289.html.
434

Id.; see also Bill Glauber et al., supra note 433.

435

Mike Lowe, Wisconsin Supreme Court Uphold Act 10 Union Law. “It Will Affect All of
Us,” FOX 6 NOW (July 31, 2014, 10:20 PM), http://fox6now.com/2014/07/31/wisconsinsupreme-court-upholds-2011-union-law/.
436
Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 839 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2013); see also Jason Stein,
Supreme Court upholds Scott Walker's Act 10 union law, J. SENTINEL (Aug. 1, 2014),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/supreme-court-to-rule-thursday-on-union-lawvoter-id-b99321110z1-269292661.html.
437

See, e.g., John Nichols, Recall Campaign Against Scott Walker Fails, NATION (June 6,
2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/recall-campaign-against-scott-walker-fails/.
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In 2014, Governor Walker stood for reelection in a contest that drew national
attention in which unions spent enormous sums in an attempt to defeat him.438
During the campaign, Milwaukee County Democratic district attorney, John
Chisholm, targeted Walker’s supporters using a “John Doe” process to launch
sweeping and virtually unsupervised investigations of those supporters while
imposing gag orders to prevent investigated people from defending themselves, or
rebutting politically motivated leaks.439 Chisholm was searching for evidence of
‘“coordination’ between Walker’s campaign and conservative issue advocacy
groups” and although his tactics were generally condemned, they nevertheless had
the effect of chilling political speech by those favoring Governor Walker.440
Walker won reelection with 52.3% of the vote and a spread of 5.7% over his
opponent, Mary Burke, a former Secretary of Commerce with executive experience
in her family business and a Harvard MBA.441 The campaign received national
attention.442
In Rhode Island, Gina Raimondo, the state treasurer, who survived a well-funded
union backlash after she used her office to generate public opinion to support her
reforms to public pensions, won the Democratic gubernatorial primary. The reforms
lifted the retirement age from sixty-two to sixty-seven and froze cost-of-living
adjustments for current pension recipients until pension funds are determined 80%
solvent.443 The same intensity was put into the general election, which Raimondo
won with 40.78% of the vote compared to 36.33% for her Republican opponents.444
438
Daniel Bice, Union Bosses, Wealthy Donors Spend Big for Mary Burke, Scott Walker,
J. SENTINEL (Oct. 26, 2014),

http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog/noquarter/union-bosses-wealthy-donors-spend-big-formary-burke-scott-walker-b99377685z1-280475452.html.
439

George F. Will, The Nastiest Political Tactic this Year, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-in-wisconsin-done-in-by-johndoe/2014/10/24/b30ee2ec-5ad8-11e4-b812-38518ae74c67_story.html?hpid=z2.
440

Id.; see also Guy Benson, Nail-biter: Democrats Go All In to Defeat Walker, Polls
Show
Tied
Race,
TOWNHALL.COM
(Oct.
26,
2014),
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/guybenson/2014/10/24/nailbiter-democrats-go-all-in-to-defeatwalker-polls-show-tied-racen1909725?utm_source=thdaily&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=nl (suggesting that
allegations of “coordination” between Walker’s campaign and outside donor sources that is
“chilling” conservative voices could also be alleged against Democratic candidate’s activities
with the unions in Wisconsin).
441
See Wisconsin Governor—Walker v. Burke, REAL CLEAR POLITICS,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/elections/live_results/2014/governor/ri.html (last visited Jan.
3, 2015) (regarding election results).
442

Benson, supra note 440.

443

Matt Miller, Gina Raimondo’s Primary Win in R.I. Could Transform Debate on
Progressivism, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.washintonpost.com/opinions/mattmiller-gina-raimondos-win-in-ri-could-transform-debate-on-progressiveism. Miller reports
that Raimondo is a Harvard, Yale, and Oxford educated former venture capitalist. Id.; see also
NJ STATUS REPORT, supra note 299, at 21 (noting that Rhode Island made some interesting
changes to their pension plans).
444

See Wisconsin Governor—Walker v. Burk, supra note 441.
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Raimondo is Harvard educated, an Oxford Rhodes Scholar, and a graduate of Yale
Law School.445 Prior to being elected state treasurer, she was a venture capitalist and
started the first venture capital firm in Rhode Island. Her approach to pension reform
is business oriented and some find it a template that may work on a national level:
“Her pension-reform campaign was fascinating for its blunt talk of trade-offs, of
sacrifices today for investments in tomorrow. She framed the cutbacks as
progressive-as the only responsible liberalism-because without them education,
infrastructure, transportation and more would suffer.”446
The 2014, Illinois gubernatorial race avoided outright discussion of Illinois’
pension problem.447 When Republican Bruce Rauner won the election he was
immediately faced with the expiration of a temporary 2% increase in the state
income tax that will aggravate the state’s fiscal problems particularly since Rauner
must work with a Democratic legislature.448 It is reported that Rauner, who railed
against pension inefficiencies, now declares “that it is most important to ‘protect
what is done—don’t change history. Don’t modify or reduce anybody’s pension who
has retired, or has paid into a system and they’ve accrued benefits.’”449 Still, dealing
with the problem may make Illinois the first state to find out whether courts will
force cuts in pensions to avoid pushing the state into a “death-spiral” that occurs as
people leave the state as the state is forced to cut vital services and raise taxes.450
E. Private Employer Pensions: Problems with General Motors
The growth of private pensions was, in large measure, a result of government
regulation and the implementation of Social Security. This is particularly true of the
impact of the income tax, which allowed contributions to a trust to be deducted by
the employer and not taxed to the employee until many years later when the money
was withdrawn from the trust.451 Initially, there was no funding requirement and the
regulations were mostly interested in preventing discrimination in favor of highly
compensated individuals and the loss of tax revenues, but later it became necessary
to focus on funding the promises.452 Furthermore, tax deferral of pension
contributions has in recent years become a topic of debate, as Congress needed
additional revenue.453
445

Frank Bruni, A Democrat to Watch in 2015: Gina Raimondo’s Approach to Income
Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/opinion/frankbruni-gina-raimondos-approach-to-income-inequality.html?_r=0.
446

Id.

447

Mark Peters, Illinois Faces Big Revenue Hit in 2015, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 30, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/illinois-faces-big-revenue -hit-in 2015-1419967717.
448

Id. The temporary increase had been from 3% to 5% but would fall to 3.75%.

449

Public Pensions, America’s Greece?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2015, at 37.

450
See id. at 38 (referring to attorney James Spiotto’s argument that a point can be reached
when a state is unable rather than unwilling to pay pensions and a court finds the well being of
citizens overrides any state constitutional protections).
451

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 130.

452

Id. at 130-31.

453

Id. at 130.
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The move toward adoption of private pension plans was also promoted by the
institution of Social Security plans because an employer could supplement the Social
Security payment with its own pension plan to provide workers with a reasonable
retirement income without having to fund the entire cost. Of course, the employer
could take credit for the benefit provided by the employer’s portion of the payroll tax
as well.454 Government restrictions on wages during World War II excluded
pensions and other benefits from the restriction thereby creating additional
incentives to create such plans to attract employees during the War.455 Later during
the 1950s and 1960s, unions began negotiating for pensions for their workers.456
Private pensions face three types of risks. First is the agency risk of plan
managers improperly handling plan assets. Second is the forfeiture risk of the
employees leaving employment prior to vesting. Third is the default risk that plan
sponsors would fail or be unable to make plan contributions which was a particular
problem since creating a plan based on years of service and final annual pay meant
there would be a substantial unfunded benefit for persons with existing years of
service.457
In the early 1970s, Senators Jacob Javits and Harrison Williams, who published a
report focused on the flaws in the private pension system, intensified congressional
focus.458 Although their statistics were inaccurate, they were more concerned with
stirring up public sentiment than accurate numbers.459 The same was true with a CBS
ninety-minute documentary focusing only on the flaws in the system.460 The report
and documentary had the desired effect and the public was outraged.461 The eventual
result was Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).462 In 1978,
President Carter recommended a savings account to be administered by Social
Security in which 3% of compensation would be put into a Mandatory Universal
Pension system.463
There are three clear principles that apply not only to private pensions, but also to
public pensions, that anyone should keep in mind when planning retirement security.
First, the cost of a pension is not the benefits currently being paid but the benefits
that are being accrued by current workers. Second, this current expense should be
covered by a cash contribution to an independent fiduciary to secure their ultimate
payment to the employee rather than rely on the ultimate success of the plan sponsor.
454

Id. at 133.

455

Id.

456

Id. at 134-35.

457

Id. at 136-37. Ford Motor Company started its pension plan with an immediate
obligation of $200 million for existing workers and nothing in the trust fund. The result was
that employers and unions agreed to fund the initial obligation over 30 years. Id. at 138.
458

Id. at 142.

459

Id. at 143.

460

Id.

461

Id. at 143-44.

462

Id. at 144.

463

Id. at 150.
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Third, the plan participants had to have a vested right to a payout from the system.464
Although these basic principles have been recognized as early as the 1920s, they
were not acted upon so that years later it could be said:
Both business and union members on President Kennedy’s Advisory
Committee on Labor-Management Policy felt that government had no
business interfering in labor contracts, but officials at the Treasury
Department were coming to believe that government had a prominent and
legitimate interest in regulating employer-sponsored retirement plans. In
the mid-1950s, Walter Blum began to develop a concept that ultimately
became known as “tax expenditures.” Writing in the Joint Economic
Committee’s 1955 study Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and
Stability, Blum argued that if the government “decided to subsidize a
certain activity, we should be hesitant about administering the subsidy by
way of a tax preference. Subsidies in this form vary directly in amount
with the tax brackets of the recipients; they are invariably hidden in the
technicalities of the tax law; they do not show up in the budget; their cost
frequently is difficult to calculate; and the accomplishments are even
more difficult to assess.”465
From the end of World War II in 1945 through the early 1990s, private
employers were providing even more generous pension benefits.466 In order to
protect worker’s pensions, Congress—in 1974—passed ERISA to provide a
regulatory framework to make benefits available to workers and created the Pension
Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) to protect employee expectations if the
employer went bankrupt.467 Initially the funding requirements were flexible, but the
unusually large returns in the 1990s made many plans appear fully funded so that
Congress instituted funding limitations as a way to raise revenues without raising tax
rates.468 As the nation entered the new millennium, the unusually high rates of return
in the 1990s disappeared making many plans appear unsustainable.469 Congress, in
2004, reversed some of the funding limitations, but the reversal came too late to help
the Baby Boomers that were preparing for retirement.470
Since the late 1970s, another phenomenon was occurring, which was the
introduction of defined contribution plans, but that trend changed and was even
reversed as employers began to convert the defined benefit plans into hybrid plans
464

Id. at 26-27.

465
Id. at 141 n.14 (citing The Effects of Special Provisions in the Income Tax on Taxpayer
Morale, in Joint Econ. Comm. Fed. Tax Pol’y for Econ. Growth & Stability, 84th Cong., 25051 (1955) (statement of Walter J. Blum)).
466
An early reason for providing pensions was that they were seen, in the banking
industry, as being less expensive than fidelity bonds. Id. at 130.
467

Id. at 13.

468

Apparently, avoiding tax rate increases became more important than securing
retirement funding. Id. at 14. It is also noted that during this period lawmakers gave union
pension plans waivers on funding requirements. Id.
469

Id.

470

Id. at 15.
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that provided a cash balance.471 By 2008, the conversions, which were primarily a
large plan phenomena, covered 2,984 plans representing 10.3% of total plans and
31.3% of defined benefit participants as reported by the PBGC.472 Smaller plans
began to reflect the need for change by freezing accruals under existing plans and
denying new entrants. By 2007 the PBGC reported that 18% of covered plans were
under a hard freeze representing 7.6% of all plan participants.473
During the 1980s and 1990s, the funding of private pensions was discouraged or
stopped by administrative regulations. In 2008, the Pension Protection Act took
effect with the goal of reaching 100% of unfunded accrued liabilities over a sevenyear period.474 These new rules came at an inauspicious time considering the
economic turmoil of the 2007-2010 period. Companies were required to make
enormous extra contributions in this tumultuous economic environment.475 The
resulting changes were seen as unfair to some workers, but many plans that did not
change witnessed their unfunded pension obligations force them into bankruptcy.476
Toward the end of the twentieth century, the employer based pension was
deteriorating and people were convinced they were better off relying on the new
401(k) defined contribution investment vehicle, which had been showing consistent
double digit gains during the 1990’s stock market boom.477 Furthermore, the end of
the 1990s foreshadowed more problems:
By the end of the 1990s, some defined benefit plan sponsors had been on
contribution holidays for 10 or 15 years. Even back in 1967, when Pal
Samuelson was writing about Social Security being “the greatest Ponzi
scheme ever contrived,” the Social Security system at least required
contributions. Pension operations in the 1990s seemed to be one-upping
Samuelson’s assessment of Social Security. But along the way, we had
forgotten that saving for retirement requires some actual saving.
Samuelson’s assessment of Social Security would prove wrong when
economic and demographic fundamentals changed. And the employer
pension system would also run into problems when economic
fundamentals changed at the beginning of the new millennium.478

471

Id. at 192.

472

Id. at 195. In 1983, there were 175,000 private defined benefit plans covering 29.9
million active workers, but by 2007 those numbers had declined to 49,000 plans covering 19.4
million workers. Id. at 7.
473

Id. at 195. Other definitions of “freeze” can be found but the trend is among major
employers is to freeze various pension plans in one way or another. Id. Among 723 companies
that made the Fortune 1000 list every year from 2004 through 2010, 242 did not sponsor a
defined benefit plan during the period and, among the 481 that did, one terminated its plan in
2009 and eight others did the same in 2010. Id. at 196.
474

Id. at 199.

475

Id. at 198-99.

476

Id. at 199.

477

Id. at 180.

478

Id. at 181.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

75

844

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:769

Private pension plans are not uniquely American. In fact, it is reported that
globally, defined benefit plans, although often grossly underfunded, have $23 trillion
of liabilities to current and future pensioners479 and are estimated to grow by 4%
with each extra year added to one’s life expectancy.480 Several private companies
have structured new financial instruments to absorb a portion of the longevity risk
thereby making some pension plans safer recognizing the risks to the pension
plans.481
During the 1980s, reducing corporate tax deductions associated with such plans
continually reduced funding requirements for private pensions in order to raise tax
revenue.482 Such reductions in funding put benefits for Baby Boomers at greater
risk.483 Seeking to more widely distribute the benefits of private pensions, Congress
began reducing the vesting requirements.484 In addition, accounting rules were
changed in a way that allowed lower levels of funding and plans were terminated
with billions of dollars withdrawn as excess funding.485
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, many companies froze all or
part of their defined benefit plans saving considerable amounts of money.486 Much of
the savings went to defined contribution plans in which employees sought to offset
losses in the stock market and in their defined benefit plans.487 The Pension
Protection Act took effect in 2008 and required plans to attain full funding over a
period of seven years.488 Further, single-employer plans with less than 80% funding
are subject to benefit restrictions, those with between 60% and 80% cannot increase
benefits and can only pay partial lump-sum distributions,489 and multi-employer
plans must reach full funding over fifteen years.490 The timing for this Act to become
479

Longevity Risk: My Money or your life, ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 2014, at 69.

480

Id. (referencing the International Monetary Fund).

481

Id.

482

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 154.

483

Id. at 154-55. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 slowed pension funding
during the early part of the Baby Boomers careers and left many plans over funded so that no
current funding was required. Id. at 168. Further hindering the funding of private pensions was
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, which imposed a tax on taking money out of
an overfunded pension plan as well as the possibility that overfunding might be considered a
breach of management’s fiduciary duties to shareholders. Id. The author calls this erratic
changing of the funding requirements in the 1980s and 1990s “regulatory schizophrenia” at
the beginning years of the Baby Boomers work lives, which had a dramatic effect on the need
to fund pensions in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Id. at 249.
484

Id. at 168.

485

Id. at 158-59. By the end of the 1980s, the funding of pensions had shifted from how
much was needed to pay future retirees to how much had to be paid if the pension was shut
down today. Id. at 163.
486

Id. at 95.

487

Id. at 195, 198.

488

Id. at 198.

489

Id. at 198-99.

490

Id. at 199.
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effective was unfortunate because the increased liabilities hit companies just as the
Great Recession hit and market values plummeted forcing many companies into
bankruptcy and the loss of many jobs.491 The underfunding of plans was primarily
the result of the boom in the 1980s and 1990s when funding requirements were
curtailed, but government finds it a hard lesson to learn. In enacting the Highway
Bill in 2014, it was proposed that “pension smoothing,” by which the funding
requirements would be delayed thereby increasing the tax revenues by reducing the
deduction, could offset some of the cost of the bill.492
The effectiveness of employer provided pensions has been the subject of some
debate. It appears the data to support its effectiveness is not available.493 While a
high percentage of people report being covered under a pension plan (either a
defined benefit plan or a defined contribution plan, or both), the number of families
receiving pension income is much smaller and the amount received seems
inconsistent with reported assets in such plans.494 This seeming incongruity could be
the result of workers taking a lump sum and not converting it into an annuity or
workers using the money to pay off debts or some other use, but it could also suggest
that employer sponsored plans are a poor way to provide for retirement security.495
A major problem with most defined benefit plans is that the benefit accrues most
rapidly at the end of a long career with a single employer. When employees leave
after ten or fifteen years they have a greatly reduced pension that will only start
when they reach retirement age. When they start work for an employer late in life,
they have a limited time to accrue the pension so that the pension is often quite
small.496
Managing pensions has become cumbersome for employers who are now forced
to put the liabilities and investment losses from pension funds on their balance
sheets.497 Furthermore, the pension liabilities sometimes exceed the market
491

Id. at 199. The $1.1 trillion Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Bill, enacted in December
2014, contained a provision that would allow workers, retirees, and management an
opportunity to voluntarily restructure retirement benefits to save a multi-employer pension
plan from insolvency. Resistance to this legislation came from unions and the AARP who
wanted to hold out for the plans to be bailed out, but a bailout seemed out of the question for
law makers. Multi-employer plans are minimally covered by the PBGC, protecting retirees
with 30 years of service for pensions less than $13,000. In 2014, the PBGC deficit for multiemployer plans grew to $42.4 billion from $8.3 billion in 2013 while the deficit single
employer plans fell to $19.3 billion from $27.4 billion in 2013. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 10 (2014); see also Daniel Borenstein,
Before Retiring, Rep. George miller breaks ranks to help save trouble pension plan, MERCURY
NEWS
(Dec.
28,
2014),
http://www.contracostatimes.com/danielborenstein/ci_27201607/daniel-borenstein-before-retiring-rep-george-miller-breaks.
492

Luca Gattoni-Celli, Pension Smoothing Risks Losing Money, But Few Alternatives
Seen, 145 TAX NOTES 50 (2014).
493
494

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 260-62.
Id.

495

Id. at 254-62 (including various charts demonstrating retirement assets held by various
household types).
496

MARIN, supra note 2, at 85.

497

Id. at 86 (noting the impact of FASB ASC 715 and FAS 158b).
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capitalization of the company. Before General Motors transferred their pension
liabilities to Prudential, its global pension liabilities were approximately $134.7
billion ($25.4 billion unfunded), while its market capitalization was $30.7 billion.498
Increasing the payment rate to the PBGC also increases the burden on employers
providing defined contribution plans.499 Even with retiree health care plans, private
employers as well as government employers have only gradually came to the point
where accounting rules require disclosure of liabilities.500 As health care costs
escalated and accounting standards began to require disclosure, many private
employers began to dramatically reduce or eliminate the benefit.501
1. GM’s Pension Troubles
GM has been caught in a downward pension spiral since 1950 when the company
signed the Treaty of Detroit with the UAW.502 First, pensions had the effect of
retiring workers early. By 1960, ten years after the treaty of Detroit, only three out of
every ten senior citizens remained in the labor force compared to six out of ten in
1920.503 According to the UAW union’s Social Security department, “an increasing
number of men in good health are choosing to retire rather than go on working.”504
According to a UAW economist, “[p]ensions got better every year” and “there
was little resistance.”505 However, the continued rise in pensions was primarily due
to the fact it kept wage increases slow, was less inflationary than wage increases,506
and GM did not have to account for the future obligations on its books.507
In 1966, Walter Reuther, the original head of the UAW, testified in favor of
federal pension insurance. However, federal pension insurance was viewed as a form
of welfare that would make workers lazy and unproductive and the idea that
498

Id. (describing General Motors as a pension company that happens to make cars).

499

Id.

500

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 296-300. Funding retiree health care face the same problems
as pensions which included: (1) the cost of benefits was not the current cost but the cost
accruing for current workers; (2) the benefits had to be funded as they were earned so retirees
would not be dependent on future success of the sponsoring firm; and (3) participants had to
be vested in their rights after some reasonable time. Id. at 296. An added problem with retiree
health care is that it was often the case that the retiree’s spouse would also be covered by the
plan. Id. at 299.
501

Id. at 301.

502
ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHILE AMERICA AGED: HOW PENSION DEBTS RUINED GENERAL
MOTORS, STOPPED THE NYC SUBWAYS, BANKRUPTED SAN DIEGO, AND LOOM AS THE NEXT
FINANCIAL CRISIS 24 (2008).
503

Id. at 28.

504

Id.

505

Id. at 47.

506

Firms did not have to pay out the pensions until retirement, a stark contrast to pay hikes
which were payable immediately and would, intuitively, only grow bigger and bigger in
response to inflation.
507

Id. at 18, 19, 45 (the government froze wages throughout World War II, which ended
only five years before the Treaty of Detroit and had an impact on negotiations with the UAW).
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pensions should be fully or partially funded annually was seen as a way for
employers to slow down the gradual and exponential increase of benefits.508 Both
views contributed to the unmitigated growth of pensions and their unfunded
liabilities.509 Social Security only added fuel to the fire because, rather than being
viewed as a supplement to retirement, Social Security’s “gross inadequacy” made
higher pension insurance all the more necessary.510
GM’s infamous “thirty-and-out” plan further hurt GM’s ability to compete
because of three problems: (1) GM would lose an experienced worker to early
retirement, (2) GM would have to support that worker for a longer period of time,
and (3) there was an increased likelihood that the worker’s spouse and children
would be eligible for benefits.511 Five months after GM’s “thirty-and-out” pension
plan was increased in 1990, GM’s stock dividend was cut from seventy-five cents to
forty cents512 and stockholders still had yet to receive a single dollar increase in their
stock price for over the prior twenty-five years;513 proof that shareholders were the
ones suffering. Observers noted that GM was being managed for the benefit of GM’s
“institution” rather than its shareholders.514
GM could have acquired half of Toyota motors with the same amount of money
it used to fund pensions in the mid-1990s.515 As of 2006, GM workers were
compensated between seventy-four dollars an hour compared to only forty-four
dollars an hour for Toyota workers employed in American plants.516 Consumers
have been given a choice to either pay for cars encumbered by pensions from GM or
to buy from foreign companies like Toyota.517 A major reason for this is that
pensions for Japanese automakers are paid by the state and they buy parts from
outside suppliers and therefore do not pay pensions for the making of their parts or
cars while GM is on the hook for both.518
GM did make an attempt to cut costs with the creation of an auto parts spin-off
Delphi in 1998.519 However, the UAW demanded that GM pay for Delphi’s pension
and healthcare obligations and if Delphi failed to do so, hire back Delphi’s surplus
workers and renew Delphi contracts on the same terms as GM for the next two
508

Id. at 42-43.

509

Id.

510

Id. at 43.

511

Id. at 41-43 (the spouse and/or children could also be eligible for benefits for a longer
period of time under the new plan).
512

Id. at 56.

513

Id. at 53.

514

Id.

515

Id. at 59-60.

516
ALEX TAYLOR, III, SIXTY TO ZERO: AN INSIDE LOOK
MOTORS – AND THE DETROIT AUTO INDUSTRY 221 (2010).
517

AT THE

COLLAPSE

OF

GENERAL

Id.

518

LOWENSTEIN, supra note 502, at 60 (the pensions for German auto workers are paid by
the state as well).
519

Id. at 61-62.
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rounds of negotiations (almost a decade).520 Unsurprisingly, Delphi filed for
bankruptcy in 2005 as the company had $8 billion in unfunded healthcare liabilities
and $4 billion in unfunded pension liabilities.521 The court filings stated, “Delphi
needs a pension solution . . . it cannot afford to fund the pension . . . and no business
can operate successfully if it cannot respond to market forces.”522 Other large
corporations such as HP, Verizon, and IBM immediately began to permanently
freeze their pensions around this time as well.523 Starbucks even announced it was
spending more on healthcare than coffee beans, proof that the Social Security
problem is not exclusive to Social Security insurance or pensions.524
GM has been left with no choice but to keep its liabilities unfunded. Even if GM
made its annual contribution and paid on its installment plan, each new deal makes
the prior installment plan deficient.525 Additionally, pension increases affect more
than current workers; they apply to retired workers as well. A GM employee who
retired with a forty-five dollar pension per month in 1950 was collecting $435 a
month by 1980.526 The result, a need for more and more employees to provide
contributions to the already retired workers whose pensions continue to increase
during each round of negotiations, a disincentive to fire unproductive workers, and
an incentive to hire new workers even if their labor is not needed.
Furthermore, GM has developed a habit of creating more vehicles than
consumers want because its fixed costs (included legacy costs) are too high to let
factories sit idle when demand wanes.527 According to CEO Wagoner, “[t]o the
extent that we sell more products . . . we amortize those costs over more cars and
trucks sold, and the impact (of retiree costs) isn’t so great.”528 As a result, GM’s
brand and profits have taken a hit as resale value of GM cars drop due to market
saturation.529 By 2008, GM’s two fundamental and closely related weaknesses—a
huge legacy cost burden and an inability to adjust its structural costs—crippled the
corporation’s profitability, forcing a bailout.530
2. What to Do Now?
Concerning GM’s 2012 deal with Prudential, Vice President of Finance and
Treasurer Jim Davlin said, “[o]ur pension liability was so large . . . that each time
funding went down the ratings agencies and others doing financial evaluations
considered this a substantial debt-like obligation,” and, “[a]s our funding status
520

Id.

521

Id. at 72.

522

Id.

523

Id. at 78.

524

Id. at 39.

525

Id. at 47-48.

526

Id. at 48.

527

Id. at 53-54.

528

TAYLOR, supra note 516, at 176.

529

LOWENSTEIN, supra note 502, at 53-54.

530

Id. at 78.
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changed we’d go from no debt one year to dramatically high debt the next year.”531
He also highlighted how the pensioners were safer in Prudential’s hands because
“this is their core business.”532 Also, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 changed the
pension issue from one of investment to one of finance because GM’s finances are
impacted more short-term with potential “shareholder repercussions.”533
Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (“Map 21”)534 was enacted
in 2012 and changed the minimum and maximum obligations for pension funding.535
The minimum percentage decreased 5% every year from 90% in 2012 to 70% in
2015, while the maximum percentage increased 5% every year from 110% to 130%,
giving companies more flexibility to underfund during tough times and overfund in
times of growth.536 The relief further came in the form of adjusting the calculations
for overall liabilities known as segment rates, which are used to calculate funding
obligations.537
On the other hand, Map 21 increased the annual premiums employers are
required to pay the PBGC per plan from $30 in 2012, to $42 in 2013, and $49 in
2014, with inflation adjustments thereafter.538 The additional variable rate premium
for underfunded companies was also increased from nine dollars per $1,000 worth of
underfunding as of 2013 to fourteen dollars in 2014.539 The Bipartisan Budget Act of
2013540 then raised premiums to fifty-seven dollars and sixty-four dollars in 2015
and 2016 respectively541 while raising the variable rate premium to twenty-four
dollars and twenty-nine dollars in 2015 and 2016 respectively.542
The relief undoubtedly helps, but overall liabilities do not change while the
payments to the PBGC continue to rise increasing the short-term impact on
employers and, potentially, shareholders. Also, if and when the current Map 21
extension phases out,543 “the impact to operations (could) be substantial.”544
531

Russ Banham, The Great Pension De-Risking; Stung by funding shortfalls time and
again, companies are using a variety of tactics to lighten their pension burdens for good. CFO
MAG., Apr. 2013, at 42, 43.
532

Id. at 45 (emphasis added).

533

Id. at 42.

534

Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, H.R. 4348, 112th Cong. (2012).

535

Id. at 845.

536

Id. at 847.

537

Id.

538

Id. at 850.

539

Id.

540

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, H.R.J. Res. 59, 113th Cong. (2013).

541

Id. at 26.

542

Id. at 27.

543

Surface Transportation and Veterans Health Care Choice Improvement Act, H.R. 3236,
114th Cong. (2015) (3rd Extension of Map 21; extension up to Oct. 29, 2013).
544
Barry B. Burr, Corporations Face Looming Pension Bills: End of Federal Relief and
Increasing Longevity To Strain Balance Sheets, PENSIONS & INV. (June 29, 2015),
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In GM’s 2014 annual report, the automaker described how their unamortized pretax actuarial gain went from a $1 billion dollar gain in 2013 to a $4.6 billion dollar
loss in 2014545 by saying “[t]he change is due primarily to the decrease in discount
rates546 and the change in mortality assumptions partially offset by actual asset
returns in excess of assumed returns.”547 Liabilities for pension obligations are
discounted at the market rate for corporate bonds and, for the past fifteen years, the
average annual rate of return for corporate bonds has been 4.57%. GM’s corporate
bond rates have been below average at 3.59% in 2012, 4.46% in 2013, and 3.73% in
2014.548
Pension “contributions [should] rise very substantially, double if not triple” due
to the possibility the stock market “turn[s] around, which it mostly will now that the
fed [could] raise [interest] rates.”549 However, as of June 2015, GM’s spokesman
Tom Henderson said, “[w]e don’t expect [to make] a significant mandatory
contribution for the next five years.”550
IV. LEG THREE: PRIVATE SAVINGS PLANS
A. The Rise of the 401(k) Plan
Leg three of the retirement stool is the private savings leg. Leg three has
traditionally involved life insurance, bank accounts, individual stock purchases, and
similar investments. However, as employer defined benefit plans have been
discontinued, they have been replaced with Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs),
401(k) plans, and other similarly tax motivated plans.
Defined benefit plans are perhaps the ultimate paternalistic oversight of an
employee’s well being. The participant often pays nothing into the plan, but upon
retirement receives a lifetime benefit that is often inflation protected without casting
any investment responsibility on the participant.551 The main disadvantage for the
participant is if the participant leaves the employment covered by the plan the
accrual of benefits usually stops far short of the ultimate goal of providing an
annuity based on a percentage of the participant’s final years’ earnings.552 On the
employer or sponsor’s side the defined benefit plan creates tremendous burdens that

http://www.pionline.com/article/20150629/PRINT/306299972/corporations-face-loomingpension-bills.
545

GEN. MOTORS CO., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 55, 56 (2015) [hereinafter GM 2014
REPORT].
546
Id. at 103 (noting that the discount rate for United States pension benefit plans
decreased from 4.46% to 3.73%).
547

Id. at 55-56.

548

Id. at 103.

549

Burr, supra note 544.

550

Id.

551

MARIN, supra note 2, at 81-82.

552

Id. at 82.
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must be administered over an undetermined period dependent upon the longevity of
the participants.553
Sponsors’ concerns over defined benefit plans and participants’ desire for some
control over their investment future led to the introduction of defined contribution
plans, typically individual retirement accounts and 401(k) employer sponsored
retirement plans.554 Defined contribution plans provide tax advantages to participants
by allowing for a deduction of amounts contributed into the plan and then allowing
the contributions to grow tax-deferred until such time as the participant withdraws
the funds years later in retirement.555 A variation of this scheme, which is
economically equivalent if tax rates remain constant, is the ROTH 401(k), which
denies the deduction for contributions but allows later withdrawals to be tax-free.556
Under either variation, this method of saving is far superior to a bank savings
account, which is taxed on an annual basis.557 These plans encourage savings,558 but
unless contributions are made early in one’s career, the plans are unlikely to provide
sufficient funds at retirement and all investment risk is borne by the participant who
is often an unsophisticated investor.559
The growth of 401(k) plans closely followed the fall of defined benefit plans
such that the contributions to defined contribution plans exceeded the contributions

553

Id. at 82, 85. Government regulation under ERISA, financial reporting of pension plan
performance, and payments to the PBGC all combine to make defined benefit plans
unattractive to sponsors. Id. at 86-91.
554

Tax legislation in 1978 and through the 1980s introduced the concept of the 401(k),
which proved to be more popular than anyone at the Treasury Department anticipated.
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 160-62.
555

MARIN, supra note 2, at 83.

556

Id.

557

To perform a calculation on the lifetime impact of the 401(k), the medium earner is
assumed to save 10% of lifetime income in which case the medium earner would accumulate
$359,015 by age sixty-five based on assumed tax rates of 15%. SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at
286. At that tax rate, the tax would be $53,852, leaving an after tax amount of $305,163. Id.
However, if instead of using the 401(k) plan, the medium earner had put his money into a
regular savings account and been taxed currently he would accumulate and after-tax amount
of $241,521 at age sixty-five. Id. The tax advantaged account would have resulted in $63,642
more than a regular savings account. Id. Thus, the medium earner would receive a tax benefit
in this amount. Id. Each earner category would benefit from the tax benefitted savings, but the
higher earner would receive higher benefits. Id. at 286 tbl.24.4 (identifying the net tax benefits
for low, medium, high, and maximum earners as $17,185, $63,642, $152,014, and $433,604
respectively).
558

Results of studies are conflicting on the question whether IRA or 401(k) savings
contribute to the overall savings by contributors or are merely a change in the form of the
savings. One study suggested that 45% to 60% of the contributions are new savings while
another study suggested it was only 2%. Id. at 175 (citing William G. Gale & John Karl
Scholz, IRAs and Household Saving, 84 AM. ECON. REV., Dec. 1994, at 1233–60).
559
MARIN, supra note 2, at 83-84 (noting that “individuals habitually underperform
professional money managers by as much as 10 percent, and the most ‘gentle’ surveys show
that there is a at least a 2% disadvantage to individuals investing on their own”).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

83

852

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:769

to defined benefit plans in all but one year between 1984 and 2008.560 As selfdirected plans grew, concerns were raised about the effect of such changes on
workers’ retirement security since participants seemed to be older, higher-paid, male
workers and not those most in need of retirement security.561 During the 1980s,
401(k) plans shifted investment decisions to the beneficiary and retirement security
become a “do-it-yourself” project supported by employer sponsorship with
increasing investment options being provided.562
Initial enrollment restrictions such as the one-year waiting period were
eliminated and enrollment was encouraged which helped companies to meet antidiscrimination rules.563 Behavioral economists’ suggestions about how to increase
plan participation were included in The Pension Protection Act of 2006, which
allowed for automatic enrollment and other automatic features such as increasing the
contribution rate annually by 1% until the 10% level is reached or the employee says
stop.564 The Act also encouraged the use of default investments in various types of
stock and bond funds. In 2007, the Department of Labor issued guidelines providing
that automatic enrollees’ contributions are to be invested in various stock funds.565
The guidelines were in response to studies showing that professionally managed
defined benefit plans outperformed self-managed defined contribution plans and that

560
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 205. Notwithstanding the increasing popularity of 401(k)
plans in some circles, a number of states have experienced adverse results for workers from
defined contribution plans and have opted to replace them with defined benefit plans after up
to thirty-five years experience with defined contribution plans. Ron Snell, Pension Reform:
Not Easy, But Worth It, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/research/laborand-employmentpenson-reform-not-easy-but.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).
561
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 203 n.7. Schieber describes a study using 1993 census data
and concludes:

[P]articipants tended to be older, have longer tenures, earn higher pay and work for
larger companies than nonparticipants. Women were less likely to participate than
men. Workers tended to contribute more to their plans as their pay levels climbed. The
results suggested that those who needed help the most in acquiring retirement security
were being left out.
Id.
562

Id. at 201-03. The 22.6% drop in the stock market on Black Monday, October 19, 1987,
reduced the value of assets in defined contribution plans and raised questions of fiduciary
responsibility for market losses. Id. The result was regulations governing “self-directed”
accounts that allowed participants to select the investments, which included equities, bonds or
fixed income, or money market investments and relieved the fiduciary of any fiduciary
obligation for investment losses. Id. Large mutual funds became the investments of choice and
participants could move investments on a daily basis based on the end of day valuation. Id.
563

Id. at 206.

564

Id. at 208-09. Tony Robbins calls this a “save more tomorrow” plan and recommends
this in his book, TONY ROBBINS, MONEY MASTER THE GAME: 7 SIMPLE STEPS TO FINANCIAL
FREEDOM 67 (2014).
565

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 201-10.
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automatic enrollees were mostly contributing the minimum amounts (usually 3%)
while leaving the money in the most conservative investments.566
The defined contribution plan also presented a problem with “leakage.”567 There
was a tendency for participants, particularly younger participants with relatively
small amounts in their plans, to cash out the plan when they changed jobs. This
deprived them of early-career retirement savings compounding, which could work
over a forty or fifty year period with maximum benefit. The “cashing-out”
phenomena with defined contribution plans which reduces future retirement security
may not be significantly different than when individuals change jobs in mid-career
and the defined benefit plan accrual is terminated at one company and started fresh
at a second company.568
Nevertheless, 401(k) wealth has been on the rise. A 2007 study compared the
Social Security and 401(k) wealth of persons turning sixty-five in 2000 with the
projected wealth that would be accumulated in 401(k) plans by persons turning
sixty-five in 2010, 2020, 2030, and 2040.569 In 2000, a time when defined-benefitplan wealth was swiftly declining, the Social Security wealth of persons sixty-three
to sixty-seven exceeded the combined wealth of their defined benefit plans and
401(k) plans.570 Making the same comparison for persons turning sixty-five in 2010,
2020, 2030, and 2040 the study broke the age cohort into ten groups based on
projected lifetime earnings and found that, by 2030, 401(k) wealth will exceed
Social Security wealth in the six highest of the ten earnings groups, and, by 2040,
566
Id. Return differences of 1% to 2% would be significant over a forty-to fifty-year
career. Id. Permissible investment options included a life-cycle fund reflecting an enrollee’s
age, target retirement date, or life expectancy; a balanced fund reflecting the characteristics of
the plan participants as a whole; or an allocation between various funds reflecting the
enrollee’s age, target retirement date, or life expectancy. Id.
567

Id. at 210-11.

568

Id. at 211-12 (describing results from Andrew A. Samwick & Jonathan Skinner, How
Will 401(k) Pension Plans Affect Retirement Income?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 329 (2004)). The
research found that distributions associated with job changes decreased in number and value
from 2001 to 2007, while another researcher emphasized the need at least 25% of distributions
early in one’s career and 50% later in the career were necessary to approximate the values
achieved in defined benefit plans, and that, for the most part, defined contribution plans would
provide higher benefits. Id.
569

Id. at 212-13.

570

Id. at 213-14 (citing James M. Poterba et al., Rise of 401(k) Plans, Lifetime Earnings,
and Wealth at Retirement, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 13091, 2007),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13091. The comparison here does not include IRA or Keogh
wealth in the calculation of 401(k) wealth in this calculation which, had it been included,
would have found the highest lifetime earning decile’s wealth to exceed the value of Social
Security wealth. Poterba et al., supra, at 5. Social Security wealth was calculated as the
present value of projected benefits and the results were categorized by the deciles based on
lifetime earnings. The calculations were based on 2000 dollars using standard Social Security
estimated wage growth of 3.9% and inflation of 2.8%. Lifetime earnings ranged from $70,993
in the first decile, to $1,336,716 in the fifth decile, to $1,722,307 in the sixth decile, to
$3,565,347 in the tenth decile. Id. As with any study, the underlying assumptions of the study
could be challenged, but the general thrust of the study that growing 401(k) wealth will
outstrip Social Security wealth as the 401(k) plans mature. Id. at 6 tbl.1-2.
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will exceed Social Security wealth in all but the two lowest earnings groups.571 Thus,
by 2030, 401(k) projected accumulations over a fifty-year period will exceed Social
Security’s accumulated wealth over a ninety-five-year period. 572
Despite the projected success of the 401(k) phenomenon and the soaring stock
market, the question remains whether and to what extent individuals are able to bear
such responsibility. A recent op-ed piece by a renowned pension expert railed
against privately managed plans referring to them as a ridiculous approach to
retirement:
Not yet convinced that failure is baked into the voluntary, self-directed,
commercially run retirement plans system? Consider what would have to
happen for it to work for you. First, figure out when you and your spouse
will be laid off or be too sick to work. Second, figure out when you will
die. Third, understand that you need to save 7% of every dollar you earn.
(Didn’t start doing that when you were 25 and you are 55 now? Just save
30% of every dollar.) Fourth, earn at least 3% above inflation on your
investments every year. (Easy. Just find the best funds for the lowest price
and have them optimally allocated.) Fifth, do not withdraw any funds
when you lose your job, have a health problem, get divorced, buy a house
or send a kid to college. Sixth, time your retirement account withdrawals
so that so the last cent is spent the day you die.573
Although questioning the ability of individuals to manage private accounts,
Ghilarducci recognizes the need for savings beyond Social Security, suggesting that
someone earning $100,000 at retirement would need $2 million (twenty times annual
income in financial wealth) beyond Social Security to maintain their living standard
in retirement.574 Ghilarducci may be overstating the case by suggesting saving $2
million for a person earning $100,000. Using a simplified mathematical model and
assuming someone works for fifty years, retires at age seventy, and lives to age 100,
571

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 213-14.

572

Id. at 212-13 n.30 (citing Poterba et al, supra note 570, at 28, 32 referring to Tables 4-1
& 4-4 respectively). Calculations for the comparison for 401(k) assets included assets in IRAs
because it is likely that some retirees will have rolled over their assets in connection with a
change of employment or at retirement. Poterba et al., supra note 570, at 4-5. The growth of
401(k) assets will be modest for the lowest earners although with automatic enrollment and
other practices designed to increase enrollment may have a positive effect on these earners.
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 213-14. One study found that workers covered by defined benefit
plans would retire one to two years earlier than those with only defined contribution plans. Id.
at 257.
573

Teresa Ghilarducci, Our Ridiculous Approach to Retirement, N.Y. TIMES (July 21,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/opinion/sunday/our-ridiculous-approach-toretirement.html. The article also suggests it is a myth that people can plan to work more years
to boost their retirement. Id. Conditions such as layoffs, finding work after fifty, or spousal or
personal illness, among other reasons, make it difficult to work as one ages. See generally
TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO
SAVE THEM (1964).
574
Ghilarducci, supra note 573. There is some inconsistency in her statements since
saving $7,000 a year for fifty years and earning an annual 3% only accrues $789,578, not the
$2 million suggested as needed for the person making $100,000.
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that person would need to save $17,400 every year and earn 3% per year to
accumulate $1,962,665 by age seventy. At that point, the person could withdraw
$100,000 per year until the fund was exhausted at age 100. If the same person
invested in a broad based stock fund earning 7% per annum that person could
accumulate the $2 million simply by contributing $4,900 per year. If the 7% return
continued into the retirement years, the person could provide $100,000 for thirty
years simply by accumulating $1.25 million by age seventy. Obviously, all sorts of
combinations can be made, but the important point is that investing over long
periods of time and utilizing the benefits of compounding can provide a relatively
attractive retirement.
Ghilarducci does not think the population can be educated to voluntarily make
the sacrifice to save for retirement and proposes a plan for guaranteed retirement
accounts (GRAs) with a forced savings component as the way to proceed.575 Her
plan which addresses the need for additional retirement savings along with other
plans, such as the one in Chile, which replaced its social security type plan, are
discussed below.
B. Guaranteed Retirement Account
Ghilarducci’s concern is real; and allowing individuals to micromanage their
investments may need to be limited in any solution to the retirement dilemma. For
Ghilarducci, expecting individuals to shoulder the responsibility to save in a private
pension plan for forty years is to defy human behavior. She proposes a guaranteed
retirement account model to supplement Social Security by a forced contribution of
5% of payroll, which may be split between employee and employer, into an
investment account in which the government invests the monies in the financial
markets but guarantees a minimum real return of 3%, reflecting the historic longterm growth of the economy with the possibility of an inflation adjusted lifetime
annuity at retirement.576 Covered payroll would be the same as current Social
Security and everyone would receive a $600 tax credit against their contributions
paid for through the reduction of tax expenditures for 401(k) plans.577 At retirement,
participants can elect how they will receive their account distributions.
The GRA supports retirement because it requires people to save, provides
participants with flexibility on choosing a retirement date, provides lifetime benefits
without the risk of not having the best investment advice, has predictable outcomes,
is available to small businesses, is compatible with defined benefit plans, and is
national in scope.578 There is a lot of merit in Ghilarducci’s approach and many of
the features are reflected in the One-Fund Solution.
C. President Bush’s Plan for Private Accounts
Numerous proposals have been made for private accounts as part of Social
Security. New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan added voluntary individual
575

Id. at 15.

576

See Butler, American Paternalism, supra note 11, at 515-17 and citations therein
(describing the guaranteed retirement account model); see also GHILARDUCCI, supra note 573,
at 260-93.
577

GHILARDUCCI, supra note 573, at 277.

578

Id. at 263-74 (explaining each parameter in detail).
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accounts to a proposal which Robert Ball, Commissioner of Social Security; thought
was “antithetical to the social elements of the existing system.” In Ball’s view,
individual accounts, if successful, would make workers want to make them larger,
undermining commitment to the existing program.579
In the late 1990s President Clinton was ready to move forward with a reform
proposal that included diverting 2% of the Social Security tax to private accounts.580
The proposal was never formalized and unrelated events focused President Clinton’s
attention in other directions.581
Using private accounts to solve Social Security problems is seen by many as
diverting revenues away from current payment obligations.582 However, with or
without private accounts the country will face the same choices only with private
accounts they face them sooner.583 One knowledgeable Democrat is reported to have
summed up the current stalemate as follows:
The unsaid but implicit conclusion in her statement was that we can’t
increase our contributions now and save them in a way that gives us
meaningful financing relief later—added revenues put into the trust funds
cannot be saved. All that is left is benefit cuts if we do anything now. She
could not understand why any elected Democrats would ever want to put
themselves in that no-win position. The implications of Kennelly’s
observation, as I see it, is that some policymakers will avoid taking up
Social Security reform until the trusts funds are nearly depleted and we
again face the prospect of coming up short on the monthly payroll.584
In 2005, President Bush proposed a system of voluntary accounts needed to be
put into place on a phased in basis as part of a reformed Social Security system
recognizing the long-term fiscal problem facing OASDI.585 He stressed how the ratio
of workers supporting each retiree had dropped from forty to one to 3.3 to one in
2005 and will drop to two to one by the time the youngest workers reached
579

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 90.

580

Id. at 106.

581

Id. at 112.

582

Id. at 115.

583

Id. (referencing a statement from Andrew Biggs, an advocate of private accounts and
member of President Bush’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security).
584

Id. at 117 (reflecting on a conversation with Barbara Kennelly, a former Member of the
House Ways and Means Committee and former president of the National Committee to Save
Social Security and Medicare).
585
Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century, WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES,
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/social-security/text/ (last visited Apr. 24,
2016). President Bush’s plan was only outlined in general terms which were evaluated in
LAURA HALTZEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32879, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: PRESIDENT
BUSH’S INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PROPOSAL (2005). A subsequent report evaluated the status of
various proposals for reform including President Bush’s proposal. DAWN NUSCHLER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33544, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: CURRENT ISSUES AND LEGISLATION
(2006). That the idea of private accounts gained in popularity in the 1990s was surprising.
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 107 n.16 (citing Douglas Elmendorf et al., Fiscal Policy during the
1990s 30 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8488, Sept. 2001)).
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retirement.586 Further, the problem would be aggravated by the Baby Boomer
retirees scheduled to begin reaching sixty-two, the age for early retirement, in 2008
and continue thereafter until 2031 at which time the number of retirees would have
doubled.587 Also, because the wage index that determines initial benefits is growing
faster than inflation, future retirees will be receiving higher benefits in real terms
further jeopardizing Social Security. 588
In making his proposal President Bush said a variety of proposals had previously
been made to solve the fiscal short fall in Social Security including, “limiting
benefits for wealthy retirees, indexing benefits to prices rather than wages,
increasing the retirement age, discouraging early collection of retirement benefits
and changing the way benefits are calculated.”589 These were all on the table for
discussion as ways to make Social Security sound, but he emphatically stated that
increasing payroll taxes was not a permanent solution.590
There were three other parameters that were cornerstones of the proposal. First,
the system’s progressivity must be maintained; second, there should be no change
for persons fifty-five years and older; and third, any change should be gradual.591 A
fourth caveat that Social Security should be a better deal for younger workers
through voluntary accounts continues to be controversial.592
Under President Bush’s proposal for individual accounts (IAs), workers under
age fifty-five would be given an option to divert 4% of the 12.4% Social Security
contribution to a private investment account in which the worker could invest into a
group of broadly diversified index funds similar to the funds offered government
employees in their Thrift Savings Plan.593 The maximum amount that could be
diverted to IA would be $1,000 annually which would increase by $100 per year
over a series of years.594
Worker’s retirement benefit would be reduced to the extent that a worker
diverted a portion of their Social Security tax to an IA. To determine the amount of
the reduction, the administrator would create a hypothetical “shadow” account for
the worker in which the worker’s IA contribution would be credited on paper. That
shadow account would accrue interest at a real (inflation adjusted) rate of return of
3%. At such time as the worker retired, the hypothetical amount in the shadow
account would be used as the amount the worker could receive if he purchased a
586
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 53 (referring to the ratio of the number of beneficiaries
receiving benefits to the number of workers paying into the system as the “dependency ratio”
and the ratio of the average benefits paid to the average wage of workers contributing to the
system as the “earnings replacement rate”).
587

Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century, supra note 585, at 1-2.

588

Id. at 2 (estimating for twenty-year olds in 2005 the benefit was estimated to be 40%
higher in real terms when they retired).
589

Id. at 3.

590

Id.

591

Id.

592

Id. at 3-4.

593

Id.

594

Id. at 4.
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lifetime annuity with an appropriate cost of living adjustment. That monthly amount
would be used to reduce the worker’s Social Security benefit.595
President Bush’s proposal was subject to considerable debate as he travelled
seeking to build support for the change. Unfortunately, the IAs would not help the
long-term deficit, and President Bush did not address that issue, which made the plan
incomplete. Further, the Democrats thought the present system was just fine and that
the solvency problem was thirty-five years away. President Bush’s plan never gained
traction in the country or in Congress.
Advocates of reform see Social Security as an out-of-date depression-era plan in
need of modernization. The economic, social, and demographic changes of the past
seventy years force the need for change, which has been accomplished in other
countries. The present pay-as-you-go system is unsustainable and a system that
allows workers to acquire ownership in an account is preferable and would give
workers a larger retirement income. Also, reform may have the effect of curbing
entitlement spending. Finally, current workers are paying for over-generous
payments to former retirees who will get a much better return than they will.596
Those advocating for a more restrained approach believe minor changes to the
taxes or benefits would be sufficient and that advocates of private accounts want to
undermine public support of the system and erode the social insurance nature of the
system. They see considerable problems in transitioning to a system of private
accounts and, even if it could be done, think it would put workers at excessive risk to
the market. In any event, people already have the right to invest outside the Social
Security system. 597
D. Chile’s Private Pension System
On November 4, 1980, Chile transitioned from a pay-as-you-go system598 into an
“Individual Capitalization” pension system, providing for individual member
accounts.599 The reform gave every individual the option of opting out fully from
government run pension systems.600 Under this new plan, employers were required

595

HALTZEL, supra note 585, at 4.

596

NUSCHLER, supra note 585, at 3-4.

597

It is also suggested that the demographic problem is overblown since people who live
longer will likely work longer. Id. at 4-5.
598

Pay-as-you-go (“PAYGO”) is the practice of using funds currently collected for future
obligation to pay amounts due under already accrued obligations rather than setting the funds
aside for the future obligations. Pensions in Chile, WIKIPEDIA (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pensions_in_Chile.
599
Id.; see also SUPERINTDENCIA DE PENSIONES, THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, A
DESCRIPTION
OF
THE
CURRENT
SYSTEM
53
(2008),
http://www.spensiones.cl/portal/informes/581/articles-3523_chapter4.pdf [hereinafter THE
CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM] (stating each member has an individual account with an APF in
which his/her social security contributions are deposited for investment in appropriate mutual
funds). When the member retires or passes away, the amount in the account is returned to the
member or his/her surviving beneficiaries in the form of a pension based directly on the
amount in the account. Id.
600
Empowering Workers in Chile, JOSEPINERA.ORG, http://www.josepinera.org/articles/
articles_empoweringworkers.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/5

90

2016]

ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS

859

to pay a stated percentage of a worker’s wages in the worker’s pension fund.601
Workers already in the system were not required to switch over to the new plan, new
workers were automatically placed in the new plan, and older workers were given, as
an incentive to convert, a statutory minimum contribution of 11% lower than their
contributions under the old pension system.602 As a result, over 95% of Chile’s
workers converted to privately managed personal retirement accounts (PRA).603
1. An Overview of Chile’s Private Pension System
The pension system is managed by private institutions called Pension Fund
Administrators (AFPs) each of which operate five mutual funds with different
proportions of debt and equity securities purchased with funds accumulated by
workers in their PRA accounts.604 AFPs are highly regulated to protect the interests
of the workers and to insure the workers are fully informed of their PRA accounts,
which are the source of their pension.605
601

Employees are obligated to pay a total of 10% per pay period. THE CHILEAN PENSION
SYSTEM, supra note 599, at 60; see also ALISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL42449, CHILE’S PENSION SYSTEM: BACKGROUND IN BRIEF 2 (2012), www.crs.gov, R42449;
On the way to responsible citizens: Pension reform on the example of Chile, JOSEPINERA.ORG,
www.josepinera.com/josepinera/Jp_ABC_Revolucion_pension_ger.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2014) (indicating that the 10% rate was determined on the assumption of a 4% average real
return on a PRA during a whole working life for the typical worker would be sufficient money
in his account to fund a retirement benefit equal to approximately 70% of his final salary).
602
THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 599.
603

The PRA is also referred to as an “individual capitalization account.” Id. at 60. This
same reform introduced two important changes to the health system: (a) the disability and
survivor insurance system became an integral part of the so-called “AFP system” (the AFPs
are highly regulated private companies which can be 100% foreign owned that manage the
PRAs on workers’ behalf); and, (b) it allowed workers to opt out from the monopolistic
government health insurance system with all their mandatory contribution (another 7% of
wages), as long as they were willing and able to buy with that money a minimum health
insurance plan in what became the “ISAPRE system” (the ISAPREs are the private companies
that offer diverse health insurance plans). Empowering Workers in Chile, supra note 600. This
comprehensive reform has changed dramatically Chile’s economy and society. Six million
workers (95% of the labor force) have a PRA and 1.5 million (almost 25% of labor force and
gradually increasing as higher wages allow their 7% of wages to buy the minimum health
plan) have an ISAPRE plan. Id.
604
Empowering Workers in Chile, supra note 600. The exclusive purpose of the AFP is to
carry on activities related to the social security system. In the Chilean system, people can
choose between five types of savings funds, denoted A to E, defined by their ratio of fixedinterest to variable-interest assets. Kristian Niemietz, Chile’s private pension system has
weathered the crisis, INST. ECON. AFF. (Jul. 27, 2010), http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/
chile%E2%80%99s-private-pension-system-has-weathered-the-crisis. Fondo A is the most
risky one, with up to 80% of its assets invested in equities. Id. Fondo E is the most
conservative one, consisting of fixed interest bearing bonds only. Id. The other ones are
intermediate solutions. Id.
605
The AFPs are regulated by a government body, appointed by the President of the
Republic, that guarantees the financing of benefits, which is represented within the system
itself by the “Superintendency of Pension Fund Administrators” (SAFP). The SAFP is broken
down into six separate divisions: Legal Department, Institutional Control Division, Finance
Division, Benefits and Insurance Division, Research Division, and Internal Administration,
and IT Division. In addition, the SAFP has two units – the Medical Commissions Unit,

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

91

860

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:769

Workers choose which AFP(s) to join as well as the individual funds within the
AFP, although older members and pensioners are limited to funds with a high
percentage of debt securities and younger members can have up to 80% in
equities.606 Employees are obligated and self-employed workers have the right to
make regular deposits at 10% of taxable monthly wages and income subject to an
upper limit.607 An additional 3% voluntary payment can be made to cover disability
and term life insurance.608 These deposits are made into the employee’s individual
capitalization account and invested by the AFP. Workers not making timely
payments are subject to collection procedures609 and money put into the account
remains tax-free.
In 2002, a voluntary contribution system was added to the current system to
encourage voluntary contributions to the individual capitalization account. These
extra savings could mean early retirement for an individual or a higher pension on
retirement. Alternatively, the extra savings could be used to compensate the
individual for periods when no contributions were made due to some misfortune,
such as unemployment. Under the voluntary system, workers can contribute an
additional 10% of his wage subject to limits.610

ensuring compliance with disability legislation, and Unemployment Insurance Unit, ensuring
that unemployment insurance functions correctly. THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note
599, at 55-58.
606

Investment decisions are made by the AFP but percentage limits are set for specific
types of instruments and for the overall mix of the portfolio. Empowering Workers in Chile,
supra note 600. The spirit of the reform is that those regulations should be reduced
progressively as the AFP companies gain experience and capital markets work better. There is
no obligation whatsoever to invest in government bonds or any other security. Id. Legally, the
AFP companies and the mutual funds are separate entities. Id. Thus, should an AFP go under,
the assets of the mutual funds-that is, the workers’ investments-are not affected at all and only
the AFP’s shareholders lose their capital. Id.
607

The contribution limit is approximately $2,427 USD (sixty UF in Chile’s currency, the
“Unidades de Fomento”). Barbra Kritzer, Chile’s Next Generation Pension Reform, 68 SOC.
SECURITY BULL. 69, 81 (2008), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v68n2/v68n2p69.pdf.
Unidades de Fomento is a real, inflation-adjusted unit that is used for special purposes in
Chile including pension contributions and guaranteed benefits under the pension system.
SHELTON, supra note 601, at 2 n.5.
608
Generally, it is advisable to pay the 3% and avoid the possibility of paying for their
own disability costs. See Steve Idemoto, Social Security Privatization in Chile: A Case for
Caution, ECON. OPPORTUNITY INST. (Sept. 29, 2000), http://www.eoionline.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/social-security/SSPrivatizationChileCaseCaution-Sep00.pdf.
609
See THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 599.
610

The voluntary contribution is limited to fifty UF per month (approximately $2,022
USD). Id. at 61; see also Empowering Workers in Chile, supra note 600. As a compliment to
the individual capitalization account, an independent voluntary savings account was
authorized in 1987, which can be used to create extra savings for retirement. Unlike the
individual capitalization account, the voluntary savings account allows the individual to
withdraw money from the account four times per year. THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra
note 599, at 62-63. Withdrawals from the account are taxable income pursuant to a formula
that determines the proportion of any withdrawal that constitutes gain or loss in the account.
Id.
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2. Obtaining Benefits
The individual capitalization system offers three different types of pensions.
First, the normal pension offered at the time of an individual’s retirement–—for men
at or after age sixty-five and for women at or after age sixty.611 Second, a person can
retire early provided the member qualifies for a pension equal to or greater than 50%
of his or her average taxable income for the last ten working years, but which is not
less than 110% of the minimum pension guaranteed by the State.612 Third, the
members, through the plan’s administrators, finance a disability and survivorship
benefit, but if the member is not covered by such insurance then the benefit is
financed through that member’s individual capitalization account alone.613
The pension is paid at the option of the member, either as a programmed
withdrawal, a life annuity, or temporary income with a deferred life annuity. The
programmed withdrawal must meet certain requirements to insure that the member
does not exhaust their account.614 The member is able to withdraw the excess funds
in his account to the extent the account balance is sufficient to meet 110% of the
minimum pension guaranteed by the State and higher than 70% of the member’s
average monthly taxable wage over the last ten years. 615
Chile also provides a minimum pension for those that contributed to the account
for twenty years but have an amount in their fund below the minimum. In 2002, the
value of the minimum pension was approximately $72,000 for members under
seventy years of age and $79,000 for members over seventy years of age.616 From
1992 to 2002, the minimum pension grew at an annual rate of 4.6% in real terms.617
611

THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 599, at 65.

612

Id.

613

Id. at 65-66. To qualify for a disability pension, a person must be under the age of
retirement and must have lost at least two-thirds of their ability to work. Id. If the worker loses
only one-half to below two-thirds of their ability, the individual may still be able to receive a
partial disability pension. Id.
614
Niemietz, supra note 604. The Programmed Withdrawal option allows a retiree to leave
his funds in the PRA and make programmed withdrawals, subject to limits based on the life
expectancy of the retiree and his dependents; with this option, if he dies, the remaining funds
in his account form a part of his estate and can be given to his heirs basically tax-free.
Empowering Workers in Chile, supra note 600. The Life Annuity option allows members to
sign an irrevocable contract, losing ownership of their resources, allowing their pension
benefits to be paid by a life insurance company (of their choice). Id. “This company promises
to pay them a constant monthly income, in real terms, as long as they live, and to pay a
survivorship pension to their beneficiaries. In this way, the member’s resources are transferred
to the Life Insurance Company which assumes both the financial risk and the risk of longevity
on the part of the pensioner and his/her family group.” THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra
note 599, at 68-69. Lastly, the Temporary Income with Deferred Life Annuity option in
essence allows a member to receive a loan on their benefits from the insurance company. Id.
At the time of retirement, the individual retains ownership and therefore risk of loss on their
annuity until such time as the loan is repaid. Id.
615
616

THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 599, at 68-69.
Id.

617
Id. at 69-71 (finding other criteria are in place to determine minimum pensions for the
disabled and survivors).
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3. The Transition Financing Pensions and Pension Options
The transition from a pay-as-you-go system to a system of private accounts is a
difficult and expensive process, but was accomplished without raising taxes.618 At
the time Chile was in the hands of a dictator, essentially bankrupt, and had just
started a modern pension system modeled on the United States system.619
Chile took three important steps to facilitate the transition. First, it guaranteed the
benefits of those in the former system.620 Second, workers who opted out of the
former system were given a “recognition bond” in an amount equal in value to their
interest under the former system.621 The bond would be a zero coupon bond bearing
real interest of 4% per annum payable on the date of the individuals retirement. The
bond could be traded in secondary markets and would be deposited in the worker’s
PRA account. Third, all new entrants into the labor force were required to enter the
PRA system.622 An element of transparency in the system is the following:
We also ended the illusion-artificially maintained by lawmakers around
the world-that both the employer and the worker contribute to social
security. As economists know well, all the contributions are ultimately
paid from the worker’s marginal productivity, and employers take into
account all labor costs-whether termed salary or social security
contribution-in making their hiring and pay decisions. So, by renaming
the employer’s contribution as additional gross wage, our reform made it
clear, without reducing workers’ take-home pay, that all contributions are
paid ultimately by the worker and that he can control his own money. Of
course, at the end of the day, wage levels will be determined by the
interplay of market forces.623
At the time of transition in 1980, the Chilean pay-as-you-go system short fall was
estimated to be equivalent to 80% of GDP.624 Chile used five “sources” to finance
the transition. First, Chile issued bonds at market rates of interest, some of which
were purchased by the AFPs.625 Second, since the savings rate needed to fund the
618
Empowering Workers in Chile, supra note 600. Addressing transition costs is difficult
but a key insight is that: “[C]ontrary to the widely held belief, there is no ‘economic’
transition cost, because there is no cost to GNP due to this reform . . . . A completely different,
and relevant, issue is how to confront the ‘cash-flow’ transition cost to the government of
recognizing, and ultimately eliminating, the unfunded liability created by the pay-as-you-go
system.” Id.
619

MARIN, supra note 2, at 180.

620

Empowering Workers in Chile, supra note 600.

621

Id.

622

Id.

623

Id.

624

From 1981 to 1999, transition costs averaged about 3.25% of GDP. SHELTON, supra
note 601, at 6.
625
Using debt, the transition cost was shared by future generations. In Chile, roughly 40%
of the cost has been financed by issuing government bonds at market rates of interest. See
Idemoto, supra note 608. Prior to changing the system, “the government deliberately created a
budget surplus, and for many years afterwards the treasury minister was able to use . . . .” Jose
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PRAs was lower than the payroll tax under the old system, a fraction of the
difference was used as a temporary “transition tax.”626 Third, Chile sold government
owned assets to raise funds.627 Fourth, Chile reduced and held down government
spending.628 And, fifth, the value-added tax resulting from economic growth fueled
by the PRA system increased tax revenues.629 These actions led one commentator to
point to two lessons: (1) pension plans and their critical role in providing retirement
income and support are perhaps the single most important variable in the fiscal
stability of the world economies, so understanding their status—country-by-country
or entity-by-entity—is the key to assessing and/or running those economies; (2)
pension plans are the most important source of long-term capital in almost all
economies and, as such, are the true engines of growth and must be tended to
accordingly.630
4. Criticism of the Chilean Model
The full impact of Chile’s privatization remains unknown until the system
matures. Critics point to its negative impact on public spending, exorbitant
management fees, the income disparity between men and women and low-income
individuals, and the susceptibility of the accounts to market down turns.631 Some of
these criticisms were addressed in a 2008 reform that limited commissions paid to
the AFPs and enhanced the minimum pension (often referred to as a “poverty
prevention tier”) and benefits for women.632
Critics question whether Chile’s model is applicable to other countries although a
number of countries have already adopted it.633 For example, the Social Security in
Pinera, Empowering Workers: The Privatization of Social Security in Chile, in SOCIAL
SECURITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: PERSPECTIVES ON CHOICE (Michael D. Tanner ed., 2004).
626

Id.

627

Id.

628

Id.

629

Id.

630

MARIN, supra note 2, at 181. Regarding the sale of government assets, Marin points to
the sale of Chile’s largest pension fund company, Provida, and insurance company,
Consorcio. Id. at 180.
631
See Idemoto, supra note 608, at 3 (reporting, in 1990, high management fees and
unfairness to lower, middle, and women workers); Niemietz, supra note 604 (observing that
the value of Chilean pension assets crashed “spectacularly” in 2008 but rebounded in 2009,
that 30% of Chilean pension assets are invested abroad making them less dependent on
Chile’s economy, and that pensioners have more security than under the prior PAYGO
system); see also THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 599, at 88 (explaining that, since
administrators fix set commissions within a legally established structure and members have
freedom to choose between AFPs, commissions should reflect competitive levels between
AFPs).
632
SHELTON, supra note 601, at 8-9. The poverty prevention tier provides a means-tested
minimum benefit (the “Basic Solidarity Pension”) to everyone as well as a Pension Solidarity
Complement for those who’s PRA does not provide a pension equal to a threshold amount. Id.
at 1-2. Furthermore, the enhanced provision for women who, among other things, provides a
bonus at age sixty-five for every live birth or adopted child. Id. at 9.
633

“Since 1990, ten other countries in the region have adopted some form of what has
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the United States was more efficient than Chile’s system in 1981 when they
converted to a private system.634 Further, the high administrative costs incurred by
Chile, a lack of a public mandate for change, the large cash flow requirements for
transition, and the lack of a current budget surplus all make adoption of the Chile
system in the United States unlikely.635
Chile’s new system has performed well. Reports are, from 1981 through 2014,
Fund C, a balanced fund, averaged real returns of 8.6% with annual real returns
between minus 3% and plus 30%. While the rate of contribution is almost half the
former payroll tax rate, the benefits have been many times higher. Further, capital
has experienced significant productivity gains, poverty has been reduced, and
government expenditures as a percentage of GDP declined from 34.3% in 1984 to
21.9% in 1990. Finally, pension funds and investment funds have accumulated funds
equal to 70% of GDP.636
E. Australia’s Model
The retirement income security system in place in Australia consists of three
pillars.637 The first pillar is a government provided, means-tested aged pension while
the second and third pillars are mandatory and voluntary savings retirement funds
together called the “superannuation fund.”638 The superannuation fund—employer
sponsored mandatory retirement payments and private voluntary payments—was
instituted by the government to alleviate some of the public burden and reduce

become known as the Chilean model: Argentina (1994), Bolivia (1997), Colombia (1993),
Costa Rica (1995), Dominican Republic (2003), El Salvador (1998), Mexico (1997), Panama
(2008), Peru (1993), and Uruguay (1996).” Kritzer, supra note 607, at 69; see also THE
CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 599.
634

Idemoto, supra note 608.

635

SHELTON, supra note 601, at 9.

636

For information regarding the success of the Chilean plan, see Empowering Workers in
Chile, supra note 600. The success of the system will ultimately be evaluated of a full
working life plus any period of retirement. Id.
637

Australia’s national health care (often a fourth pillar of retirement) provides world-class
medical treatment for medical emergencies, but, for treatments that can be delayed such, as a
non-emergency hip replacement, retired Australians purchase private insurance. See
Australia’s Health System—An Overview, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEPT. HEALTH,
http://www.doctorconnect.gov.au/internet/otd/publishing.nsf/Content/australiasHealthSystem
(last visited Apr. 24, 2016). Australia’s medical system consists of two parts: a universal
health care that is funded by the government and pays for about 70% of medical costs, and a
private individualized insurance system that covers the other 30% of costs. Id. Similar to the
health care system in the United States, their public system is referred to as “Medicare” and is
only available to qualified citizens based on eligibility requirements that vary based on age,
income, disability, and more. Id. Home ownership has also been described as a fourth pillar.
See David Ingles & Miranda Stewart, Superannuation Tax Concessions and the Age Pension:
A Principled Approach to Savings Taxation 1 (Tr. Territory of the Pacific Islands, Working
Paper 7/2015, 2015).
638

Cormick & McLaren, supra note 2, at 497.
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government expenditures.639 The Superannuation Guarantee Charge (SGC) requires
employers to contribute 9.25% of the salary paid to employees640 and employees can
contribute an extra amount up to, in 2014, $30,000 ($35,000 if aged over forty-nine),
as well as contribute to a voluntary savings account.641
Under the first pillar, all citizens are provided a basic means-tested benefit with a
level of income deemed sufficient to provide a minimum standard of living.642 Most
retirees in Australia are entitled to a pension benefit from a government-sponsored
and administered system.643 Unlike the United States Social Security system, it is
neither contributory nor meant to be a “safety net.”644 The amount of age pension an
individual is eligible to receive “is determined by two factors: (1) the base amount,
which is the same for every Australian, and (2) the means tests.”645 Coverage is not
necessarily universal, but is based on eligibility criteria,646 and is meant to be a
639

Id. (finding currently over 25% of government expenditures is on health, age-related
pensions, and aged-care and will grow to over 50% by 2049-2050). John Hewson, The Politics
of Tax Reform in Australia, ASIA & PACIFIC POL’Y STUDIES 590, 595 (2014) (stating that,
while Australia’s overall tax burden is low, the simpler superannuation introduced in 2006 is
both inequitable and inefficient, and finding that: “the [tax] system encourages wealth
accumulation by borrowing and speculation, while . . . impos[ing] the highest rates of tax on
wage and salary income and savings in deposits, while imposing substantially lower rates on
the same amount of income from other investments and particularly if those investments are
funded by debt.”).
640

Nick Summers, In Australia, Retirement Savings Done Right, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK.
MKTS. & PERS. FIN. (May 30, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-30/inaustralia-retirement-saving-done-right (explaining, when it began in 1992, the law required
employers to divert 3% of most workers’ salaries into retirement accounts). As of July 1,
2014, the rate was 9.5% and will remain flat for six years and increase to 10% on July 1, 2020,
and to 12% on July 1, 2025. Ingles & Stewart, supra note 637, at 3; see also Superannuation
in Australia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superannuation_in_AUSTRALIA (last
visited Apr. 24, 2016) (stating “[e]mployers are not required to make employer contributions
for employees earning less than $450 per month not working more than 30 hours per week, or
for employees aged under 18 or over 70. If however they are earning $450 per month before
tax and working more than 30 hours per week full-time, part-time or casual, the employer is
required to pay superannuation regardless of being under 18.”).
641
Cormick & McLaren, supra note 2, at 497 n.15; Summers, supra note 640 (“One in
five employees saves even more with voluntary contributions known as ‘salary sacrifice.’
Some companies match workers’ contributions.”).
642

Cormick & McLaren, supra note 2, at 497 and citation contained therein.

643

This system is known as “Age Pension.” The age pension redistributes income both on
the basis of wealth and between the stages of the life cycle and is paid by current tax, which is
largely paid by younger workers. Dana M. Muir, Building Value in the Australian Defined
Contribution System: A Values Perspective, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 93, 104-08 (2011).
644

Id. at 104.

645

Id. at 106-08 (finding the Age Pension uses both an income test and an asset test to
determine the amount an individual may be eligible for).
646
The eligibility requirements are that the individual reaches the age of sixty-seven, if
born after January 1, 1957, and either have a been a resident for a continuous period of ten
years at the time of filing, or the individual must have been a resident for five continuous
years prior to filing with other years of residency that would total ten years. Id. Ingles &
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“social assistance program to prevent poverty among the elderly.”647 Furthermore,
benefits are foregone if not received during the time period in which they are
available.648 Take for example, a sixty-seven year old beneficiary who is a resident
and has worked for the past fifteen years but still working, he could not receive an
age pension for the length of time in which he was still working and those benefits
would not be later given to him upon his retirement; the benefits that accrued after
age sixty-seven would have been.
For most individuals, private wealth is tied to owner-occupied housing and
values in the superannuation fund.649 Contributions, both mandatory and voluntary
(pillars two and three), to the superannuation fund are taxed at a reduced rate of
15%.650 At such time as the individual reaches retirement age, if the private account
is above a certain amount, the individual will not be eligible for the social insurance
retirement benefit.651 However, all moneys taken from the retirement account are
tax-free.652 Over the past two decades, the retirement plan has increased in wealth,
growing from just under 20% of GDP to roughly 90% of GDP, and with over 90%
of employed Australians having savings in a superannuation account, the total assets
in these accounts now exceed Australia’s GDP.653
Australian marginal tax rates go up to 40% and the only deduction allowed is for
charity.654 No deduction is permitted for mortgage interest on a primary residence.
Stewart, supra note 637, at 5-17 (describing in detail the age pension and the income and asset
tests and pointing out that the eligibility age will increase to sixty-seven in 2023 and to
seventy in 2035).
647

Muir, supra note 643, at 105.

648

Id. at 104-08.

649

Cormick & McLaren, supra note 2, at 497.

650

Id. at 501 (noting the criticism that taxing contributions reduces the amount invested
and the accumulation over the contributor’s working life). Income generated in the
superannuation fund is taxed to the member as it accumulates, and taxed according to their
proportion of tax-free and taxable benefits, although the fund receives dividend imputation
credits, based on investment in Australian equities that can reduce the effective tax rate for
investment income to 8%. Id. at 506; see also MERCER, TAX & SUPERANNUATION:
BENCHMARKING AUSTRALIA AGAINST THE WORLD’S BEST RETIREMENT SAVINGS SYSTEM 7
(2013),
http://www.mercer.com/content/dam/mercer/attachments/asiapacific/australia/News/130208_Global_Tax_Benchmarking_Final.pdf; Ron Bird & Jack Grey,
A Brief Critical Review of Australia’s Retirement Savings System, 12 J. INV. CONSULTING 53,
53 (2011).
651

Summers, supra note 640.

652

Id.

653

Daniel J. Mitchell, Unexpected Praise for Australia’s Pension Social Security System,
CATO LIBERTY, http://www.cato.org/blog/unexpected-praise-australias-private-social-securitysystem (last visited Apr. 21, 2016); see also Summers, supra note 640 (pointing out that assets
in the superannuation fund grew to $1.52 trillion from 1992 to 2013 compared to $2.8 trillion
in United States 401(k) plans with a population fourteen times larger than the Australian
population).
654
If an individual has other investments income from such investments would be taxed at
the regular rates. See Cormick & McLaren, supra note 2, at 501; see also MERCER, supra note
650.
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Australia has a 10% goods and services tax (GST), but no local sales taxes.655 In
Australia, taxes make up 22.2% of GDP656 and national debt is 20.48% of GDP.657
The system, however, is far from perfect.658 Migratory labor law, for example, is an
area where the law is limited, making it difficult for migratory workers to save for
retirement the way national workers can.659
F. Canadian Savings Account
Canada has instituted a savings program attractive for middle class investors
called the Tax-Free Savings Account (TFSA). The TFSA is a flexible, registered,
general-purpose savings vehicle that allows Canadians to earn tax-free investment
income to more easily meet lifetime savings needs.660 The nearest United States
equivalent is Roth Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA). With a Roth IRA,
earnings are taxed before contributions are made into the account. The money then
grows tax-protected, and people pay no tax when the funds are withdrawn. However,
Roth accounts have numerous restrictions and, in some cases, can be subject to
penalties.661
While IRA accounts have been around for many years, only 38% of United
States households own some type of IRA.662 Canada introduced TFSAs in 2009, but
48% of Canadians have already signed up; and, as of 2013, TFSAs hold $109 billion

655

See
Exports
&
GST,
AUSTRALIAN
TAX’N
OFFICE,
https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/International-tax-for-business/Australians-doing-businessoverseas/Exports-and-GST/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).
656
Tax-to-GDP Ratio – Past and Prospective Developments, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2013/EconomicRoundup-Issue-2/Economic-Roundup/Tax-to-GDP-ratio (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).
657
Australian
Government
Debt
to
GDP,
TRADING
ECON.,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/australia/government-debt-to-gdp (last visited Sept. 14,
2014).
658

See, e.g., Hewson, supra note 639 (“Australians are left with a system that still visibly
fails three original, key objectives of tax policy, let alone to have adequately adjusted to the
dramatic shifts in global and domestic economic and social environment and related policy
challenges . . . .”)
659

See Cormick & McLaren, supra note 2, at 503–12 (discussing issues such as: the ability
of sovereign nations to tax workers on their own authority, thus leading to the double taxation
of some migratory workers; and the inability of migratory workers in many cases to transfer
their earned retirement in a separate nation to Australia without significant ramifications).
660

Tax Free Savings Account, CAN. GOV’T. (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.tfsa.gc.ca/.

661

Roth IRAs are subject to a number of restrictions based on income limits (cannot have
AGI over $191,000 in 2014) and penalties if money is withdrawn within five years or before
reaching age fifty-nine and six months. Id.
662

Amity Shlaes & Chris Edwards, A Simple Tax Reform Can Help Families Promote
Economic Growth, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/amity-shlaesand-chris-edwards-a-simple-tax-reform-can-help-families-and-promote-economic-growth1408919408.
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in assets.663 While the account is not completely without tax penalty, there are far
fewer restrictions on these types of accounts than those placed on IRAs.664
1. Key Features
Some of the key features that set a TFSA apart from an IRA are, the lack of
income limitations on contributions, lack of restrictions for using the account, and
the tax benefits gained by having the account.665 Unlike the income, contribution,
and withdrawal restrictions in an IRA, a TFSA allows any qualified Canadian
resident666 to contribute up to $5,500 annually without tax penalty.667 Any unused
contribution is saved and carried forward for use in future years.668 For example, if
you contribute $3,500 this year, next year you could add the unused $2,000 and
make a deposit of $7,500 that year. Any withdrawal made in the prior year can also
be contributed without penalty.669 In addition, TFSA account owners can choose
from a wide range of investment options.670 The investment income earned on the
TFSA is tax free, as well as any withdrawals from the TFSA.671
Although contributions to a TFSA are not tax deductible, “neither income earned
within a TFSA nor withdrawals from it affect eligibility for federal income-tested
benefits and credits, such as Old Age Security, the Guaranteed Income Supplement,
and the Canada Child Tax Benefit.”672 Unlike an IRA, a TFSA does not have to be
withdrawn at retirement. In the event of the taxpayer’s death, the assets within a
663
Id. (“At the end of 2013 Canadians held $109 billion in assets in TFSAs. In an
economy the size of the United States’ economy, that amount would be the equivalent of $1
trillion.”).
664

Id.

665

About the tax-free savings account (TFSA), CAN. REV. AGENCY, http://www.craarc.gc.ca/tx/rgstrd/tfsa-celi/bt-eng.html (last updated Dec. 15, 2015).
666
Canadian residents must be eighteen years or older and have a valid social insurance
number to be able to set money aside tax free. Id.
667

Id. see also Four Reasons to Open a TFSA, GETSMARTERABOUTMONEY.CA,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/investor-education/investor-educationfund/tfsas/four-reasons-to-open-a-tfsa/article16886502/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2016) (“The
money you put into a TFSA has already been taxed. So if your marginal tax rate is higher
when you take the money out, you'll have paid less in taxes . . . . You can use the TFSA to
shelter investments that would otherwise be taxed at the highest rate. That’s because you don’t
pay tax on your TFSA’s earnings.”).
668

Tax Free Savings Account, supra note 660.

669

Tax-Free Savings Account, CAN. REV. AGENCY (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.craarc.gc.ca/tfsa/; see also Tax Free Savings Account, supra note 660 (“Re-contributing in the
same year may result in an over-contribution amount which would be subject to a penalty
tax.”).
670

This includes mutual funds, bonds, and Guaranteed Investment Certificates. Tax Free
Savings Account, supra note 660.
671
Full amount of withdrawals can be put back into the TFSA in future years. However,
re-contributing in the same year may result in an over-contribution amount, which would be
subject to a penalty tax. Id.
672

Id.
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TFSA can generally be transferred to the taxpayer’s legal or common-law spouse.673
An account can be opened at any bank branch, or online, and can hold different types
of assets, including bank deposits, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and more.
The largest danger faced by TFSA owners is over contribution to their accounts
annually.674 Canada’s Revenue Agency imposes a tax penalty of 1% per month on
the excess contributions.675 Although the issue of penalties for excess contributions
gained considerable attention in 2010, it eventually quieted down, but so far in 2012
the government collected $22.5 million in penalties.676 In that year, nearly 80,000
people were sent notices of over contribution but less than 20,000 received a waiver
on the penalties they incurred.677
The United States could adopt its own TFSA simply by expanding existing
legislation. A TFSA is subject to simple and rather straightforward rules so that
investors should be able to become adept at evaluating investment choices rather
than the complex provisions of tax law. A United States TFSA would create an
incentive for people to save for serious projects like the purchase of a home or
saving for higher education or retirement. A TFSA would be equally available to
both high-income persons as well as low-income persons. Even though there would
be certain revenue losses, much revenue is already lost with Roth IRAs and 401(k)s
and growth may be spurred with the additional savings created by a TFSA.
G. Social Security Works All Generations Plan
Those commentators who think private accounts are unacceptable, but realize the
inadequacy of current arrangements in providing a secure retirement, propose
expanding Social Security through the existing system and paying for it with
increased taxes.678 They reach their conclusions because they believe America is the
richest nation in the world, income has been inequitably captured by the top 1% of
earners, and numerous groups have suffered under the economic recession and from
general adverse economic conditions beyond their control.679 “The All Generations
Plan” would expand the program to provide for millions of persons who give
voluntary care to others in need and to those going through life changing events such

673

Id.

674

Rod Carrick, Misunderstanding This Simple TFSA Rule Could Cost You A Lot, GLOBE
& MAIL (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/personalfinance/retirement-rrsps/dont-let-your-tfsa-land-you-in-tax-jail/article17123629/ (explaining
that Canada’s Revenue Agency (CRA) figures show that approximately 74,000 people were
sent notices for over contribution in 2012). “Also, the CRA has waived its penalties an
average of 21,000 times in the past three years [but only] for people who were able to argue
they made an honest mistake and remove the amount of their excess contribution as soon as
they were told about it.” Id.
675

Id.

676

Id.

677

Id.

678

ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 88-104.

679

Id. The authors argue that legislation has shifted the redistribution curve upward toward
the wealthiest 1% of the earners. Id. at 100-01.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

101

870

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:769

as the birth of a child or the oldest of the old.680 The basic Social Security formulas
and coverages are seen as offsetting these inequalities.681 The All Generations Plan is
seen as:
[A] solution to . . . the income insufficiency of today’s seniors; the
retirement income crisis confronting today’s middle-aged and young
workers; insufficient recognition of and public support for the caregiving
functions of the family; and increased inequality, now hollowing out the
middle class.682
The first step in the All Generations Plan is to increase every benefit by 10% up
to $1,500 per month.683 The second step is to recognize that the cost-of-living index
does not adequately address the costs incurred by seniors by creating a more accurate
COLA for seniors.684 This would prevent the erosion of benefits being received by
seniors over time. Third, enhance the special minimum so that those working thirty
years and retiring at full retirement age will receive a benefit equal to at least 1.25%
of the federal poverty level.685 Other parts of the plan would enhance supplemental
security income, provide benefits during caregiving for family members and others,
restore benefits for students through age twenty-two, and expand benefits for adult
disabled children.686
The All Generations Plan contains proposals to pay for the enhancements.687
Using GDP percentages, Social Security costs would be 4.94% of GDP as of 2015,
will increase to 6.16% of GDP by 2035, and drop to 6.08% by 2085. This percentage
is significantly lower than that incurred by other developed nations. The authors of
the All Generations Plan consider this a minor and manageable increase since the
United States is the wealthiest nation in history.688 The All Generations Plan
proposes gradually increasing the Social Security tax divided between employer and
employee from 12.7% to 14.4% and expanding the tax base to include all salary
reduction plans such as flexible spending accounts as income for this purpose.689 In
addition, it would eliminate the earnings ceiling on the tax and provide enhanced
benefits affecting only 6% of the taxpayers.690 The plan would gradually direct that
680

Id. at 73-86.

681

Id. at 103.

682

Id. at 107.

683

Id. at 110.

684

Id. at 110-11.

685

Id. at 113-14.

686

Id. at 117-22.

687

Id. at 123-40.

688

Id. at 125. The authors compare the allocations of GDP for other uses to that of Social
Security and conclude that the increase for Social Security is modest and affordable. Id. at
126. Further, the authors reason that if 0.93% of GDP can be allocated for 401(k) and related
plans through tax expenditures that Social Security can be enhanced. Id. at 128.
689

Id. at 130-32.

690

Id.
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40% of the trust fund assets be invested in equities to enhance fund’s income.691
Finally, reasoning that high-income persons benefit most from services provided by
the government, the plan proposes a 10% tax on income above $1 million dollars.692
H. The Better Base Case
Edward D. Kleinbard would focus on public investment, particularly on “hard”
infrastructure, science, education, and providing more comprehensive social
insurance believing that we can accomplish the goals without “radically changing
our tax system.693 He advises greater spending in each area and, regarding education,
thinks the focus should be on early childhood education in economically
disadvantaged areas.694 He would also rethink the cost of post-secondary education
since:
Student loan programs make college affordable in a technical sense for
some students, but they then graduate with tens of thousands of dollars of
debt, which hangs over their future, dampening their appetite for
entrepreneurial risk-taking at precisely the point in their lives when such
risks should be least costly to them.695
Kleinbard sees social insurance with mandatory participation, such as Social
Security, employer provided health insurance, and unemployment insurance as a
necessary characteristic of a modern growing state.696 Kleinbard notes:
691

Id. at 133-34.

692

Id. at 134-38. The plan would also eliminate the distinction between the OASI and DI
trust funds and summaries of the proposals. See id. at 138-39, 216-77 (appendix B provides
Additional Information About the Social Security Works All Generations Plan and Other
Proposals Including Cost and Revenue Estimates).
693

KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 267. Kleinbard thinks public investment in infrastructure
is justified because governments have lower financing costs, there is an absence of financial
profit, and it results in positive externalities in that everyone likely benefits and there is a
creation of good paying construction jobs. Id. at 277-78.
694

Id. at 289-98. Kleinbard sees religiously based private education as “tribal havens” with
low academic standards. Id. at 297.
695
Id. at 296. Making loans to students always seems like government is helping students,
but, by failing to police the practices of schools in taking student loan money or providing
money only for programs with a history of providing jobs to students, the government is faced
with large numbers of students who cannot pay those debts. Id. The result is that the
government creates ways to forgive those debts either through payment plans or by favoring
work for non-profit organizations with forgiveness. Id. Lately governments are considering
forgiving loans if the school violated state law in enticing students to matriculate there. Josh
Mitchell, Obama Administration opens Door for More Student-Debt Forgiveness, WALL ST.
J., June 8, 2015.
696

KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 305. Kleinbard states:

The universal experience around the world is that as a country grows richer the basket
of insurance that its government offers its citizens—more accurately, the mutual
insurance its citizens provide for each other through the intermediation of
government—also grows in size. This is not the sure sign of decadence, but of
common sense.
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Countries employ social insurance as a key component of the social
compact because most people believe that to be a member of a society is
to have an interest in the welfare of other members of that society. This
impulse can be expressed in ethical terms, but it also is based on straight
forward economic logic: healthy and adequately nourished citizens are
more productive, and will contribute more to the prosperity of society,
than will sick and emaciated ones. Finally, in many cases, such as health
insurance or insurance against absolute inadequacy,” insurance most
efficiently delivered as mandatory social insurance (that is, as a
government program), because this effectively address problems of
adverse selection.697
Social insurance is seen as a fair price to pay for the “safety net” and encourages
risk taking by the youth because they know the down side is protected if their
adventure does not work out. This safety net is paid for by the progressive income
tax, which is seen as a “known alternative” justifying taking the risk where any
moral hazard is a mere side effect that can be addressed with program design.698
Kleinbard finds it ironic that individuals who have their health insurance subsidized
through the tax code as well, receive numerous other tax benefits, and exemptions
under the income and Social Security taxes still fight to repeal the subsidies and
other benefits received by individuals forced to obtain health insurance under the
Affordable Care Act.699 Our current system spends more money per capital than
other developed countries on healthcare and produces trillions of dollars in waste
and poor overall outcomes, according to Kleinbard.700 The answer for healthcare is a
“national single-payer” system, the obvious and logical system, and Kleinbard stands
amazed that President Obama did not pursue this option.701
Regarding Social Security, Kleinbard admits that it has a progressive benefit
scheme funded by a regressive tax source. It is a form of social insurance that allows
people to say, “I made contributions, and now I get benefits,” although strictly
speaking the early retirees did not pay very much for their benefits, which Kleinbard
dismisses as an “accident of the start of the program” and a mere “generational

Id. at 298.
697

Id. at 303-04.

698

Id. at 305-06.

699

Id. at 307-08.

700

Id. at 316, 321.

701

Id. at 323. For Kleinbard, it is simple:

At one stroke, the fundamental problem of adverse selection disappears, because all
members of society participate. Premiums are easily collected through the existing tax
administrative machinery. A patch work of largely monopolistic local sellers now
faces a monopsonistic buyer. Operating administrative costs are reduced, as we see
today in Medicare administration. There is more than enough value on the table here
to compensate the medical community fairly and still reap hundreds of billions of
dollars of savings every year.
Id.
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mismatch.”702 He does not classify the refundable portion of the earned income tax
credit as insurance but as an “investment in our fellow citizens” or as a “special set
of tax rate” applicable to individuals with incomes at certain levels.703 The
refundable portion can be characterized as “primarily a rebate of payroll taxes borne
by a low-wage worker” and he does not question how a low-wage worker can claim
benefits of Social Security and later claim, “I paid for them.”704
Kleinbard develops the history of how the income tax was adopted to move from
a consumption tax (primarily tariffs) to an income tax based on ability to pay. The
current tax scheme was an attempt to make wealthy Americans pay their “fair
share.”705 Ability to pay builds on the “now-familiar language of the declining
marginal utility of income,706 which is the most common justification to this day for
our zero rate foundational bracket of income and increasing marginal rates
thereafter.”707 For Kleinbard, the solution to the fiscal problem comes from a mildly
progressive tax structure primarily focused on funding a government “big enough”
to create the social insurance programs that will change lives.708 He finds the current
focus on the progressivity of the income tax is misguided. Rather, the focus should
be on what the spending side needs to achieve the goals of a good society and
structuring the tax system as necessary to generate the needed revenues.709
The attempt to use a “progressive” tax structure to reduce inequality is shown by
Kleinbard to be a mistake. He proposes that it is the size of the revenue raised, rather
than its progressivity, that is important because the “progressive” overall fiscal
system that distributes revenue in a progressive fashion should be the real focus.710
702

Id. at 326.

703

Id.

704

Id. at 326-27.

705

Id. at 338, 339.

706

Id. at 343. The concept of declining utility of income is the basis for asserting the need
for an “equal sacrifice” in paying taxes by all citizens so that the wealthy must pay a greater
rate than less well-off people so they feel the same pain. As Kleinbard acknowledges,
referring to a book by Walter Blum and Harry Kalvern, the criticism of the concept is that:
[U]tility cannot be measured in cardinal terms, which is just a fancy way of saying
that no one knows the quantum of utility I derive from my next dollar of income,
according to some objective scale (like “pounds” or “yards”). As a result,
interpersonal comparisons are impossible, which means that one cannot answer the
question, how many dollars must we tax the rich fellow to make him feel the same
pain that the poor one does when we tax her, say, $100?
Id. at 343 (citing WALTER BLUM & HARRY KALVERN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION (1953)). He would recast the concept as an aspirational one in which we could say
that it represents how we would act if we all had good mothers. Id. Although determining the
optimal degree of rate progressivity is difficult, the concept of the declining utility of income
is the core theory of the utilitarian social welfare norms. Id. at 352-53.
707

Id. at 339. This combination meant that the income tax and progressive rate structure
were “joined at the hip.” Id.
708

Id. at 341.

709

Id. at 344.

710

Id. at 366.
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In this regard, he demonstrates that the elderly are the overwhelming winners when
government spending per household is compared to the taxes paid by those
households.711
Kleinbard builds his argument on a foundation of a moral responsibility of every
individual in society to give back to society in recognition of the fact that no one
succeeds on his or her own but succeeds from the contribution of society and the
“luck” of the draw. He asserts:
[I]f you accept the fundamental premise of this book, that material
outcomes are determined by an undifferentiated porridge of personal
efforts and brute luck, by virtue of which we all have a bit less control
over our material success than we like to pretend, then some tax rate
progression functions as a broad social insurance program to address the
brute luck component.712
Here he argues for big government funded by a “mildly” progressive tax system
focused on investment and social insurance that will complement the private market
and make for a much “happier” society as a byproduct.713 To support his moral
foundation, he builds on an early work by Adam Smith, Theory of Moral
Sentiments.714 He chooses this book because it creates a perspective with which to
review Smith’s better known book, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations,715 which is cited by conservative writers to support their views of
limited government and see the road to happiness in reliance on “unalloyed realworld private market outcomes,” referring to these writers derogatively as “markettriumphalists.716
Kleinbard proposes a “Better Base Case” to address the problems he has
identified. He would expand infrastructure spending to create an infrastructure bank
and raise the level of social investment and insurance. To provide the revenues for
his expanded government, he would revert to the pre-2001 tax rate structure with
four modest changes which include: (1) permanently repealing the individual
alternative minimum tax; (2) retaining the child tax credit at the 2012 levels,
including the refundable portion as a “make work pay” incentive; (3) keep the tax
rate on dividends equal to the capital gain rate (20% pre-2001 rate); and (4) reinstate
the 2009 estate tax level.717 Revenue of up to $1.5 trillion over ten years lost by the
tweaks would be made up by converting the personal itemized deductions and the

711

Id. at 363.

712

Id. at 346.

713

Id. at 169-70.

714

ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (A. Millar, 6th ed. 1790) (this book
was originally published in 1759, seventeen years before Smiths better-known book on the
Wealth of Nations).
715
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1776).
716

KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 30 (this term is used throughout the book).

717

Id. at 379. His illustrations could leave a 1% to 1.5% of GDP deficit, $235 billion to
$355 billion in 2021. Id. at 377.
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standard deduction from deductions to a 15% credit.718 This, he believes, would be
supported by “widespread bipartisan consensus.”719 He does not suggest curtailing
tax expenditures for income support such as pensions and 401(k) plans. As
mentioned earlier, making Social Security solvent over the next seventy years and
increasing the progressivity of our tax system can be achieved easily by gradually
phasing out the earning cap on the Social Security tax.720
Kleinbard describes his Better Base Case as modest and, from the standpoint of
taxation, simple and straightforward.721 He believes our national wealth is sufficient
to service the debt and begin paying down the debt. However, his plan sees deficits
for the next ten years. Kleinbard sees government as being good at infrastructure
investments and social insurance such that these actions will not only produce
positive returns but will also produce a well-designed social insurance program that
will “increase our appetite for economic risk.”722 Notwithstanding Kleinbard’s
confidence in government, the primary impediments to the future are the trillion
dollars of waste in the health care program and the trillion dollars of tax expenditures
put in place by government.
V. ONE FUND SOLUTION
The foregoing has demonstrated the inability of governments (whether federal,
state, or local), unions, and employers to effectively administer retirement plans in a
political environment where restraint is required. Whether individuals can manage
the accumulation of retirement wealth is an open question, although Social
Security’s lack of transparency has created a reliance and expectation with a
retirement security that is likely to disappoint.
The One Fund Solution has been described in two previous articles.723 The One
Fund Solution proposes a government administered private account with
characteristics similar to what is commonly thought of as a “whole-life” insurance
policy in which post-tax contributions build up over a lifetime of mandatory
contributions to be distributed and used tax-free upon retirement. Investment options
within the plan are limited but gradually expand as balances in the fund grow and a
secure retirement is established.724 For security, there is a government guaranteed

718
Id. at 380-83. He proposes curtailing all the personal itemized deductions, including the
charitable deduction, because he finds it impossible to choose among them. Id. at 382. Scaling
them back would make the tax system more “progressive, more efficient, less distortive, and
simpler.” Id. at 383.
719

Id. at 381.

720

Id. at 384. Kleinbard views Social Security revenues like any other revenues as far as
deficit reduction is concerned. Id. Removing the wage cap on Social Security would also
likely create pressure to increase the benefit levels for those impacted by the removal.
721

Id. at 401.

722

Id. at 404.

723

See generally Butler, American Paternalism, supra note 11; Butler, It’s My Money,
supra note 11.
724
Because of the long period from beginning work until retirement, the individual should
be allowed to invest early in the stock market to get the maximum benefits of compounding.
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fund with a guaranteed inflation protected return of 3%, which is available for all
amounts in the fund.725 By making the One Fund Solution the sole tax-advantaged
retirement account funded with after tax dollars, every participant receives the same
benefit.
Mandatory contributions to the One Fund would be set between 15% and 20% of
taxable payroll, and voluntary contributions would be permitted so long as annual
contributions do not exceed $50,000. Mandatory contributions are required only
until the assets in the fund are valued at $1 million or more. Thereafter, voluntary
contributions can continue until the fund value reaches $2 million, at which time no
further contributions will be permitted. Tax-free withdrawals are limited to taxable
gain of $2 million. All other retirement savings would be done on a personal level
but would not be tax advantaged. Money in the One Fund account would belong to
the contributor and would be inheritable at death.
The transition to the new system extends over a ten-year period and begins with a
determination of the present value of the account held by each individual in the
present system. Each person is then given the option of continuing in the present
system or transferring to the new One Fund system with the value of the Social
Security benefit being the initial deposit in the One Fund account. For a period of ten
years, all deposits remain in the guaranteed account such that no funds would leave
the system and move into stock, bond, or other available accounts. The gradual
elimination of retirement tax expenditures during the ten-year period provides
additional funds to cushion the transition. Likewise, additional revenues are
transferred into the system by the increased taxation of the entire contribution,
although tax rates may be adjusted to allocate the burden of the expansion of the tax
base.
Capitalizing Social Security benefits would not be difficult since the value of
each individual’s contributions and expected benefit is calculated on an ongoing
annual basis. Capitalizing the liability would not increase the amount of the liability,
but would merely quantify it and allocate it in a fair and reasonable way, while
income from the elimination of tax expenditures would increase over time thereby
enabling the government to address the unfunded liability. The problem of using tax
revenues to support Social Security payments is already upon us in the form of the
need to pay interest on the trust fund. Furthermore, these payments are continuing to
increase into the indefinite future.
While the One Fund Solution may seem inconsistent with the current retirement
plans in place, it is intended to be a simple and straightforward approach to
retirement planning. It replaces the complicated and inadequate Social Security
system as well as the highly complex system of tax-benefited plans that benefit
By adding a separate savings feature to the One Fund that would serve as an emergency fund
which could be invested in the stock market so long as the individual was on a path to full
retirement benefits.
725

The United States economy has a history of 3% real growth over an extended period of
time, which was the justification for the guaranteed return in the GRA and the reason it was
chosen for the One Fund Solution guaranteed return. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 573, at 15.
Unfortunately, not since 2004 has the economy experienced 3% growth, a full nine years of
below par growth. Editorial, Another Growth Dip, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2015, at A12.
Interestingly, the State of Kentucky has an interesting plan that pays 4% on employee
contributions. NJ STATUS REPORT, supra note 299, at 21.
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various interests in different ways. Social Security was never intended to be the sole
source of retirement funds; but, now that the full force of the mature system is upon
us, we find that, except for certain categories of beneficiaries, it is not a good return
on the 12% of a person’s lifetime income used to fund the benefit.
The current system of federal tax expenditures has created a hodge podge of
savings vehicles that favor high-income taxpayers, and a fairer and more transparent
system could be put into place by combining the various systems of federal tax
supported retirement programs. The time has come to acknowledge that the
multitude of tax benefited federal, state, local, and private pension system made
possible by the federal income tax code is, year after year, creating greater unfunded
liabilities that future generations will be called upon to pay. The concept that such a
system is contributory and an entitlement is an artificial creation that needs to be
abandoned. Ultimately the risk will rest on the public, which has no control over the
means to accept that risk. This artificial concept of an entitlement should be
abandoned in favor of a system giving individuals control of their own destiny.
A. Integrating Social Security with the Total Retirement Scheme
President Roosevelt’s comment that payroll tax contributions were put into the
system to prevent future politicians from scrapping Social Security discloses the
nature of the program;726 a welfare program wrapped up in a retirement plan with
limited insurance benefits added. Social Security advocates tout its benefits and
necessity as noted in the following statement:
To this day, public defenses of the program often start with a recitation of
how many retirees have no other income and would fall into poverty
without it. The pitch is made even more effective by the fact that much of
the employer-sponsored pension income never shows up on surveys . . .
so Social Security seems even more dominant in providing retirement
income than it actually is. 727
Social Security was implemented at a time when the Great Depression left
millions of people who never expected to retire unemployed at an advanced age.
Such poverty was devastating, but at that time there were few private pension plans
and private savings were lost in the market crash. Social Security filled the gap, but
times changed, and, during the 1940s, employers adopted defined benefit plans and
in the 1970s defined contribution plans were created.728 The retirement world is also
different because in 1940 single earner couples were the norm but today those able
to afford single earner couple status are high-income taxpayers.729 These changes
were not contemplated in the 1930s.
Social Security wealth and private pension wealth have traditionally been
considered two separate realms and not integrated on matters of policy. If the
numbers previously provided as to the investment return on Social Security
contributions are correct, everyone except the single earner couple should be calling
for change and a better return on their investment. But high-income taxpayers, or at
726

Shaviro, supra note 170, at 140.

727

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 280.

728

Id.

729

Id.
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least those with incomes above the median who do not have their tax liability offset
by credits, are beneficiaries of the rich tax expenditures available for 401(k)
contributions and other types of retirement vehicles that make up tax expenditures
totaling nearly $800 billion from 2014-2018 or $69.4 billion in 2014 alone.730
Objecting to the poor return on Social Security could raise questions about massive
subsidies for high-income taxpayers thereby giving them an incentive to accept the
current system.
Schieber suggests the loss most earners experience in Social Security would be
offset by the tax benefits received from 401(k) contributions over a lifetime.731 He
calculates that for a single male medium earner the net result over a lifetime would
be a net loss of $17,109, reflecting a loss under Social Security of $80,751 but a gain
of $63,642 from his 401(k).732 A similar analysis for a single female showed a net
gain of $14,609; for a single-earner couple a net gain of $264,071; and for a twoearner couple a net gain of $29,218.733 The gain for the two-earner couple is merely
twice the gain for a single-female and far less than the gain for a single-earner
couple. For medium earners, the maximum gain goes to the single-earner household
because of the spousal benefit under Social Security.734 For maximum earners, only
the single-earner couple has a net gain from the combined system.735 The “winner”
of this lottery is the single-earner couple and, to some extent, a two-earner couple
where the lower earner is less than half the higher earner.736
This analysis suggests that in some broad context “government” programs for all
income levels provide a rough equality to all participants. The advantage for singleearner couples may no longer be justified since the number of female retirees grew
from 11.6% in 1944, when the benefit was adopted, to 35% in 1960.737 In 2008, 44%
of women drew benefits based solely on their own earnings, 28% had a benefit based
partially on their own earnings and supplemented by their husband’s earnings, and
28% based solely on their husband’s earnings.738
730

JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2014-2018, at 32 (2014) (identifying the five-year tax expenditure totals for items of
income security). The figures in the text do not include the tax expenditure for the exclusion
of untaxed Social Security and railroad retirement benefits which total $209.1 billion over five
years or $37.4 billion in 2014. Id. at 33. For a breakdown of the $800 billion by type of plan
see infra note 897.
731

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 287-88.

732

Id. at 287.

733

See id. at 288.

734

Id.

735

Id. at 287-89 tbl.24.5. Table 24.5 provides the analysis for the four household styles and
for low, medium, high, and maximum earners. Id. For maximum earners, the net loss for the
single male is $61,858, for the single female $15,060, and for the two-earner couple $30,119.
Id. The net gain for the one-earner couple is $325,226. Id.
736

Id. at 288.

737

Id.

738

The spousal benefit could change and be made more equitable but there may be other
anomalies such as differential mortality rates across the demographic profile. Id. at 290.
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Studies show that any redistribution of income from higher earners to lower earners is
undermined by “spousal benefits for married couples where one spouse earns
significantly less than the other.”739 When tax-favored retirement plan participation is
considered, the redistribution of income is even further undermined. The conclusion is
that future policy discussions need to be conducted in the context of the complete
retirement support system and not merely Social Security in isolation.740
B. The True Cost of Retirement
A significant problem with the current retirement system, that integrates the three
legged stool analogy with government control and tax advantages, is that people fail
to appreciate the true cost of the benefits they expect to receive. The three legs are
not independent, but instead are all related and ultimately stand or fall directly or
indirectly on the employee’s compensation package. Employers can allocate so
much to compensation and that amount is divided between Social Security,
supplemental retirement, healthcare, and other benefits with the remaining amount
being take-home pay. When one cost increases, other benefits suffer or take-home
pay is reduced affecting personal savings. These costs are “hidden” to the employee
who only sees that his pay is flat and his health care deductibles are increasing.741
Productivity increases, which should benefit the employee, are being absorbed by
increases in the cost of payroll taxes, retirement plan funding, and health benefits. A
study of the 1980 through 2009 period showed that the 1980s increases in total
compensation were absorbed by payroll tax increases (30%) and by health benefit costs
(50%) while retirement plan costs were reduced (by 45%) as a result of reduced ERISA
funding requirements.742 Increases in the 1990s were absorbed by payroll tax increases
(6%) and health benefit costs (22%), while retirement plan costs were reduced slightly
(by 8%).743 Increases from 2000 to 2009 were absorbed by payroll tax increases (3.5%),
739
Id. at 292 (citing Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L. Steinmeier, How Effective Is
Redistribution under the Social Security Benefit Formula? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7597, 2000)). The working paper concludes:

When families are arrayed according to the total lifetime earnings, and spouse and
survivor benefits are taken into account, the extent of redistribution from families with
high lifetime earnings to families with low lifetime earning is roughly halved. Much
of the remaining redistribution is from families where both spouses spend much of
their potential work lives in the labor market, to families where a spouse, often with
high earning potential, chooses to spend a significant number of years outside of the
labor force. . . .
Id. Schieber also relies on Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Is Social Security Part of the Social Safety
Net? 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15070, 2009) (reaching similar
conclusions as Gustman and Steinman).
740

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 292-93.

741

“[T]he American middle class has absorbed a step increase in the cost of health care
and other necessities as income have stagnated over the past half-decade, a squeeze that has
forced families to cut back spending on everything from clothing to restaurants.” Ryan
Knutson & Theo Francis, Basic Costs Squeeze Families: Surging Price Taxes for health Care,
Other Essentials Leave Less for spending Elsewhere, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2014, at A1.
742

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 248 tbl.21.3.

743

Id.
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health benefit costs (28%), and retirement plan costs (28%) that grew dramatically as
ERISA funding standards were reinstituted to make up of the lack of funding in the
1980s and 1990s.744 Funding future benefits will exact a toll on productivity for some
time in the future, although a few years of economic growth with exceptional returns on
pension funds may alleviate some of the pressure.745
Another way to look at the problem is through Schieber’s estimates on how these
hidden costs in compensation have escalated over the past fifty-six years and have
become an increasing weight on an employee’s take-home pay.746 Schieber analyzes
the situation of persons retiring at age sixty-five in 1955, 1975, 1995, and 2011 and
estimates the percentage of lifetime income a person would have allocated to Social
Security returning approximately 40% to 45% of final pay, to the contribution
required to produce an annuity for an additional 40% of final pay, and to the cost of
healthcare.747 His estimates are in the following chart.
Table 6
Year reaching age 65
1955
1975
1995
2011
Lifetime payroll tax as percentage of
2.1%
5.9%
9.9%
13.1%
lifetime earnings
Supplemental retirement benefit 40% of
4.6%
5.9%
6.7%
7.5%
final pay
Total retirement cost per year
6.7%
11.8%
16.6% 20.6%
Annual health benefits cost748
1.0%
3.5%
8.0%
10.6%
744
Id. (detailing percentages for three categories of non-cash compensation that absorbed
workers’ compensation increases over three decades for ten wage groups. The percentages in
the text are approximations of the percentages in the middle compensation deciles).
745
As women entered the workforce in the 1980s, the number of two-earner families
increased significantly yet families did not feel as though they were getting ahead since “most
of the rewards for all that extra work were diverted to benefit costs, especially among the
bottom half of earners.” Id. at 250. During the 1990s, much of the increase was being paid out
in additional wages, but during the 2000s benefit costs were again absorbing compensation
increases although not as much was going to the lower income workers and the distribution
was therefore more equitable. Id. at 250-51.
746

Id. at 241 tbl.21.1, 365. Schieber predicts that a worker retiring in 2020 will see an
increase of 20% over that of the person retiring in 2011. Id. at 334. When the Social Security
system in 1939 was being amended in a way to carry the program into the future, the issue of
whether to fund it, or a move toward pay-as-you-go was discussed by the Advisory Council
on Social Security. Id. When member, Edwin Witte, seeking to put the program on an
insurance model with funding as desired by President Roosevelt, suggested that to put the
system on pay-as-you-go would make future taxpayer have greater payroll tax obligations,
another member, J. Douglas Brown, responded by telling Witte that by then “we will all be
dead.” Id. at 366 n.5 (citing MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 235
(1979)).
747

Id. at 240.

748

Id. at 242. The health care costs are those paid by the employer divided by the total
payroll without reduction for persons not covered by the health care benefits. Further, the
health care costs do not include amounts paid by the worker for the insurance or out-of-pocket
expenses. It has been estimated that a sixty-five-year-old couple retiring in 2013 will, on
average, spend $220,000 out-of-pocket for medical expenses not including the cost of longterm care. ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 53. In 2015, Fidelity Investments suggests the
couple will spend $245,000 over two decades including Medicare premiums and non-covered
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Year reaching age 65
1955
1975
1995
2011
Retirement plus health costs
7.7%
15.3%
24.6% 31.2%
Cumulative Lifetime Employee plus Employer Payroll Taxes as a percentage of
Cumulative Lifetime Earnings, Supplemental Retirement Savings Rate, Employer
Average Contributions for Health Benefits, and Totals as a percentage of pay for
Workers Retiring at Various Dates.749 (All amounts stated as a percentage of salary
or wages)
These estimates reflect assumptions regarding age of retirement, life expectancy,
and quality of healthcare in each of the referenced years and do not represent the
actual experience of any retiree.750 Nevertheless, the specific observations are
striking. In 1955, the cost of providing a retirement benefit equal to 80% of final pay
was roughly 6.7% of lifetime income (2.1% for Social Security and 4.6% for a
supplemental annuity).751 By 2011, the combined cost grew to 20.6%. Adding in
health care, the lifetime payroll commitment to retirement and healthcare would
have been 7.7% in 1955 and 31.2% in 2011.752
With the way these benefits are structured, their true cost is hidden from the
employee, allowing most taxpayers to assume they are getting a “good” deal for their
“contributions” or perhaps that some government subsidy will allow them to collect
more than they paid for. Some may think, “My 6.2% payroll tax for Social Security
and 1.45% for Medicare will make my retirement comfortable,” when they should
actually be thinking, “I am already contributing 31.2% of my compensation, but, is it
enough? Maybe a higher number is more realistic.”753 One possibility is to make
employees aware of these hidden costs so they would choose less expensive plans,
portions of Medicare but not including dental and long-term care expenses, leading one
commentator to suggest that a health savings account is preferable to a 401(k), after funding to
receive the employer match, or individual retirement account because contributions are
excluded from Social Security and Medicare taxes and withdrawals for medical expenses are
free of income tax. Anne Tergesen, HSAs Offer Benefits Beyond 401(k)s, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,
2016, at B7.
749

Id. at 241 tbl.21.1.

750

For example, the comparison reflects certain assumptions for the supplemental
retirement; namely, that a return of 7% per annum and a retirement date that has gradually
become earlier and earlier determined the costs of an annuity to supplement retirement
income. For this Article’s purposes, the numbers are sufficiently accurate.
751

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 240 tbl.21.1.

752

That we retire earlier, live longer, and have superior health care in 2011 can explain
some of the difference but allocating income to these purposes has a dramatic impact on the
employees’ ability to provide for life’s other needs or desires. Id. Schieber puts it somewhat
differently, pointing out that, for retirement alone, the average worker would surrender
roughly 3.5 to 4 more years for their lifetime earnings to finance their retirement benefits than
the generation retiring in the mid-1950s. Id. Going a step further, he points out that, when
health care is added into the equation, the difference between 1955’s contribution and 2011’s
contribution is more than nine years worth of pay out of a forty-year career. Id.
753
Schieber suggests that “[i]f we simply sit on our hands until 2030, those workers would
have to divert roughly 16% of their pay to make up Social Security’s financing shortfall.
Under recent health cost growth rates, the tab for health benefits could be as much as 17% of
workers’ pay. Given the need to save for their own retirement, these costs could consume
more than 40% of workers’ earnings. What are we leaving the next generation.” Id. at 252.
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thereby allowing for greater take home pay or increased retirement savings. For
example, limiting the costly exclusion754 for employer provided healthcare would
make employees aware of the cost of healthcare and broadens the income tax and
Social Security tax base.755
C. Market Failure
The enthusiasm for private accounts dissipated when the stock market
experienced dramatic declines during the bursting of the “tech-bubble” in 2000, and
again when the “housing-bubble” collapsed and took the stock market with it in
2008. People saw their 401(k) balances fall in half and their retirement security
evaporate.756 Taxpayers close to retirement age decided to stay on the job and forego
retirement.757 However, since that time, the market has largely recovered, although
the recovery is attributed to actions of the Federal Reserve Bank’s quantitative
easing and near zero interest rates.758 But reacting to individual market downturns
does not form a basis or require staying away from the market and perhaps a better
understanding of markets would change that attitude.
The notion that an average earner in 2011 dedicated up to 31% of their lifetime
earnings to healthcare and retirement together with the low rate of return on Social
Security should raise serious questions about the system in place. Such knowledge
should cause people to develop a serious savings habit at a young age.
Unfortunately, unless someone has a business degree, they are unlikely to
understand the basics of financial management. Many people are unable to
understand their own paycheck. The basics of financial management should be
included in every high school curriculum to create a culture of savers rather than a
754

KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 246-47 (noting the loss of tax revenues in 2014 as $143
billion from the income tax and another $100 billion from the Social Security tax).
755
STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 145; see also KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 246-47
(pointing out how the exclusion for employer provided health care has distorted the market for
health care). Kleinbard states:

The core story line of healthcare policy in the United States over the last fifty years is
a meditation on how the tax exclusion for employer-provided healthcare has impeded
sensible policy. Employees have every reason to prefer oversized healthcare plans
over cash income and employers have every reason to accommodate them. The result
has been the relative over consumption of healthcare insurance (that is, a relative
insensitivity to its costs), the proliferation of employer-provided plans, and with the
latter the collapse of the individual health insurance markets, because most people
most of the time are covered through their employers. (The technical formulation here
would be that the subsidy distorts “allocative” decisions—decisions about how and
when we spend our money.).
Id.
756

The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Worker’s Retirement Security: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Hon. George Miller,
Chairman).
757

Id.

758

Quantitative easing in the United States is now over but is just getting started in Europe
and Japan so that United States investors are anticipating a benefit from investments in those
countries.
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culture of spenders. By creating a single account that individuals can see and
understand, the One Fund Solution seeks to provide that impetus needed to learn the
basics of investing, which, when coupled with government oversight of the
investment choices and disclosure, make responsible savers.
A simple illustration may help understand how basic financial management
concepts provide protection against stock market failure. A young person starting
their first job at age twenty will likely have fifty years before needing retirement
funds. Allowing compounding of interest to work over this period say at a rate of 3%
per annum would increase a $1,000 to $4,384 by age seventy. Of course the investor
may reach age seventy during a year in which the stock market crashed as it did in
1929, 2000, and 2008. The risk of market failure should be minimal since in every
twenty-year period since 1802 the stock market after-inflation return has been
between 1% and 12.6%. Considering that our young investor will have lived through
more than two such twenty-year periods, it is likely that he is still in a position to
retire.759 If he invests every year he should be in a position to withdraw the increased
funds every year for the remainder of his life. A further protection our investor
would have against market failure is that as he begins to see retirement on the
horizon, he would begin either converting a portion of his portfolio into bonds that
would form a buffer against any unexpected down turn in the market.
Respected Professor of finance at the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania, Jeremy Siegel, suggests that although the future might see lower
realized returns than in the past, there is “overwhelming reason to believe stocks will
remain the best investment for all those seeking steady, long-term gains.”760
Commenting in Professor Siegel’s latest book, Peter Bernstein states:
“[O]verwhelming reason” is an understatement. The risk premium earned
by equities over the long run must remain intact if the system is going to
survive. In the capitalist system, bonds cannot and should not outperform
equities over the long run. Bonds are contracts enforceable in courts of
law. Equities promise their owner nothing—stocks are risky investments,
involving a high degree of faith in the future. Thus, equities are not
inherently “better” than bonds, but we demand a higher return from
equities to compensate for their greater risk. If the long-run expected
return on bonds were to be higher than the long-run expected return on
stocks, assets would be priced so that risk would earn no reward. That is
an unsustainable condition. Stocks must remain “the best investment for
all those seeking steady, long-term gains” or our system will come to an
end, and with a bang, not a whimper.761
A common fear is that, as America ages, it will be unable to afford the massive
retirement of the Baby Boom generation and, accordingly, the retirement age should
759

JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO FINANCIAL
MARKET RETURNS AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 95 fig.6-1 (5th ed. 2014). Over
thirty years, stocks averaged from a low of 2.6% and a high of 10.6%. The lowest return on
stocks approximated the return on Social Security. Bond returns over thirty years averaged
from negative 1.9% to a positive 7.7%.
760

Peter Bernstein, Foreword to SIEGEL, supra note 759, at xviii.

761

Id.
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be lifted. Further, how will the aging population sell all their securities if the number
of young people able to buy those securities is declining? Will the next generation be
as well off as the present generation? Jeremy Siegel noted that from 1950 to 2010
life expectancy rose from sixty-nine years to seventy-eight years while the age at
which men retire from the workforce fell from age sixty-seven to sixty-two and the
period of retirement grew from 1.6 years to 15.8 years. 762 This trend is not likely to
continue demographically, and the question of increases in retirement age will
become paramount as fewer people will be called upon to support a growing retiree
population.
Siegel suggests that, if the developed world depended on its own productive
capacity to produce the goods and services needed by the retiree generation, the
retirement age needs to increase to age seventy-seven by mid-twenty-first century.763
However, when growth in the emerging markets is considered, he projects that the
retirement age need only increase to age sixty-eight, but that depends on the
continued growth of emerging markets at a rate of 4.5% over the next fifty years, the
rate obtained since 1990.764 The United States retirement age could continue to fall
to age fifty-eight if the growth rate meets the 9% that China experienced over the
past twenty years.765 This reflects the scenario that emerging markets provide goods
needed by the aging developed world that are paid for with the funds from the
purchase of shares by the savers in the emerging markets.766 Siegel projects that by
2060 the developed world’s percentage of the economy will drop from its current
50% to 25% and to 14% by the end of the century.767
This simple view of the future should make every twenty-year-old consider the
wisdom of devoting 12% of their lifetime income to a system whose return was
based on United States government bonds. Citizens need to be educated on the
accumulation of wealth and the One Fund Solution would provide them with an
incentive to do so. Those unwilling or unable to understand such information would
be protected by the paternalism of the federal government that would guarantee a
real rate of return of 3% protected from taxes, inflation, and actions of the federal
government.
The impact of inflation is a difficult concept to understand when considering
long-term investing. Government policy is that a certain amount of inflation is

762

SIEGEL, supra note 759, at 60.

763

Id. at 62, 63 fig.4.2 (Scenario A).

764

Id. at 63 fig.4.2 (Scenario B), 64-66.

765

Id. at 63 fig.4.2 (Scenario C), 67.

766

Id. at 63 fig.4.2. Siegel addresses the question whether people in the emerging markets
are likely to purchase assets of Western firms and notes that the firms are becoming global
and not dependent on the country of origin. Id. at 68. Responding to recent unrest in the
Chinese market, Siegel’s research continues to confirm that emerging markets will provide the
needed savings to absorb retirees’ asset sales. Jeremy J. Siegel, China Worries Are
PERS.
FIN.
48
(Dec.,
2015),
Overblown,
KIPLINGERS
http://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/T019-C019-S002-china-worries-areoverblown.html.
767

SIEGEL, supra note 759, at 65 fig.4-3.
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necessary for a growing economy.768 Today, interest rates are so low that the return
on government bonds or certificates of deposit is virtually zero.769 Although inflation
is also low, any return on such bonds is taxed, leaving an after tax return that is
somewhat less than the inflation so that the investor would be losing money by
investing.770 Remarkably, rates in Europe have been pushed into the negative
territory, a concept few investors can comprehend.771 The One-Fund Solution’s
guaranteed 3% real rate of return protects those taxpayers who are unable to grasp

768
Deflation is a threat to the economy even to the point that negative interest rates may be
needed just to avoid falling into the grips of deflation. A recent article in The Economist points
out that:

On March 25th Jens Weidmann, president of the Bundesbank, suggested that the ECB
might need to be more forceful in order to keep the euro-area economy out of the grips
of deflation. Look again, however, and the path forward appears similar across the
rich world. The outlook is clearest in Europe, where the ECB may toy with negative
rates as a means to fend off deflation. But even in America and Britain ‘normal’ rates
are a distant prospect.
Inflation and Interest Rates: Up, up, and away: Higher inflation may be needed to leave extralow interest rates behind, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2014, at 75. Moving on to 2015, the European
Central Bank (ECB) has announced its bond-buying program, but skeptics wonder if the ECB
will be able to find enough bonds to purchase to carry out its objective, which is to achieve
2% inflation target. Christopher Whitall, ECB’s Test Is to Find Enough Bonds, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 26, 2015, at C1. Takashi Nakamichi & Megumi Fujikawa, Japan Adopts Negative Rates,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2016, at A1 (reporting the Bank of Japan (BOJ) is instituting negative
interest rates in a “desperate” attempt to avoid sliding back into stagnation that has plagued
Japan for two decades). In this effort, the BOJ is following the lead of the ECB and various
national central banks in instituting negative rates. Quantitative easing seems to have lost its
effectiveness leading one editorial writer to conclude: “The failure of unconventional
monetary policy in Japan and Europe is proof that central banks can’t conjure growth in
economies that need major reforms to let resources find more effective uses.” Editorial, Japan
Goes Negative, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2016, at A10. It has also been pointed out that the main
effect of quantitative easing has been a run-up in prices of investment assets and that the
ending of quantitative easing in late 2014 presented a good time for Congress to raise taxes on
capital and puncture the asset price bubble. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis:
International changes the United States shouldn’t Have Made, 145 TAX NOTES 739 (2014).
However, this is unlikely because of the dependence on the political class of money from
corporate sources.
769

Central banks worldwide have been frustrated in their attempts to reach the targeted
2%. The fall of oil prices and other commodities in 2015 may be temporarily suppressing core
inflation at a stable 1.3% (which excludes food and energy prices) as well as the price index
for personal-consumption on which the Federal Reserve bases its 2% target is currently at
0.4%. Global inflation: Low for longer, ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 2016, at 53.
770
Emese Bartha & Ben Edwards, Germany Sells Five-Year Debt at Negative Yield for
First Time on Record, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2015, at C2.
771

German bond yields fell to a negative 0.08% in anticipation of the European Central
Bank’s sovereign-bond-buying program, which investors believe will push bond prices higher.
In any event, negative yields mean the investor is paying the German government for holding
its debt. Id.
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inflation’s impact on their investments. Investing in a diversified portfolio of stocks
is also a long-term inflation hedge.772
There will be limited investment choices for funds and those choices will be
monitored by the federal government to determine they are following sound business
practices including accurate disclosure. Recently, index funds tend to outperform
actively managed funds on a regular basis and may be a possible avenue for the One
Fund investments.773 Low-cost index funds have put a considerable squeeze on fund
managers, seeking to outperform the market as market analysis becomes ever more
efficient making the market more efficient and harder to beat.774 Once a participant’s
assets reach predetermined levels, the One Fund Solution would permit greater fund
choice. Such flexibility is important since:
[H]ow your money is invested is far more important than the amount you
save (actually somewhere between 6 and 100 times more important). And,
in addition, it only gets more important in the later periods once the
retirement pool is accumulated. Thus, pensions must rely heavily on their
investment schemes to succeed in providing retirement income
security.775

772

SIEGEL, supra note 759, at 221 (“In contrast to the returns on fixed income assets, the
historical evidence is overwhelming that the returns on stocks over long time periods have
kept pace with inflation. Since stocks are claims on the earnings of real assets—assets whose
value is intrinsically related to the price of the goods and services they produce—one should
expect that their long-term returns will not be harmed by inflation.”).
773
Cheap is cheerful, ECONOMIST, May 3, 2014, at 10 (discussing Fund management: Will
invest for food, ECONOMIST, May 3, 2014, at 19). Individual hedge funds have not done well,
so investor management firms now seek to allocate investors’ money among hedge funds but
the management fee is “1 and 10” (1% on the assets managed plus 10% on the profits) on top
of the hedge fund management fee of “2 and 20.” Funds of funds: Not yet dead, ECONOMIST,
June 7, 2014, at 80.
774
Jason Zweig, The Decline and Fall of Fund Managers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23-24, 2014,
at B9. Competition continues to force mutual fund fees toward zero. Jason Zweig & Sarah
Krouse, Mutual-Fund and ETF’s Tumble Toward Zero, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2016, at A1.
775

MARIN, supra note 2, at 63 (“What differentiates pension fund management is the longterm nature of the retirement cycle and thus the impact . . . that the investment return has on
the amount of money available to satisfy retirement income security.” Id. at 64. Although
investment constraints often give rise to hedge fund manipulation, these options would likely
not be available for One Fund accounts. Id. at 75. Marin notes:
For alpha to exist, there must be mispricings or anomalies to exploit, inefficiencies or
arbitrages to be exact. The secret to hedge funds being able to avail themselves of
these anomalies lies in the highly constrained nature of most institutional investing.
That same ERISA that protects pension funds from bad thing happening to them also
serves to dramatically constrain them. Hedge funds do not, for the most part, live in
these constraints . . . There are fewer risk controls, no restriction on using derivatives
and other sophisticated structures, no foreign content or the use of foreign exchange
contracts, generally no limits on leverage except what is stated in their own
prospectuses, no limitation shorting or the borrowing and lending of securities to
accommodate that activity, and historically much less regulatory constraint.
Id.
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D. Annuities
Upon reaching retirement age, the One Fund participant will need to determine
whether to keep and manage their own retirement fund or accept a lifetime annuity
structured to meet the participant’s anticipated needs. Richard Marin offers an
example of such a decision coming from General Motors’ transfer of pension
liabilities to Prudential Insurance Company.776 The participant, a sixty-three-year-old
man with a twenty-year life expectancy is given the option of taking a lump sum of
$818,000 or an annuity of $4,854 per month for life.777 In its simplest terms, the man
could put the lump sum in a mattress and remove $3,408 each month ($818,000/240)
for 240 months or put $4,854 in the mattress for 240 months and accumulate
$1,164,960 at age 83. On the other hand, if he invests the lump sum at 5% return per
annum he could withdraw $4,854 per month for 240 months and have $214,575 left
in his account at age 83. At 6%, he would have a final account balance of $451,529.
Finally, if he received a 3% return, he would run out of money after 218 months;
and, with a return of 2.5%, he would run out of money in 207 months.778 If he takes
the annuity and dies before reaching eighty-three, he leaves nothing to his survivors;
but, if he lives to age 100, his payments continue.
Although retirees in defined contribution plans choosing to annuitize their
savings are more sanguine about retirement than those who do not, the
overwhelming majority of private retirement assets are not being annuitized.779 To
Marin further states:
Alpha is actually the risk-adjusted measure of excess return. That relates to beta in
that it implies the value of the selection of a specific security versus the market return.
That is what we define as excess return. Naturally since no return is generally had
without risk, the issue of interest is the amount of excess return only after you have
adjusted for the added risk you are taking. If the investing world was truly “perfect” . .
. there would be no alpha because the amount of excess return available from any
security would be offset by the risk being taken to achieve it.
Id. at 65.
776

Id. at 158.

777

Id.

778

Id. (calculating the actual annuity a person would receive is a complicated matter based
on mortality tables and bond rates not discussed here).
779

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 355. Between 1990 and 2004, 60% of retirees with a defined
benefit plans took their benefit in the form of an annuity while only 5% of those retirees with
a defined contribution plan did so. Id. at 263. Economists are confounded by people’s
avoidance of annuities when on a simple expected return analysis they would be better off
with an annuity. Several reasons are offered, including the observation that often people in ill
health do not expect to live long and the opposite for those in good health, the desire to have
some money remaining to give their heirs, and the perceived excessive fees associated with
annuities. Id. at 266-67. Some variations of the survey suggested that, if the annuity were
presented in the context of consumption rather than as an investment, the annuity option was
selected. Id. One study supported the conclusion that, at every income level, having an annuity
made retirees report greater satisfaction in retirement than those who did not have them. Id. at
355, 355 n.14. (citing Constantijn W. A. Panis, Annuities and Retirement Satisfaction (Rand
Labor
&
Population
Program,
Working
Paper
03-17,
2003),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/drafts/2008/DRU3021.pdf.
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be sure, there are numerous uncertainties including the longevity risk and the risk
that the annuity provider becomes insolvent. The impact of interest rates on the
amount necessary to provide an annuity can be significant, especially over the past
six years in which the Federal Reserve has kept interest rates low. For example, the
amount needed to fund an annual annuity of $1,000 at age sixty-five when interest
rates are 8.5% is $8,900 but is $10,670 when interest rates are 6% and $12,580 when
interest rates are 4%.780
Providing annuity default protection might overcome this reluctance to annuitize
retirement savings.781 Purchasing annuities by installment over the ten years prior to
retirement rather than purchasing the annuity at age sixty-five in a lump sum may
help also. Installment purchases smooth out two prime variables in the determination
of annuity values—total savings accumulated at the time the annuity is purchased
and the interest rate on the date of purchase. Purchasing annuities through a group
market could reduce fees.782 Inconsistent government regulations discourage
employers from changing automatic default settings because they have fiduciary
obligations to employees. An independent clearinghouse accepting lump sums from
retirees over the installment period and spreading the risk among insurance
companies might help.783
Concern about the financial literacy and sophistication among self-managing
retirees will be increased with the One Fund solution, since, presumably, many will
decide to self-manage their funds. A 2008 study testing the ability of participants
fifty-five years and older to make investment decisions showed the majority of
retirees did not know what a bond was and only about one-third understood risk
diversification.784 Men generally have had more knowledge about investing than
women, and men were more likely to take risks and diversify their investments.785
Age related dementia showed that retirees’ ability to manage their own affairs
diminished over time, but the real challenge is to plan for and cover both anticipated
and unanticipated expenses over an undeterminable period of time.786

780
Id. at 183. In 1991, corporate pensions were using 8.49% to calculate funding
requirements, but by 2009 it was 5.97% causing a 20% increase in funding requirements if
everything else remained the same. Id. But it did not, and by 2009 Baby Boomers were ready
to retire, the stock market was no longer exuberant, and the pension bill was coming due. Id.
Further the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corp. (PBGC) was experiencing greater claims from
underfunded plans from bankrupt employers. Id. Much of the PBGC problem arises from
charging the same rate for all plans regardless of risk. Id. This is a continual problem with
government insurance.
781

Id. at 356.

782

Id. at 357-60 (describing the simulation to compare the installment method of
purchasing the annuity with the spot market purchase for retirees reaching age sixty-five for
each year from 1915 to 2010).
783

Id.

784

Id.

785

Georgette Jasen, Male Investors vs. Female Investors: Studies show men and women
could learn from the other’s approach, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2015.
786

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 263-66.
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One study posited a worker, who saved 6% of their income from age twenty-five
to sixty-five, retired and purchased a lifetime annuity with their savings paying a
15% purchase and longevity fee at the time.787 Depending on which calendar year
the worker turned age sixty-five and retired, the replacement percent of preretirement income covered by the annuity varied from 15% to 43% with an average
replacement rate of 28.4%.788 The replacement rate has generally been above the
average since 1965.789 The assumption here is that the worker saved religiously,
worked forty years with no periods of unemployment, took no distributions, and had
constant plan coverage.790
It is possible to purchase annuities with contractual automatic increases in
amounts up to 7% with 3% being the most popular. Contractual cost of living
increases are also available, although such increases depend on a formula, which is
not easily understood.791 Such features are protection against the possibility of
inflation. Some people think the “best inflation adjusted annuity on the planet is
Social Security.”792 A final warning on annuities:
Annuities can help when planning for future inflation but it’s important to
understand that you need to have realistic expectations levels and not fall
for the current over-hyped annuity income sales message that’s flooding
the airwaves. It’s always a mathematical trade off when adding any type
of income increase to an annuity.793

787

Id.

788

Id. at 266.

789

Id. at 265-67.

790

Id. at 270-71. The return is comparable to that under Social Security, but the initial
annuity payment would be lower if the worker wanted inflation protection, spousal protection
with a joint and survivor format, or wanted an amount for his or her heirs. Id. at 271.
791

Be warned to “just make sure to run the real contractual numbers so you can properly
drink the annuity COLA, and not swallow annuity Kool-aid.” Stan Haithcock, Should you
drink
the
annuity
COLA?,
MARKETWATCH
(Sept.
30,
2014),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/should-you-drink-the-annuity-cola-2014-09-30.
792

Id.

793

Id.
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E. Put No Confidence In princes . . . or Their Economists794
For 2015, the federal government expects to have an expenditure of $3.750
trillion through direct spending and another trillion dollars through tax expenditures
leaving a deficit of $469 billion for the year.795 From 2015 to 2019, it expects a
deficit of $2.777 trillion and from 2015 to 2024; the deficit is expected to be $7.196
trillion.796 Direct expenditures and tax expenditures will impact and virtually control
the individual’s housing, medical care, education, and retirement. Not only is
spending controlled but the financial system is controlled, through the Federal
Reserve System, which over the past eight years has kept short term interest rates
near zero and, through a process known as “quantitative easing,” flooded the market
with funds maintaining the liquidity of the financial system.797
Elected officials at the national level have been able to avoid responsibility for
the sluggish economy by relying on the Federal Reserve System to address the
financial crisis.798 The action of the Federal Reserve System has, in large measure,
given record profits to the owners of equities in the stock markets but a meager
return on the savings of millions of retirees who were depending on their modest
nest egg to supplement their Social Security payments. As inflation is kept low, the
COLA on those Social Security Payments has been minimal, although that benefit
cuts both ways depending on the items affected by the increases in price.
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 is credited with undermining support for
private accounts as a part of Social Security, since it convinced many people that
they could not rely on the equity markets to produce an adequate return. It is
inaccurate to think that the crisis simply resulted from overleveraging that took place
prior to the financial crisis. The action of the government in encouraging expanded
homeownership and the failure of oversight played a part as did failures of rating

794

In Trillion Dollar Economists, Robert E. Litan extols the virtues of economists and
suggests they got a bad rap for not accurately predicting the 2008 crash. One reviewer
suggests that Mr. Litan paid little attention to guilds although the economics profession
exhibits the classic characteristics of a guild which: “[I]nsists on adherence to a particular
methodology and set of beliefs—in this case, the standard understanding of macroeconomics,
with its emphasis on Keynesian categories and government-fueled aggregated. The guild
operates with an unofficial but real license from the banks and the federal governments.”
Amity Shlaes, The Wonks Can’t Save Us, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2014, at A17. Further, macroeconomists eschew the Austrian School, which focuses on the individuals, and Public Choice
Theory, which “predicts that governments will take advantage of market crises to expand in
nonmarket sectors.” Id. Ironically there were no Public Choice Theorists in the White House
or powerful institutions to warn that there might be a housing bubble if government expanded
its presence in the housing sector. Id. Economists who can demonstrate the inefficiency of
guilds fail to focus their attention on their own guild of economists. Id.
795

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO AN UPDATE
2015 TO 2025, at 2 (2015).
796
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO AN UPDATE
2014 TO 2024, at 2 (2014).
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Id.

798

Willis L. Krumholz, Blame The Next Economic Crisis On The Fed, FEDERALIST (Dec.
15, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/12/15/blame-the-next-economic-crisis-on-the-fed/.
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agencies in rating mortgage backed securities.799 But Jeremy Siegel concluded: “[I]t
was the management of many of these financial firms who should be held most
accountable. They were unable to grasp the threats that would befall their firms once
the housing boom ended, and they abdicated responsibility for assessing risks to
technicians running faulty statistical programs.”800
But this conclusion should not negate the part played by the federal government
and the Federal Reserve System. Indeed, other observers reject the assertion that
financial firms were the primary cause and place that mantle on federal housing
policies.801 Prior to the crisis, it was believed that the Federal Reserve could bring
about a “soft” landing from the excessively low interest rates and a return to normal.
Siegel’s analysis is mixed:
The financial crisis also punctured the myth that grew during Greenspan’s
tenure as Fed chairman that the Federal Reserve could fine tune the
economy and eliminate the business cycle. Nevertheless, despite having
failed to see the crisis brewing, the Federal Reserve acted quickly to
assure liquidity and prevented the recession from becoming far more
severe than it turned out to be. 802
Whatever responsibility the federal government may have for the Great
Recession, the One Fund Solution should have the effect of pressing the government
toward financial stability by insisting on a fair rate of return on the government’s
borrowing from its citizens. It will also create an incentive to keep inflation under
control and, in the long run, reduce federal borrowing. In the developed world, 2% is
799

See id.

800

SIEGEL, supra note 759, at 36.

801

Id.; see also Peter J. Wallison, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE
WORLD’S WORST FINANCIAL CRISIS AND WHY IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN (2015). Wallison
points out that:
[T]here is compelling evidence that the financial crisis was caused by the
government’s own housing policies. These policies . . . were based on an idea—still
popular on the left—that underwriting standards in housing finance are excessively
conservative, discriminatory, and unnecessary . . . Indeed, if we look back over the
last hundred years, it is difficult to see instability in the financial system that was not
caused by government’s own policies.
Id. at 4.
802

SIEGEL, supra note 759, at 36. Siegel also states:

The Federal Reserve was able to avoid deflation by stabilizing the money supply. In
the Great Depression, the money supply . . . fell by 29%. . . . In contrast, the money
supply actually rose during the 2008 financial crisis as the Federal Reserve increased
the total reserves by over $1 trillion. This action provided sufficient reserves so that
banks were not forced to call in loans as they were forced to in the 1930s. Although
one can certainly question whether the later injections of reserves (called quantitative
easing) aided the economy, there was little doubt that the initial provisions of liquidity
were critical to stabilizing the financial markets and preventing the downturn from
becoming substantially worse.
Id. at 41.
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the magic number for inflation.803 Anything less seems to be a problem for the
developed economies. Inflation provides an incentive to invest money and to
purchase goods today because prices will be higher tomorrow. It also supports rising
wages in which employers can reward productive employees and borrowers can
expect to lessen their debt load over time. Falling prices are seen as creating the
opposite effect, slowing down an economy.804 But government induced inflation
works against those on fixed incomes who see the purchasing power of their
pensions and savings consumed by higher prices. The One Fund Solution offsets this
government-induced effect.
F. Markets Not as Free as People Think
Accepting investment responsibility should reflect an appreciation of market
principles, but over the last couple of decades investment return has been determined
(or rather guaranteed) more by Federal Reserve policy than overall market
conditions. This has been the case since the United States’ intervention in the
Mexican Peso Crisis, the Long Term Capital Management Liquidation by the
Federal Reserve in 1998, the bursting of the Dot-Com Bubble in 2000, and the Great
Recession in 2007-2008, which saw the market plummet precipitously.805 In each
case, the Federal Reserve intervened by supporting loans, dramatically reducing
interest rates, or instituting bond purchases (called “quantitative easing”) thereby
providing liquidity in the economy but also stimulating increases in stock prices.806
Stock market commentary over the past few years has been dominated by
speculation on when Federal Reserve policy would reduce bond purchases or return
interest rates to more normal rates.807 The slightest murmur from the Chair of the
Federal Reserve regarding future action causes dramatic instantaneous upward or
downward swings in market prices, making market participants enormous returns.808
803
Binyamin Appelbaum, 2% Inflation Rate Target Is Questioned as Fed Policy Panel
Prepares
to
Meet,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
28,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/business/economy/2-inflation-rate-target-is-questionedas-fed-policy-panel-prepares-to-meet.html?_r=0.
804

Deflation: The high cost of falling prices, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 2015, at 69 (suggesting
that most shoppers can ignore the slow ascent of prices).
805

The crisis followed the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the Russian Financial Crisis
of 1998. An earlier crisis caused by the devaluation of the Mexican Peso in 1994 and 1995
required intervention by the United States through loans recommended by the Federal
Reserve. JOSEPH A. WHITT, JR., THE MEXICAN PESO CRISIS, ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE
ATLANTA FEDERAL RESERVE BANK 16-17 (1996). The loans totaling $12.5 billion were issued
through the Exchange Stabilization Fund controlled by the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. This
fund is normally used for short-term foreign exchange intervention, not for medium-term
loans such as those to Mexico, but was used by President Clinton since Congress was
reluctant to act because of the moral hazard of bailing out creditors of foreign governments.
Id.
806

Id.

807

See, e.g., Jon Hilsenrath, Fed Likely to Remove ‘Patient’ Barrier for Rate Increase as
Soon as June, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2015, at A1.
808

Id. (noting that interest rates have been near zero since 2008 and that raising them
requires the Federal Reserve Chair to be confident that inflation would move toward the 2%
target). Volatility is expected in the market as investors speculate on the action of the Federal
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At the same time, stock values soar from zero interest rates, retired persons, seeking
modest returns from secure bonds and Treasury notes, have been devastated; the
little interest they receive is subject to income tax and their initial investment has
been subject to lost value due to inflation.809 Even Charles Schwab was forced to
comment, “[b]ut is it fair that seniors subsidized cheaper credit for others?”810 Until
the Federal Reserve’s inflation target of 2% is met, the Federal Reserve will likely
keep the rates near zero.811 While seniors benefit from low inflation, they receive
little or nothing from their “safe” investments as their Social Security payments
remain stagnant and costs unique to seniors such as drugs and medical care
increase.812 Government, not the market, has been determining winners and losers.
A similar problem occurs because people have a strong incentive to save a large
percent of their income for retirement while the economy depends on high levels of
consumer spending to generate growth in the economy. The government therefore
often finds it necessary to provide incentives for consumers to increase spending by
lowering the Social Security or other taxes.813 Those efforts can be impeded if
people use the extra income to pay off credit card or other debt; although, if they
save for retirement then those savings will result in investments in the economy.814
Here, the One Fund Solution allows individuals an avenue to invest in the economy
directly.
When the Bush tax cuts were extended in 2011 and 2012, the government sought
to stimulate consumer spending with a 2% reduction in the payroll tax.815 The lost
Social Security revenue was nevertheless reflected by an accounting increase in the
amount owed to the trust fund.816 While the use of dedicated tax revenues was
Reserve. Id. The Federal Reserve raised interest rates by 0.25% in December 2015, but the
market response caused the Federal Reserve to question whether to continue the anticipated
increases in 2016. See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
809

See Hilsenrath, supra note 807.

810

Charles Schwab, Raise Interest Rates, Make grandma Smile, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19,
2014; see also Robert F. Stauffer, Letter to the Editor, The High Costs of the Fed’s War on
Seniors and Savers: Is it fair that seniors subsidize cheaper credit for others? Not only is it
unfair but it has been an ineffective policy in stimulating the economy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4,
2014, at A16; Paul Schoenbaum, Letter to the Editor, The High Costs of the Fed’s War on
Seniors and Savers: Is it fair that seniors subsidize cheaper credit for others? Not only is it
unfair but it has been an ineffective policy in stimulating the economy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4,
2014, at A16.
811

Eric Morath, Inflation Well short of Fed’s 2% Target, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2015, at A2.
The annual rate of inflation in November 2015 was 0.5%, well short of the target 2% but if
energy and food are excluded from the calculation the rate was close to 2%. Greg Ip, Fear of
Low inflation Getting Out of Hand, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2015, at A6.
812

Id.

813

Id.

814

Another Growth Dip, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2015, at A12; see also Consumers Lead
Economy As Factories Falter, INV. BUS. DAILY, Mar. 2, 2015, at A1.
815

EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT
REINVESTMENT ACT: FIVE YEARS LATER, FINAL REPORT TO

OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND
CONGRESS, 29 (2014)
816

See generally David Pattinson, 75 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 1 (2015).
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originally intended to remove Social Security from the scope of political oversight,
failing to collect the tax can give people the impression that Social Security is little
more than a welfare program. This impression was enhanced in 1976 when the
earned income tax credit was introduced and the government began refunding many
low-income people amounts exceeding their Social Security contributions.817 The
earned income tax credit and, later, the refundable child tax credit have insured that
low-income taxpayers bear none of the burden of the Social Security tax or the
federal income tax for that matter.818 These policies are merely a “payroll tax rebate
program operated through the income tax. Its operation obscures its effect.”819
Having a high percentage of citizens contributing little or nothing to the federal
government raises a serious question of tax policy. It is estimated 45.3% of
households pay no federal income tax.820 Although, one 2016 presidential candidate
suggested that, in a democracy, everyone should make some contribution to the
common good while most others candidates propose tax plans that would
significantly increase percentage of households not paying any federal income tax.821
In February 2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), a $787 billion stimulus package aimed at
reinvigorating the nation's economy (the “Federal Stimulus Package”) for purposes
of, inter alia, job creation822 and to “help states avoid slashing funding for education
and other programs.”823 Upon signing the Bill, which was thought to be the greatest
stimulus program in United States history,824 President Obama promised the money
would “help those who were hardest hit by our economic crisis.”825 Years later,
817

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 331.

818

Id.

819

Id. Other tax programs operate to offset the payroll tax such as the 6.2% Making Work
Pay tax credit in 2009 and 2010. Id. President Obama in 2011 proposed further payroll tax
deductions as a method of stimulating the economy in amounts far exceeding President Bush’s
2004 proposal to fund private accounts. Id. President Bush was loudly condemned for creating
a funding “hole” in the Social Security trust fund but Obama’s proposal was merely an
extension of the 2010 agreement. Id. at 331.
820

Id.

821

Doug Bandow, Everyone Needs To Pay Taxes To Limit Gov’t, INV. BUS. DAILY, Dec.
17, 2015 (describing a proposal by former presidential candidate, Governor Bobby Jindal, to
impose a 2% rate with few or no deductions so that everyone would have “skin in the game”
and an incentive to resist wasteful programs).
822
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553(a)(1),
123 Stat. 115, 116 (2009) (establishing the purpose for the stimulus funding).
823
Meghan Ashford-Grooms, President Obama says Gov. Perry used stimulus fund to
help balance budget, then started ‘blaming’ federal lawmakers who voted for legislation,
POLITIFACT
TEX.
(Apr.
24,
2011),
http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2011/apr/24/barack-obama/president-obama-saysgov-perry-used-stimulus-fund-/.
824

Yuval Rosenberg, Obama’s Stimulus Plan: What Worked, What Didn’t, FIS. TIMES
(Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/02/21/Obamas-Stimulus-PlanWhat-Worked-What-Didn’t.
825

Ron Hart, Where did the stimulus money go?, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/stimulus-501352-money-obama.html.
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however, critics disagree over the success of the stimulus plan.826 Of the billions of
dollars allocated, “[a]bout $500 billion went to tax cuts, unemployment benefits, and
“state fiscal relief” (shoring up insolvent state budgets)”827 with $105.7 billion given
to the states for Medicaid and Medicare.828 States used their allocation for several
purposes.829 Texas used it to reduce their budget deficit and put the majority of its
funds towards Medicaid and education; while California, which accounted for about
$31 billion of this initiative, spread the money over several programs, including
education, health, labor and workforce development, social services, transportation,
housing programs, resources and environmental protection, criminal justice, and
other programs.830 Much of the money went to maintain jobs rather than create new
ones.831
Reliance on the government is preferable to reliance on the market. However,
Congress adds new programs without paying for them, except to the extent that the
new program eliminates waste in existing programs, giving the impression that the
new program will not be expensive. With the adoption of the Affordable Care Act,
the elimination of waste would be available to help pay for the expanded
coverage.832 Later, when Congress imposed an across the board sequester of funds
for federal programs, there was no talk about eliminating waste, but only talk of the
dire consequences of cutting vital federal programs. No one seemed able to find any
waste to eliminate:
Economists are quick to speak of “market failure,” and rightly so, but a
greater threat comes from “government failure.” Because it is a
monopoly, government brings inefficiency and stagnation to most things
it runs; government agencies pursue the inflation of their budgets rather
826

Id. (discussing the disparity between President Obama’s promise and the allocation of
stimulus money per capita); Tom Howell Jr., Obama’s stimulus package, 5 years later: Dems
defend,
Republicans
ridicule,
WASH.
TIMES
(Feb.
17,
2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/17/obama-stimulus-package-dem-defendsgop-mocks/?page=all (providing political insight into the rate of unemployment five years
after the stimulus).
827

Philip K. Howard, Howard’s Daily: Finding Infrastructure in the Stimulus Plan,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-k-howard/howardsdaily-finding-inf_b_4808898.html.
828

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), U.S.
http://www.ed.gov/open/plan/recovery-gov (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

DEP’T

EDUC.,

829

See Stimulus Spending by States, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-STIMULUS0903.html
(illustrating
each state’s allocation of the stimulus money it received); Jennifer LaFleur et al., How Much
Stimulus Funding is Going to Your County, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 1, 2012),
https://projects.propublica.org/recovery/; State oversight of Federal Stimulus Funds, NAT’L
CONFERENCE ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-economicstimulus-package-oversight-plans.aspx (last updated Aug. 4, 2009) (providing individual
websites for each state to track their use of stimulus money).
830

Update from Washington, D.C., CAL. ST. ASS’N COUNTIES (July 8, 2011),
http://www.counties.org/csac-bulletin-article/update-washington-dc-07082011.
831

See Hart, supra note 825.
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MATT RIDLEY, THE RATIONAL OPTIMIST 182 (2011).
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than the service of their customers; pressure groups form an unholy
alliance with agencies to extract more money from taxpayers for their
members. Yet despite all this, most clever people still call for government
to run more things and assume that if it did so, it would somehow be more
perfect, more selfless, next time.833
The tremendous waste occurring in the United States health care system is a clear
example of how inadequate oversight is costing taxpayers billions of dollars each
year. It is reported:
Health care is a tempting target for thieves. Medicaid doles out $415
billion a year, Medicare (a federal scheme for the elderly) nearly $600
billion. Total health spending in America is a massive $2.7 trillion, or
17% of GDP. No one knows for sure how much of that is embezzled, but
in 2012 Donald Berwick, a former head of the Centres for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS), and Andrew Hackbarth of the Rand
Corporation, estimated that fraud (and the extra rules and inspections
required to fight it) added as much as $98 billion, or roughly 10%, to
annual Medicare and Medicaid spending–and up to $22 billion across the
entire health system.834
G. The Great Recession and Lost Wealth
Government works against itself when it lowers interest rates. Low interest rates
hurt retirees and makes states use a lower discount rate in valuing their unfunded
pension obligations. The low rates also push people into the stock market to get any
decent return on their savings.
The 2007 Great Recession is just now becoming part of the economic history of
the twenty-first century as employment in the United States is reaching pre-recession
levels and GDP in Europe, generally, is reaching the pre-recession levels.835 But
reaching pre-recession levels seven years after the beginning of the recession is
overlooking the lost GDP and productivity projected prior to the recession.
Evaluating economic potential based on pre-recession conditions, as of last year, the
United States was 4.7% below potential and Britain was 11% below. Other European
Union countries fared even worse with Greece, the worst of the countries in the
developed world, with 30% below. By 2015, the weighted average loss among rich
countries as a whole was projected to reach 8.4%–as if the entire German economy
had evaporated.836
833

Id.

834

Health-care fraud: The $272 billion swindle, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2014, at 26; see also
Health Care Fraud in America, That’s where the money is, How to hand over $272 billion a
year to criminals, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2014, at 13.
835

The US Economy to 2024, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/pdf/the-us-economy-to-2024.pdf.

(Dec.

2015),

836
Wasted potential: Counting the long-term costs of the financial crisis, ECONOMIST, June
14, 2014, at 71 (citing Laurence M. Ball, Long-term Damage from the Great Recession in
OECD Countries (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper 20185, 2014); Robert. E.
Hall, Quantifying the Lasting Harm to the U.S. economy from the Financial Crisis (Nat’l
Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper 20183, 2014)).
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The primary causes of the loss of GDP were identified as loss of employment
hours worked, labor-force participation, a capital investment shortfall, and
disappointing productivity growth.837 China’s demographic clock is ticking against
its economic growth. The fifteen to fifty-nine working age population fell by 3.45
million last year to 937.27 million.838 This declining demographic may trim 3.25
percentage points from its yearly growth rate between 2012 and 2030.839
In addition, Central banks, while reducing interest rates to zero, are fighting to
get inflation up to 2%, but are failing in that effort and economies are struggling:
Europe is in dire economic straits. Growth in the euro zone is stuck below
1%, unemployment is above 11% and inflation is hovering around 0.4%
far from the European Central Bank’s 2% goal and dangerously near
outright deflation. This week the Paris-based OECD rich-country club
warned that the euro zone was mired in stagnation, and added that it was
dragging down the world economy. Even the pope has joined in, calling
the European Union “elderly and haggard.”840
Deflation is destructive to the economy as explained:
[T]he belief that money made tomorrow will be worth less than money
today stymies investment; the belief that goods bought tomorrow will be
cheaper than goods bought today chokes consumption. Central bankers
can no longer set real (that is, inflation-adjusted) interest rates low enough
to restore demand. Wages, incomes and tax revenues all stall,
undermining the ability of households, businesses and governments to pay
their debts-debts which, in real terms, will grow more burdensome under
deflation.841
The burden of Eurozone debt can cause turbulence in the market:
Soldiering has been described as long periods of boredom punctuated
by moments of sheer terror. Financial markets seem to be developing the
same pattern. The boredom stems from a massive central-bank
intervention in markets.
As long as investors remain convinced that central banks are in control
of events, and can adjust monetary policy to avoid recession and inflation,
volatility will be low for most of the time. In these quiet periods, the
dominant trend will be momentum-investors buying the assets that have
most recently risen in price. By September, for example, investors were
heavily exposed to peripheral European bonds (the debt of Greece and
837

Id.

838

Id.

839

Id.

840

Fiddling while Europe burns, ECONOMIST, Nov. 29, 2014, at 13.

841

The dangers of deflation: The pendulum swings to the pit, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2014, at
25 (containing a by-line that reads, “Politicians and central bankers are not providing the
world with the inflation it needs; some economies face damaging deflation instead”). With an
inflation rate of 0.3% Europe, which produces almost a fifth of world output, may be forced
into recession next year. Id. at 15.
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Spain, for example) and to cyclical stocks (those that perform best when
the economy is dong well).
But when the trend changes, prices may move very sharply, as the
terrified herd stampedes out of what can be illiquid markets. In the last
four weeks, defensive stocks have outperformed cyclicals by one of the
greatest margins in history, according to BlackRock, a fund management
group.842
After six years of near zero interest rates, central banks are considering how to
return to normal interest rates since there continues to be low rates of inflation.843
The fear is that returning too quickly will undermine the recovery while deflation
looms as a great concern. Many observers are calling for efforts to bring inflation up
to the target of 2% or even somewhat higher than that.844
H. Social Security: A Different Kind of Defined Benefit Plan
Social Security is different than state or private pension plans because of the
federal government’s taxing power, ability to borrow money, fiscal policy control,
and ability to create demand deposits through the Federal Reserve’s quantitative
easing. These powers in the hands of a solvent and stable government may provide
the confidence desired by the public, but, in the hands of irresponsible politicians,
can lead to a disaster affecting the entire nation with no one there to bail them out.
The federal government has reached the point where the Social Security tax
receipts by themselves are insufficient to pay the benefits and general budget funds
are used to repay accruing interest on the Social Security trust fund. That condition
will worsen as claims against the trust fund grow. Since the federal budget is not in
balance, the Social Security deficit will be closed with borrowed funds. The federal
government, like Illinois, New Jersey, and California, is borrowing to pay current
Social Security benefits.
Over its first four decades, Social Security provided much larger windfall
benefits for high earners than for lower earners. This occurred early in the program
when participants had little time to contribute. The costs for the windfalls were left
for later generations to pay when, for many workers, the windfalls would disappear
and Social Security would become a bad deal.845 That bad deal will likely become
even worse as the system is reformed to save it.846
Traditional methods of reducing government debt through inflation may not
work with debt accumulated for Social Security since benefits are structured to

842
Buttonwood, Liquid diet: Recent market turbulence may be only a foretaste,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2014, at 74.
843

See generally Neil Irwin, Why Very Low Interest Rates May Stick Around, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/upshot/why-very-low-interest-ratesmay-stick-around.html.
844
Monetary policy and asset prices, A narrow path, ECONOMIST, June 21, 2014, at 67
(noting central banks around the world are struggling to promote growth without fomenting
worrisome risk-taking.)
845

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 279.

846

Id.
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account for inflation unlike many other pensions. The case is different in Europe
where:
Inflation indexation of pensions is a politically charged issue and is
particularly so in European countries, where this has become the norm.
This probably lines up with many other entitlement issues, which are
likely to be thrown into serious challenge as the full extent of the pension
crisis problems unfold.847
Of course we may simply believe we will never have to pay off the national debt
or that inflation will eliminate it altogether. But at some point, the reality of the
flawed system will manifest itself and some people will bear the pain of that system.
Social Security creates a complex set of incentives and disincentives for
continuing to work. If you retire early at age sixty-two, you receive a reduced benefit
that is further reduced if you continue to work and earn more than a minimum
amount of money, creating a disincentive to work.848 At “full” retirement there is an
incentive to continue working and delaying starting the benefit until age seventy
when the benefit will be enhanced by 8% for each year worked after full retirement
age until age seventy.849 A disincentive to continue working after age seventy is that
a person continues to contribute to Social Security without any significant increase
in benefit. 850
When discussing the sustainability of Social Security, most focus on the
increasing ratio of retired persons to working persons paying for the retirement and
on the increased longevity of the retired population.851 Until recently, the retirement
age has been moving earlier and earlier and the impact of the Social Security
program on this decision has not been highlighted. Many people find that retirement
is not what it is cracked up to be and prefer working. In fact, some perceive that the
long-term trend is that people will be working well into their seventies.852
In the Social Security system, each individual has no choice in the amount to
contribute, the manner in which it is invested, or the form of payment in which the

847

MARIN, supra note 2, at 18.

848

Retirement Planner: Benefits By Year Of Birth, SOC. SEC.
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/agereduction.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
849

Id.

850

One commentator observes:

ADMIN.,

What has not been widely appreciated is that the provisions of the social security
programs themselves often provide strong incentives to leave the labor force. By
penalizing work, social security systems magnify the increased financial burden
caused by aging populations and thus contribute to their own insolvency.
Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise, Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the
World: the Relationship to Youth Employment 3 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working
Paper 14647, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14647.pdf.
851
CHRIS FARRELL, UNRETIREMENT HOW BABY BOOMERS ARE CHANGING
THINK ABOUT WORK, COMMUNITY, AND THE GOOD LIFE 21 (2014).
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Id. (“My own guess is that the average age at retirement over the next quarter century
or so will rise to seventy.”).
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benefit is to be received.853 Because changes advocated to the Social Security system
all involve a form of forced savings with some limitation on investment choices, the
assertion can be made that the differences are merely “haggling about the price.”854
However, “no choice” is qualitatively different than having some choice in the future
of one’s retirement assets, and, having choice and control, creates a sense of
ownership and investment in a system in which one can see and understand the
implications of saving for the future.
With the One Fund Solution, a participant recognizes that at some point the
required contributions may come to an end. The level projected herein is when the
value of the account reaches $1 million. As time passes, many people will inherit a
portion of the One Fund accounts of their parents and thus begin life with a legacy of
inter-generational inherited wealth to build their own future. One can make
additional contributions in an effort to get to a given level and qualify for alternative
investments earlier in life. Of course, making additional contributions would work
against many economic policies, which depend on consumer spending. Further, and
more importantly, the One Fund Solution encourages the participant to investigate
and learn about the system rather than merely being a passive participant.
Today, in exchange for a base amount in retirement and certain disability and
survivor benefits every person is required to give approximately 12.4% of their
lifetime earnings into the Social Security system.855 This 12.4% commitment begins
with one’s first job and ends only when one stops working, but the restrictions end
only at death. The capturing of over 12% of our lifetime earnings is like an
indentured servant of colonial times who gave three years labor for passage to the
new world.856 But an indentured servant could look forward to a day in the near
future when he would be free to make his own decisions and perhaps improve his
lot.
With Social Security, unless the individual is in the lowest earning groups, the
“deal” is not a good deal, nor a fair deal, but a deal that is sure to get worse; and a
time will come when the legacy costs will demand payment and benefits will have to
shrink. Thus far, Congress’s sole objective has been to avoid pain for anyone and
pass the problem on to the next generation. The choices suggested herein are not
politically attractive. Even when solutions are suggested in other broad reform
proposals, they receive stinging rebukes. No one will be happy to pay for benefits,
but at some point, hard choices will need to be made and the choice will come down

853

Shaviro, supra note 170, at 91-92.

854

Id. at 113.

855

Id. at 106.

856

In 1738, Henry Meyer, in consideration of the payment of his passage from Rotterdam
to Bucks County Pennsylvania by Abraham Heslant, agreed to work for Heslant as a servant
for a period of three years and Abraham Heslant agreed to provide Meyer with food, clothing,
and lodging during the three year period and thereafter Meyer was to be made free and given
two suits of clothes, one of which to be new. The contract of indenture is available at the
Wikipedia site for the definition of indentured servant. Contract of Indenture, WIKIPEDIA,
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/86/Indenturecertificate.jpg (last visited
Sept. 10, 2014).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/5

132

2016]

ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS

901

to housing, health care, retirement, or education. States and cities are already making
such choices.857
The enormous growth of government into the control of housing, health care, and
education has taken much of the freedom once experienced by individuals. The
result has been a total dependence of government decisions in every major area of
life. With dependence comes a loss of freedom, control, and human dignity,
precisely the opposite of what the founders of the program intended.
Social Security has become a mixture of retirement planning and welfare. The
picture lacks transparency and is distorted. If welfare is necessary, it should be
provided outside the retirement system or be a separate supplemental system distinct
from the One Fund Solution.858 Such a separation will allow people to intelligently
save for retirement and be responsible for their own future.
I. Alleviating the Problem and Facilitating a Transition
State and local governments, along with their elected officials, are great at
promising benefits but abhorrent at setting the money aside to fund those promises.
Although funding pensions and retiree health care will come at the expense of
bridges, roads, schools, and other vital community needs. Further, cutting benefits
requires political fortitude that few politicians are willing to muster. Private
employer pensions have also proved problematic, as government-funding
requirements have been subject to manipulation depending on the revenue needs at
the time. Finding defined benefit plans impossible to manage employers have shifted
the burden of investment decision and risk onto insurance companies and are in the
process of eliminating defined benefit plans.
Transitioning to a new system requires radical change and a source of revenue to
fund the change as demonstrated by the Chilean system. Chile achieved the
transition by transferring government assets into private hands.859 There are ways
this could be accomplished in the United States and it could involve a gradual
change. Removing the United States and its people out of the spiral of continuing
debt should begin with a ten-year transition period as described in this and the
following sections. The society and the world have grown up in a debt dependence
that bankrupts nations and ruins individual lives and families. Insuring against
catastrophes for individual disability and premature death is relatively inexpensive if
planned for in advance through life and disability insurance.

857

Mark Peters & Kris Maher, Schools in Detroit, Chicago Seek State Help, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 21, 2016, at A3.
858

This recommendation goes against the argument that a program for the poor is a poor
program because the use of dedicated tax revenues and making the system universal has had
the desired effect of preventing reductions in Social Security, but has also prevented any
change that would make the system more efficient or financially sustainable. See supra notes
195, 224 and accompanying text. Lack of transparency and system complexity has also
allowed for the gaming of Social Security. Two strategies to maximize Social Security
benefits, “file and suspend” and “restricted application,” are being eliminated by the
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. Glenn Ruffenach, A Strategy to Maximize Social Security
Benefits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2016, at R2.
859

Pensions in Chile, supra note 598.
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1. Expand the Workforce
Professor Samuelson’s comment that “[a] growing nation is the greatest Ponzi
game ever contrived”860 could provide an answer to the dilemma faced by nations
with large aging populations and younger populations desiring smaller families. In
terms of Social Security, this dilemma prompts the perpetual discussions of the ratio
of workers paying the taxes and the beneficiaries receiving the payments from the
system. In such discussions, the questions focus on birth rates, women in the work
force, and immigration.
The United States is ahead of the many developed countries in that women
started migrating into the workforce back in the 1960s and the United States birth
rate has consistently been maintained at the replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman
age eighteen to forty-eight.861 With United States immigration and expanding female
participation in the workforce, the imbalance between household types is changed
and Social Security funding is enhanced. The United States has already reaped
economic benefits from some of these changes:
The increases in women’s labor force participation rates since the late
1960s have more than offset the reduced labor force participation rates of
older men. As a result, since 1970, the percentage of time in the
workforce has increased for the prime-age adult population. This has been
a major contributing factor in our economic growth and higher standards
of living over the latter part of the century. The trends raise the question
whether higher female workforce participation rates will change longterm retirement patterns. The answer is, probably not.862
Congress and the administration has been debating reform of the immigration
system, but show little hope of reaching a solution before the 2016 elections.863 The
flow of low-skilled workers seems to be continuing while higher skilled workers find
immigration opportunities limited.864
2. Return to the Fiscal Constitution
A 2014 book by Bill White outlining the fiscal condition of the United States
from the Revolutionary War to the present notes five periods in which the country
has incurred high levels of debt it moved quickly to balance the budget, even
860

Shaviro, supra note 170, at 95 (citing Paul A. Samuelson, An Exact Consumption-Loan
Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money, 66 J. POL. ECON. 467
(1958)).
861
GLADYS MARTINEZ ET AL., FERTILITY OF MEN AND WOMEN AGED 15–44 YEARS IN THE
UNITED STATES: NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 2006–2010, at 1 (2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr051.pdf.
862

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 179.

863

See Joshua Briesblatt, What to Expect from Congress on Immigration in 2016, IMMIGR.
IMPACT (Jan 5, 2016), http://immigrationimpact.com/2016/01/05/congress-immigration-2016/.
864
A recent article suggests that the Obama administration is looking to immigration
reform as a vital element in improving the financial health of Social Security by adding
millions of newly legalized workers to the workforce. Editorial, President Obama’s New
Budget, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/03/opinion/presidentobamas-new-budget.html.
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maintain surpluses, for up to a decade to bring the debt into controllable levels
calling the tradition the “Fiscal Constitution.”865 That tradition collapsed in the
twenty-first century when the author could assert:
Never before had the federal government waged major wars without
raising taxes. Never before had it so heavily relied on foreign creditors.
Never before had the president and Congress financed a permanent new
domestic program entirely with debt. Never before had progressives
accepted, much less insisted on, the substitution of federal debt for payroll
contributions supporting the Social Security trust fund. Never before had
many conservatives organized the fight against a constitutional
amendment requiring a balanced budget. Never before had so many
leaders of each major political party claimed that balancing the budget—
even with national income at an all-time high—would impair sustainable
economic growth. After 2000 the federal government borrowed increasing
amounts to pay for routine operating expenses in addition to debt incurred
to pay for wars and recession-related stimulus.866
The Fiscal Constitution is comprised of four basic principles that stood for 200
years until its collapse under President Bush. The first principle is clear budget
accounting (i.e. transparency of the budget revenues and expenditures). The second
principle is pay-as-you-go budget planning. The third principle is dedicating taxes to
a fund for a specific purpose tightening the link between spending and taxing. The
fourth principle is congressional approval of the amount and purpose of any new
debt.867
The following statement by President Lincoln’s last treasury secretary, former
Indiana banker Hugh McCulloch, provided a clear example of the principle of
paying down debt:
As all true men desire to leave to their heirs unencumbered estates, so
should it be the ambition of the people of the United States to relieve their
descendants of this national mortgage . . . . since wars are not at an end,
and posterity will have enough to do to take care of the debts of their own
creation.”868
Secretary McCulloch’s statement recognizes a flaw not only in Social Security,
but a flaw in our own thinking as a country and society that we live to consume all
that we produce and failing to leave an inheritance is somehow a virtue.869 Another
story line is set out in a recent book, in which the author described telling his clients
the “last check they write should be to their undertaker . . . and that it should

865

TOM WHITE, AMERICA’S FISCAL CONSTITUTION: ITS TRIUMPH
(2014).
866

Id. at ix.

867

Id. at 43-44, 68.

AND

COLLAPSE 408

868

Id. at 110 (citing HUGH M. MCCULLOCH, MEN AND MEASURES OF HALF A CENTURY 206
(1888)).
869

MCCULLOCH, supra note 868, at 206.
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bounce.870 To be fair, the author suggests living off “life-time” annuities and making
judicious gifts to loved ones during life rather than at death so that you can conclude,
“by striving to die broke you guarantee you live well.”871
An honorable practice recognized early in our nation’s history was the
understanding that the nation needed to conserve its credit capacity to be available in
the event of an emergency. Thus early borrowings tended to be longer term even at a
higher interest rate because “[l]ong maturities on the federal debt gave the United
States more flexibility in dealing with the unknown.”872 Debt was a resource to be
used sparingly and then paid off quickly. Debt was necessary to (1) preserve the
union, (2) secure and extend the nation’s borders, (3) fight a war, or (4) fund deficits
during a recession.873 Another lesson is that the federal government does not need to
spend borrowed money in order for the economy to grow.874
3. Breaking the Logjam of Tax Expenditures
Another author finding confidence in America’s ability to handle its fiscal
problems was C. Eugene Steuerle.875 Steuerle finds support for his confidence in the
actions of Alexander Hamilton who handled the Revolutionary War debt through the
institution of the “hidden” tariff tax and of Theodore Roosevelt who enacted the “not
so hidden” income tax and the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank at the beginning
of the Progressive Era.876 These actions took political courage, flexibility, and a
determination to solve the problems facing the nation. The problem today, in
Steuerle’s view, is that all government revenues are committed not just for today, but
also for the twenty-first century and beyond, as a result of inconsistent spending and
tax policies.877 The result is that the current discussion is about sustainability rather
than how can government be opened so that future generations have the ability to
make their own policy choices.878 Steuerle’s three-point plan is summarized as:
870

STEPHEN POLLAN & MARK LEVINE, DIE BROKE: A RADICAL FOUR PART FINANCIAL PLAN
(1998).
871

Id.

872

WHITE, supra note 865, at 51.

873

Id. at 67.

874

Id. at 86, 393. The idea of America’s Fiscal Constitution was taken up again in Carl
Lane’s book, A Nation Wholly Free, which describes in detail how, through the efforts and
determination of President Andrew Jackson, America was able to experience two years, 18351837, as a debt free country. Applying the lessons of Jackson to the current situation, Lane
warns of the urgency, stating anything might trigger a loss of confidence in the United States
creditworthiness which could cause “wide spread misery, civil disorder, and the possible
collapse of our institutions.” CARL LANE, A NATION WHOLLY FREE (2015); see also Daniel
Shuchman, When America Paid Its Debts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2015, at A1.
875
Steuerle recognizes that the nation’s long-standing aversion to debt, which seems to
have ended with Vice President Dick Cheney’s comment to Treasury Secretary O’Neill that
“[d]eficits don’t matter.” STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 35.
876

Id. at 22-29.

877

Id. at 29.

878

Id.
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Remove the automatic and eternal built-in growth in programs that
current policies will generate . . . .
Pay our bills in normal economic times and stop pretending that
deficit-financed tax cuts do anything more than shift burdens onto our
children; and
Start using some of the resources that we free up from steps (1) and
(2), above, to invest wisely in our children, in programs devoted more
to opportunity and mobility than ever-more consumptions . . . .879

Seeing the federal government tax and spending policies as alternating between
“giveaways” and “takebacks,” Steuerle sees the country entering the “takeback”
phase after excessive spending and tax cuts dominated the Presidency’s of Bush and
Obama, although both Republicans and Democrats will seek to keep their prior
successes.880 Steuerle sees the rate of growth of spending exceeding the growth of
revenue forever—or until the economy collapses—and points out that projections
under current law are that United States federal debt as a percentage of GDP will
approach 250% by mid-century.881 Such growth of debt will result in four economic
consequences as follows: (1) rising and unsustainable levels of debt; (2) a shrinking
ability to fight recession or meet other emergencies; (3) a budget for a declining
nation that invests ever less in its future, particularly in children and youth; and (4)
broken government, as reflected in antiquated tax and social welfare systems.882
In discussing these consequences, Steuerle points out that no one knows when
lenders will come to the point of refusing to fund the national debt, but it is sure to
come at some point. But it is the broken system in which he points to outdated tax
expenditures for housing and retirement that fail to achieve their purposes. Over
$400 billion in tax relief is dedicated toward savings for retirement, higher
education, and retirement, but personal savings remains low often hardly exceeding
the amount of the subsidy.883 Numerous other tax subsidies likewise fail to achieve
their purposes.884 He criticizes state and military pensions as not reflecting realistic
budget constraints and notes many inconsistencies in the Social Security program
including requirements to pay for benefits you will not receive such as the spousal
benefit being paid for by single taxpayers, the benefit for divorced spouses requiring
ten years of marriage, and certain benefits for children of healthy but retired
parents.885
Along with the four economic consequences, Steuerle posits three deadly
political consequences:

879

Id. at 31.

880

Id. at 66-70.

881

Id. at 82-83.

882

Id. at 82.

883

Id. at 98.

884

Id. at 97-99.

885

Id. at 99-101.
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The decline of “fiscal democracy,” as previous decisions by dead and
retired policymakers deprive today’s and future generations of the
power to make their own decisions;
A classic “prisoners’ dilemma,” in which liberals and conservatives
alike assess correctly that they will “lose” politically by acquiescing
to spending cuts or tax increases, respectively to reduce budget
deficits or create budget flexibility; and
Obstacles to “fixing” government because, to address new priorities
or create new programs, elected officials must renege on old
promises, telling people they are no longer entitled to the higher
benefits or low taxes that they have come to expect. 886

The third consequence is the greatest obstacle because, with all future revenues
committed, politicians will be called upon to renege on old promises to get resources
for new priorities. Restoring fiscal freedom requires more than merely reducing
deficits under current policies to sustainable levels. Rather it requires broadly
rescinding promises for ever-growing benefits or low taxes and moving government
in new directions.887 For example, real reform of health care will force a realization
that, “we cannot have it all, that we can no longer live with the illusion that we are
entitled to all the health care we can get, no matter the price.”888 Overturning the
status quo may take years or even decades, but Steuerle sees a bright future when
fiscal freedom is restored and the young can again set their own priorities.889
In summary, Steuerle is concerned about the loss of fiscal freedom brought about
by current spending and tax priorities that has effectively committed the nation’s
wealth through the end of the twentieth-first century. His solution is to limit or
eliminate the automatic provisions that cause these items to grow faster than the
economy. This is a return to a situation in which priorities are again set annually by
the current generation of leaders. In particular, he sees the need to curtail the
automatic growth in health and retirement spending (as protected by the Democrats)
and the myriad of tax expenditures built into the system (as protected by the
Republicans) in order to focus on making the twenty-first century the century of the
child as the country focuses on promoting education of the young and investment
that creates social mobility.890
4. Excessive Tax Expenditures and Retirement Tax Complexity
Improving the long-term outlook of the Social Security System inevitably
focuses on curtailing benefits or increasing the earnings cap on the Social Security
tax in a way that impacts higher earners.891 Such action would increase the inequality
886

Id. at 104.

887

Id. at 113-14.

888

Id. at 127.

889

Id. at 132.

890

Id. at 150.

891

Schieber does not think the solution is as suggested by recent commissions to increase
benefits for the low earners, decrease benefits for higher earners, increase taxes on higher
earners, and then limit retirement tax expenditures which primarily help higher income
individuals. SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 369.
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of the system but would be viewed as maintaining or improving the progressivity of
the system. Although it would make a “bad deal” for higher earners even worse, it
may be palatable to them since they are the primary beneficiaries of the many tax
expenditures already embedded in the Federal Income Tax Code.892
The engine of retirement planning is the federal tax code. People wish to avoid
paying tax on current income and want to have it accumulate tax-free over their
working life. These plans originated during World War II when benefits provided to
employees were not subject to the wage controls so unions could circumvent the
limits on labor costs by demanding higher benefits.893
Tax reform is constantly discussed in the pages of tax magazines but never
happens. The allure of the revenue that could be generated by curtailing many tax
expenditures is a prime target for reformers interested in lowering tax rates.
However, tax reform seems to be only acceptable when it is “revenue neutral.” In
other words, everyone will pay the same tax after tax reform as they paid before tax
reform.894 It will just be lower rates and fewer deductions.
Many of the so-called tax expenditures support pensions for middle and upper
income individuals, many of which are in a position to fund their own retirement
through other means.895 Furthermore, while the Social Security trust fund is credited
for contributions from low-income individuals, the earned income tax credit and tax
credit for children under seventeen are refundable in part to relieve low-income
individuals of the burden of Social Security taxes.896 There is enormous revenue tied
up in these tax expenditures. Currently, the tax expenditure associated with employer
provided plans, IRAs, and Keoghs totals $800 billion over five years from 2014 to

892
Id. at 337. Amendments to the Social Security Act in 1977 sought to tax approximately
90% of covered wages but that percentage has since fallen to closer to 83% due to higher
earnings growing faster than lower earnings. Id. at 336.
893

See id. at 13-15.

894

Significantly, tax reform requires bipartisanship to be successful. A recent report
suggested that Republicans, who generally advocated major tax reductions, would like to
repeal the deduction for state and local taxes because the benefit of the deduction favors states
that have high state income taxes and are generally Democratic voting states (for example
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, California, Massachusetts, Maryland, Illinois, Rhode
Island, and Virginia are the top ten states impacted with estimated per household increases
from $4,286 to $2,333, respectively). Richard Rubin, GOP Candidates Seek End to a Federal
Tax Break That Benefits Blue States Most, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2016, at A5.
895

See id.

896

See Thomas Hungerford & Rebecca Theis, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the
Child Tax Credit History, Purpose, Goals, and Effectiveness, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 25,
2015),
http://www.epi.org/publication/ib370-earned-income-tax-credit-and-the-child-taxcredit-history-purpose-goals-and-effectiveness/.
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2018.897 The earned income tax credit is $352.8 billion in tax expenditures over five
years and the credit for children under seventeen is another $285.5 billion.898
A proposal by recent commissions to limit the tax deduction for defined
contribution plans to 20% or $20,000 was criticized as not providing an adequate
retirement for persons earning between $100,000 and $200,000.899 Ghilarducci’s
proposal for the Guaranteed Retirement Account (GRA) suggested curtailing the tax
expenditures for 401(k) plans to fund the GRA.900 Another commentator suggests
redirecting spending away from the automatic increases in retirement and healthcare
spending on the elderly toward an investment in education for the young, increased
infrastructure spending, and research.901 There will be many voices looking at the
federal accumulation of power and wealth.
The One Fund Solution would cut through the mass of tax expenditures and treat
everyone equally. It is funded with after-tax dollars, which means that it has a
progressive element built into the structure of the plan since low-income persons
would contribute virtually untaxed dollars and high-income persons would be
contributing funds taxed at the highest marginal rate. This feature alone creates an
incentive for younger workers to make additional contributions early in their career
when they are in low-tax brackets and able to create a retirement plan that is never
taxed. Capping contributions to accounts at $2 million in assets and tax-free
withdrawals up to $2 million over a lifetime would provide a $100,000 annual
payment over thirty years of retirement even with the guaranteed real return of 3%.
As one commentator concludes:
I recognize that all of these items [e.g. tax expenditures for employer
provided health care, housing and other personal itemized deductions] are
frequently described as political “sacred cows,” but they simply are
luxuries that we can no longer afford. Either we corral theses sacred cows,
or they will stampede us.902
897

JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 730, at 32 (identifying the five-year tax
expenditure totals as follows (in billions of dollars): Keogh plans: $52.1; Defined Benefit
plans: $248.3; Defined Contribution plans: $399.0; Traditional IRAs: $69.5; and Roth IRAs:
$30.2, all of which are listed under the heading “Income Security”).
898

Id. at 30, 32 (the earned income tax credit is listed under “Income Security” while the
credit for children under seventeen is listed under “Education, Training, Employment, and
Social Services”).
899
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 369 (referring to the Bowles-Simpson Commission and the
Domenici-Rivlin Task Force).
900

Id.

901

STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 158 (as part of the author’s plan, the budget process needs
to be reformed and “permanent” tax cuts need to be repealed).
902

KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 259. Kleinbard believes that:

All these social expenditures delivered through the tax system should be accounted for
consistently as spending programs, whether they reduce tax liabilities or result in the
receipt of a check. There again we see how tax expenditures occlude our
understanding of size and function of government.
Id. at 347.
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Curtailing existing tax expenditures, providing income security, and dedicating
the revenue generated thereby to funding the legacy costs of Social Security would
be an important step toward addressing the nation’s long-term debt problem. Other
tax expenditures directed toward middle and higher income individuals that could be
curtailed for the same purpose are the deduction for mortgage interest on owneroccupied residences ($405.2 billion over five years) and the deduction for property
taxes on real property ($182.1 billion over five years).903 These two-tax expenditures
have their advocates and their critics but whether they actually assist many middle
income tax payers is questionable. The inability to assess the effectiveness of tax
preferences was evident in a 1955 report, Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth
and Stability:
[If the government] decided to subsidize a certain activity, we should be
hesitant about administering the subsidy by way of a tax preference.
Subsidies in this form vary directly in amount with the tax brackets for the
recipients; they are invariably hidden in the technicalities of the tax law;
they do not show up in the budget; their cost frequently is difficult to
calculate; and their accomplishments are even more difficult to assess.904
A 1977 estimate was that tax expenditures for pension plans affected high end
taxpayers more with the bottom 50% of taxpayers receiving only 5% of the benefits
of the tax expenditures.905 While inequities in the present system of tax expenditures
could be addressed,906 the difficulty of doing so has led some commentators to
suggest adopting a value-added tax (VAT) to fund entitlement reform and reduce
reliance on income taxes.907 Raising revenue is raising revenue and a VAT may well

903
STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 25. Kleinbard sees “curbing tax expenditures as the most
powerful single fiscal instrument by which we can right our fiscal ship.” KLEINBARD, supra
note 21, at 259. In particular, Kleinbard would substitute a 15% tax credit for all personal
itemized deductions including mortgage interest deduction, real estate tax deduction, and
charitable deduction, among others. Id. at 258-60.
904

SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 141 (citing The Effects of Special Provisions in the Income
Tax on Taxpayer Morale, in Joint Econ. Comm. Fed. Tax Pol’y for Econ. Growth & Stability,
84th Cong., 250-51 (1955) (statement of Walter J. Blum)). The concept of tax expenditures
would later be taken up and formally instituted into the federal system by Stanley Surrey. Id.
at 151.
905

Id. at 151.

906
Other inequities involve the misuse of individual retirement accounts to shelter millions
of dollars in wealth associated with the funding of IRAs with assets where incredible wealth
can be directed for tax deferred growth.
907
Martin A. Sullivan, Setting the Ground Rules for Tax Reform, 144 TAX NOTES 1352,
1354 (2014) (citing MICHAEL GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR,
AND COMPETITIVE PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES (2010) (proposing a 13% VAT that would
cut the corporate tax to 15% and include certain provisions to offset income taxes and the
heavy burden on the poor)). Sullivan further notes that resistance to the VAT is from
conservatives who believe it will be a “money machine” to fund new and expanded
governmental entitlements and liberals who believe it is unfair in disproportionally burdening
the poor. Id. at 152.
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stunt economic growth.908 But, the real reason to avoid a VAT is that its adoption
allows politicians to avoid the tough question of reforming the income tax code and
eliminating special interest provisions.909 Indeed, one commentator, concerned that
politicians would be unable to resist continual rate increases once a VAT is
instituted, suggested expansion of tax-preferred accounts such as 401(k)s and IRAs
as a way to move toward a VAT without actually adopting one.910 The One Fund
Solution proposed herein would offer such a move.911
5. Technological Breakthrough
The last few decades have seen enormous wealth developed through technical
advances. It is possible that some such advance would produce sufficient wealth to
make reform possible if that wealth were directed toward solving the entitlement
problems. We see one possible advance in the oil and gas industry with the
revolution in fracking. The fracking techniques have created a great deal of wealth
for individuals as well as for states that have encouraged such practices.912 But states
like California have resisted development of its energy resources and other practices
on environmental grounds.913 The federal government has been slow to embrace the
new technology most noticeably in the refusal to approve the Keystone XL
pipeline.914
908
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One prediction of a bright future is:
The current deficit in retirement savings took a long time to develop, and
the resulting problems will require an equally long time to solve. But the
important point is that these are soluble problems. The United States is
still a very rich country. Growth rates have slowed in recent years, but
technology and growing prosperity in emerging markets promise renewed
robust growth going forward. If we act quickly, intelligent financial
planning can enable us to meet the current challenge.915
The fall in the price of oil is a “once-in-a-generation opportunity.”916 Some
observers see it as an opportunity to reform the energy policy and promote clean
energy with the first step being the elimination of all forms of fossil fuel subsidies
and tax breaks, the elimination of prohibitions on the export of oil and gas, and the
imposition of a tax on carbon use.917 There is an opportunity to change policies but
the priorities should include retirement, education, and healthcare, which is making
ever-increasing demands on the economy. Federal government ownership of 52% of
the lands in the west offers an opportunity for oil and gas exploration that could
provide funds directed towards solving the long-term fiscal imbalance, but most of
these lands are off limits to exploration.918 The boom in natural gas is already having
an impact in supplying cheap natural gas worldwide and could also have profound
geopolitical ramifications.919
CONCLUSION
Under Social Security, individuals receive a form of social insurance they barely
understand or are able to evaluate for 12% of their lifetime income. Indeed
projections are that the benefit to be received in the future may not be as attractive as
it appears since the funding sources seem inadequate to provide the benefit.
The One Fund Solution seeks to replace the Social Security system with an
individual account for each individual having a guaranteed real rate of return of 3%
along with the possibility of investing in broad based mutual funds after the account
reaches a certain level. Amounts in the fund will be withdrawn for retirement and
915
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other specified uses on a tax-free basis. The One Fund is sufficiently large to justify
the idea that it will, after an appropriate phase in period, be the sole tax benefited
plan for retirement savings. Other tax motivated plans will be phased out. Balances
in the One Fund at the death of the owner can be passed on to the owner’s
beneficiaries thereby creating a pattern of intergenerational wealth.
The One Fund, since it is funded by participants with after-tax dollars, will create
the same tax benefit for all persons. It is not a progressive plan but there is no reason
that government cannot structure welfare plans that will dovetail with the One Fund.
Indeed the One Fund should be expanded so that health care plans, education savings
plans, and other savings needs can be structured through the One Fund over time.
Individuals need to understand the true cost of retirement and health care to
appreciate the need to accumulate significant savings over a lifetime. The One Fund
provides that vehicle; and, should the education system provide adequate financial
literacy to its graduates, then the One Fund would be understood throughout society.
The One Fund Solution promotes freedom and human dignity as people take control
of their lives and, to some extent, realize that their tax contributions will actually
have a positive effect on the truly poor.
In the long run, the One Fund Solution would replace the need to guarantee
private pensions, which are likely to be terminated as people rely on the One Fund as
their primary source of retirement income.920 The One Fund Solution is superior to
other proposed solutions; it reduces complexity in the tax code, while promoting
responsible independent citizens, and a more open, responsible political system.
America’s fiscal problems are in the news on a daily basis, but rather than
address the problem directly, Congress and President Obama choose to continue
kicking the can down the street. This was seen in the temporary fix for the DI trust
fund that was made in the 2015 budget deal. Congress and President Obama diverted
additional funds from the Social Security tax for three years to avoid fixing the
Social Security disability program before the 2016 presidential election.921 Perhaps a
future Congress and the next President will address the problem. But the general
federal budget has already begun repaying its OASI trust fund obligations and the
repayment will continue to increase until the trust fund is exhausted sometime
around 2030. Since the federal budget is in deficit, and deficits are projected for the
indefinite future, repaying the “so-called” trust fund obligation will entail additional
borrowing and increasing the national debt. In 2030, the trust fund is exhausted and
the “legal” decision will be on Congress to raise taxes, decrease benefits, or simply
recognize that funding Social Security is a general obligation of the federal budget.
Nevertheless, the $2.8 trillion trust fund will likely have been converted to an equal
amount of public debt.922
A better solution is the One Fund Solution; and, the sooner it is adopted and the
nation addresses the fact that government cannot successfully carry the burden of
everyone’s housing, education, healthcare, and retirement and facilitates a return of
those burdens to the individuals who are able to plan for themselves, the sooner we
will find financial security.
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Everyone will feel this problem. The crisis is summarized as follows:
As it turns out, you can outrun a food shortage problem . . . and even a
population growth problem . . . but who can outrun the demographic
monster created by an aging work force, slowing population growth,
slowing economic growth, and the profligate spending that ignores
retirement savings in favor of pretending that a pay-as-you-go approach
will suffice? It turns out the very few can.923
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